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Cities are increasingly important actors in the current International System. Cities fall 
under the jurisdiction of States where they play a fundamental role in the making and 
consolidation of emerging powers. In today’s State-centred International System, cities 
are underexamined in the field of foreign policy, a domain that is exclusively that of 
national governments. Using the cases of Colombia (Bogotá) and South Africa 
(Johannesburg), this thesis draws from multilingual sources to examine the role of cities 
in the foreign policy of emerging powers of the Global South. An interdisciplinary 
approach indicates that, by drawing together debates across International Relations and 
Urban Studies literature, there is little to no place for the conceptual and operational cross 
pollination necessary to engage the increasing importance of cities in the emerging 
powers of the Global South. The weak interface between cities and States in foreign policy 
is thus failing to inform local-national government interactions over global positioning 
and masks critical national actors in the evolution of cities.  
 
Through a geopolitical analysis, this thesis engages the conceptual and operational 
ambiguity around ‘emerging powers’ by demonstrating how at both the national and city 
scale notions of ‘power resources’, ‘leadership’ and ‘international recognition’ are 
actualised in the emerging powers of Colombia and South Africa. By tracking the ways 
that Bogotá and Johannesburg operate internationally, cities are, despite the lack of 
formal acknowledgement or endorsement of the nations’ foreign affairs machinery, 
shown to be crucial contributors to their countries’ emergence in the world. 
 
An analysis of primary sources in both Colombia and South Africa shows a mismatch 
between the city and the State in foreign policy caused by dynamics occurring both at 
national and local levels. The constitutional and legal ambiguities on decentralisation and 
foreign policy found in Colombia and South Africa make it extremely difficult to 
determine the how far sub-national entities can go in their burgeoning international 
engagements. The State-centred approach to foreign policy that is found in both countries 
contributes greatly to a general disregard for the city in international relations. Finally, 
the thesis reveals how the increased importance of cities in the global agenda and the 




Bogotá or Johannesburg with an alternative space in which to defend their own city 
interests without the help of the national governments.  
 
The thesis concludes by demonstrating that, while it is important that national 
governments make sure cities have a voice in the International System, changes also need 
to be made at the domestic level, both in national and local governments, in order to 
achieve functioning levels of understanding and co-operation between the city and the 
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The International System is currently undergoing a major power shift, perhaps the largest 
in history. Former superpowers United Kingdom and France are more rapidly than not 
seeing their influence in the world overshadowed by emerging countries from the Global 
South such as China, India or Brazil. The process is so apparent that even the status of 
the United States as the sole superpower in the world is currently under debate with the 
rise of China and Russia.  
 
Beyond the recent positioning of large and powerful countries like Russia, China, India 
or Brazil, there is a group of smaller, yet increasingly important nations that are thriving. 
And while they have no aspirations of becoming superpowers or radically changing the 
rules of the International System, they are keen on shifting power relations and increasing 
their influence in the world. South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Egypt, 
Vietnam and Colombia, amongst others, are generally recognised as part of this category 
of new emerging powers from the Global South (Ardila, 2014; P. Harrison, 2015; 
Hawksworth & Chan, 2015; Huijgh, 2016; Huijgh & Warlick, 2016; Jost, 2012; Kaur & 
Kaur, 2015; G. Mohan, 2016; Nolte, 2010; É. Vieira, 2011).  
 
A parallel process is also taking place at the urban level. Population growth and higher 
urbanisation rates are turning cities into fundamental actors in the International System. 
More and more, cities are responsible for larger shares of their nations’ Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and, thus, concentrating most of the country’s economic and demographic 
power. In the Global South, this phenomenon is particularly visible. Shanghai, Bangkok, 
Cairo, Mexico City, Jakarta, São Paulo, Mumbai, Johannesburg, Istanbul and Bogotá are 
increasingly becoming important economic and financial centres, not only in their 
countries and the Global South but also in the world as a whole (Gugler, 2004).  
 
At the multilateral level, the United Nations (UN) has also recognised the importance of 
cities at the global scale. In fact, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) – set 
to become the successor framework to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) – has 
already undertaken a global dialogue to “explore the increasingly important role of cities 
in advancing progress on national and global agendas” (UNDG, 2015, p. 2). Furthermore, 
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the ‘New Urban Agenda’ adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 23 
December 2016 acknowledges the crucial importance of local governments in achieving 
sustainable development, and even calls for the strengthening of the World Assembly of 
Local and Regional Governments (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). The fact that 
cities are starting to be recognised as fundamental actors by the UN undoubtedly marks 
a crucial point for urban governments to advance their interests at the multilateral level. 
 
The debate on the emergence of cities in the international arena has taken many forms. 
From discussions around city diplomacy (Beall & Adam, 2017; K. Fischer et al., 2015; 
Marcovitch & Dallari, 2014; Nganje, 2016b; van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007) and the 
pivotal positioning of city leaders in global governance (Acuto, 2013, 2015; K. Fischer et 
al., 2015; Peirce, 2015; Yuda, 2015) to the argument that Mayors are currently ruling the 
world (Barber, 2013); from the question on whether States are failing (Curtis, 2016) and 
cities are the new countries (OECD, 2016c), to international rankings and the positioning 
of cities in the global system (Alderson & Beckfield, 2004; Beaverstock, Smith, & Taylor, 
2000; Borja, 2007; Cadena, Dobbs, & Remes, 2012; Foreign Policy, 2010; Sassen, 2001, 2010, 
2011; Taşan-Kok & Van Weesep, 2007), the stances on the emergence of cities in the 
international arena are extremely varied. However, most approaches on this topic agree 
with granting the city a pivotal place in the International System while largely bypassing 
the role of nations. The tendency is thus to push for greater decentralisation and to 
assume that sub-national governments can readily absorb additional responsibilities. 
While there may be merit in this argument, especially with respect to conventional 
developmental functions of the State, this thesis interrogates the more complex 
interactions of cites and nations in their shifting global positioning through an 
examination of the machinery of the official foreign policy of the State. 
 
In a world where countries and cities from the Global South are emerging simultaneously 
to improve their international status and create a global realignment of power, there is a 
need to reassess how the International System currently operates and which actors are 
driving it. Furthermore, given the increasing importance of emerging nations, more 
attention must be given to the particular dynamics of the Global South and the question 
of the place of their large and powerful cities within this national realignment of global 
power.  
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Although both International Relations and urban studies have been consumed by issues 
of advancement, including the rise of Southern cities and nations, the academic literature 
reveals a surprising disconnect between the emergence of countries and cities. It seems 
as if they were two parallel, separate processes with no relation to each other. Though, in 
a globalised and interconnected world, it is extremely improbable that there is no 
connection between countries and their cities as they improve their international 
standing. The International Relations scholarship focuses almost entirely on the State and 
leaves little, if any, place for the city. Urban Studies engages in a similar dynamic in which 
the city as the object of study is important enough and, therefore, can be disconnected 
from the country where it is located.  
 
Consequently, there is a need to bridge these two disciplines in order to understand the 
links between the emergence of both the country and the city. The fact that cities are 
becoming more important in a world dominated by nations is the reason why it is crucial 
to understand this interface better, especially since the conceptual gap is mirrored in an 
operational gap in which both levels of government act on their own internationally. In 
turn, there is the official foreign policy of the State on one side and the international 
engagements of local governments – also known as the foreign relations of sub-national 
entities – on the other. And when these two modes of international engagement are 
analysed together, it becomes clear that they are, at best, unlinked and uncoordinated.  
 
But linking the State and the city is no easy task. The disconnection between them is not 
only present in foreign policy, but also in other topics. For instance, the Crisis States 
Research Centre at the London School of Economics acknowledges the difficulties in 
linking the national and the urban when analysing fragile states and conflict. As with 
foreign policy, Putzel and Di John argue that the “analysis and policy discussion around 
fragile states has concentrated almost entirely on the ‘central state’, failing to see the 
particular place of cities in state formation historically and the contemporary importance 
of growing cities as key sites of state building and state erosion” (Putzel & Di John, 2012, 
p. V). 
 
In an endeavour to build on the national-local disconnect, the purpose of this thesis is to 
understand the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers from the 
Global South using the cases of Bogotá in Colombia and Johannesburg in South Africa. 
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By taking a close look at both literature and practice, this study aims to examine the 
relationship – or lack thereof – between the national governments of emerging powers 
from the Global South and their largest cities when designing and implementing their 
strategies to emerge in the world.  
 
The reality of the Westphalian International System, in which the State is the only legal 
actor capable of being sovereign, forms the premise of the thesis. The primary entry point 
is thus how emerging nations might better ‘see the city’ rather than how local 
governments might take on higher profile international roles. In other words, this is not 
an assessment of city development strategies or the positioning of cities in the global 
system. While the Urban Studies literature has been largely distracted by city rankings 
and the implicit hierarchy that has been given to Northern cities rather than to cities 
elsewhere, this thesis deals with a much more nuanced question about the role of two 
successful cities from the Global South that appear on that ranking – Bogotá and 
Johannesburg – but in their own countries and as part of their nation’s emerging strategy 
in the world. In other words, this study looks at how emerging countries rise in the 
hierarchy of nations and how their largest cities contribute to or detract from that process.  
 
When discussing the emergence of countries of the Global South, most of the analyses 
have been focused on the upper tier of this category, namely Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (Besada & Tok, 2014; A. F. Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008; A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 
2013; Flemes, 2007b, 2010b; Glosny, 2010; Goldman Sachs, 2007; Gratius, 2008b; 
Hawksworth & Chan, 2015; Käkönen, 2013, 2014; MacFarlane, 2006; Moreira Júnior & 
Sérgio Figueira, 2014; Nolte, 2006; Roberts, 2010; Sinha & Dorschner, 2010; J. A. Smith, 
2011; Subacchi, 2008). However, even if these four countries are the most influential 
Southern powers in today’s world, there are a large number of other nations also striving 
to achieve the emerging power status. This thesis focuses on the next tier of countries, 
those whose size, power resources and overall capabilities are smaller, but still big 
enough to have an impact in the International System.  
 
The two case studies selected for this thesis are Colombia and South Africa. Both are 
countries with troubled pasts that have managed to radically shift their domestic and 
international performances during the last two decades. Also, they both were classified 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and HSBC in 2009 as part of CIVETS (Colombia, 
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Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) (Allen, 2011; América Económica, 
2011; Guerra-Barón, 2014; É. Vieira, 2011), a set of new emerging powers whose economic 
and political performance in the world are expected to improve considerably in the 
upcoming years.  
 
Their largest cities, Bogotá and Johannesburg respectively, have also undergone similar 
transformations. These are cities that have been able to effectively overcome some of the 
socio-economic problems associated with the Southern urban while, at the same time, 
becoming their nations’ unquestionable powerhouses. As their countries emerge, the 
cities have also turned into regional, and even global financial and economic centres.  
And although there is still a long way to go, Bogotá and Johannesburg are slowly 
abandoning their stereotype of being the materialisation of crime and violence.  
 
By using the cases of Colombia and Bogotá, and South Africa and Johannesburg, this 
thesis aims to abandon the usual Euro-North American approach to both International 
Relations and Urban Studies, and focus on emerging middle powers from the Global 
South. This geopolitical shift is important for three reasons. First, as the literature shows, 
there is little dialogue between the two disciplines and therefore the relationship between 
countries and cities in the design and implementation of official foreign policy has not 
been conceptualised. Second, there is not enough understanding of the interaction 
between cities and countries in the emerging strategies of countries from the Global 
South. Finally, there is a tendency to contrast the experiences of cities and nations within 
their regions (Africa or Latin America) and to eschew the difficulties presented by 
selecting cases with varied linguistic, administrative and cultural traditions. 
 
In order to answer the main research question on what is the role of cities in the official 
foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global South, this thesis engages with some 
secondary questions designed to contribute to the debate around the topic at hand. It tries 
to find a common ground in the existing scholarship by examining whether the 
International Relations literature includes cities when assessing the power of States in the 
International System and if the States are considered by the Urban Studies Literature 
when analysing the global positioning of cities. It questions if Colombia and South Africa 
can be considered emerging powers and if Bogotá and Johannesburg can be regarded as 
emerging cities from the Global South. The thesis also inquires how Bogotá and 
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Johannesburg operationalise their importance through the official foreign policy tools 
and instruments of Colombia and South Africa. And finally, it gives an assessment of 
State-urban interactions in foreign policy in both policy and operational contexts for both 
case studies.  
 
This study highlights ambiguities in the legal and constitutional frameworks of Colombia 
and South Africa that affect their ability to include Bogotá and Johannesburg effectively 
in their foreign policy mechanisms. Also, there are conceptual and operational 
mismatches that translate into cities not being recognised or even understood when 
designing and implementing foreign policy in Bogotá and Pretoria. Even when they share 
similar interests and are part of the same country, cities tend to be disregarded or 





Even when States are the fundamental subject of study for this thesis, cities are also a 
crucial part of the analysis. Consequently, this thesis draws from the International 
Relations scholarship as well as from Urban Studies. It does not try to fuse the two 
disciplines; instead, it lies between them in order to assess their interfaces through an 
interdisciplinary approach.  
 
Ramadier argues that the linear notion of progress “has been responsible for the 
compartmentalization of knowledge into a myriad of separate disciplines” (Ramadier, 
2004, p. 423) which, in turn, “have led to the creation of more and more new disciplines, 
to the extent that they have begun to overlap” (Ramadier, 2004, p. 424). This phenomenon 
can be clearly seen in the topic of this thesis as it engages with two different disciplines – 
International Relations and Urban Studies – that start to overlap when analysing the role 
of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers.  
 
Located at the core of the social sciences, there has been a proliferation of information 
around the ‘multi-disciplinary’ debate, a term used by Choi and Pak “when the nature of 
involvement of multiple disciplines is unknown or unspecified” (B. Choi & Pak, 2006, p. 
351). The three most common terms found in this debate are ‘multidisciplinarity’, 
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‘transdisciplinarity’ and ‘interdisciplinarity’, each one of them with its own specific 
meaning and, therefore, are not interchangeable (Alvargonzález, 2011; B. Choi & Pak, 
2006). Nonetheless, the way in which each one of these concepts deals with the 
relationship between disciplines has created not only serious critiques but also tensions 
amongst academics (Baron, 1999; Brewer, 1999; Klein, 2008; Ramadier, 2004). 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, interdisciplinarity, rather than trans- or 
multidisciplinarity, has been selected as the substantive methodological issue as it allows 
to abandon the isolation in which both International Relations and Urban studies work 
in relation to each other. This isolation would inevitably lead to diminished and 
regressive reductions (Merino Fernández, 1982) on the understanding of the role of cities 
in the foreign policy of emerging powers. Instead, interdisciplinarity becomes a question 
of structurally coordinating the plurality of dimensions involved in the unity of the 
phenomenon (Merino Fernández, 1982). In other words, it “analyzes, synthesizes and 
harmonizes links between disciplines into a coordinated and coherent whole” 
(Alvargonzález, 2011, p. 388). It is, in turn, a useful tool when addressing a common topic 
across disciplines such as cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global 
South. 
 
Also, considering not only that there is a clear overlap between the two bodies of 
literature in the topic of this thesis but also that the interface between them still needs to 
be conceptualised, the simple juxtaposition found in multidisciplinarity, that is, being 
together without a manifest relationship between them or without any of them being 
modified or enriched (B. Choi & Pak, 2006; Merino Fernández, 1982) falls short for the 
needs of this thesis. Transdisciplinarity is also inadequate for this study as it is inspired 
by the idea that everything is intertwined, but avoids the risk of condensing all 
phenomena into a single science or body of literature (Alvargonzález, 2011; Merino 
Fernández, 1982) or, as stated by Lawrence, a “fusion of disciplines” (Lawrence & 
Després, 2004, p. 400). Now, while there is a tendency to favour transdisciplinarity 
because it is more complex (Ramadier, 2004) and innovative, in this context, it is less 
useful as the two disciplines of Urban Studies and International Relations have rarely sat 
in conversation prior to this point.  
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Consequently, the interdisciplinarity in this thesis is conceptualised to generate a 
dialogue as a precursor to further discussions between the two fields that might follow. 
The existing scholarship shows not much has been done on this topic; and because 
International Relations and Urban Studies mostly ignore the existence of the other, there 
is an evident gap in the literature between the two disciplines. By exploring this gap, this 
study aims to contribute to an interdisciplinary dialogue between the two fields that 
allows for a better understanding of each other’s areas of research and creates the 
necessary bridges to come to terms on the real role of cities in the foreign policy of 
emerging powers of the Global South. It also rests on a systematic interrogation and 
critique of the existing literature, both in its components and then in relation to each 
other.  
 
In addition to being interdisciplinary, this thesis is also multilingual. This is a generic 
problem, but one that is particularly important in forging new intellectual pathways from 
the widening of empirical reference points. Mabin (2014) argues that a debate about the 
Global South limited to the Anglophone scholarship is bound to be inevitably partial. On 
this topic, Choplin states that  
 
the aim should not be to idealise anglophone scientific output to the point of creating a new 
hegemonic model of thought. It would be more stimulating to encourage dialogue between 
researchers from continental Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as 
– and, indeed, above all – from Southern countries (Choplin, 2012, p. 3). 
 
There are two different issues at this point. One, the partiality of an all-Anglophone 
debate, and two, the need to promote a dialogue across the North-South – and perhaps 
also the East-West – divide. They complement each other. A North-South dialogue could 
in fact be done only in English and it would ignore – although maybe not voluntarily – 
any knowledge produced in other languages. Salvatore argues that Latin American 
scholars had been criticising Eurocentrism long before the topic was studied in North-
Atlantic universities (Salvatore, 2010). He talks about Eurocentrism, but the argument can 
be expanded to other topics. In turn, for the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging 
powers from the Global South, it is possible to find useful information in other languages 
that enriches the debate and fills gaps found in the English language literature. 
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On the same topic, this thesis deals with two case studies from the South: Colombia and 
South Africa. And while the latter is essentially English-speaking, most of the information 
and literature available for the former is in Spanish. The fact that sources are written in 
different languages is one of the reasons for the disconnect between the International 
Relations and Urban Studies fields. Consequently, a multilingual approach to the case 
studies decreases the possibility of a partialised analysis as an even more extensive body 
of material can be included. It also allows the author to engage in interviews and access 
sources such as government documents and reports in their original language. This thesis 
has used materials mainly in Spanish, English and Portuguese, and to a lesser extent, 
French and German.  
 
The multilingual element, and the imperative of translation, is present throughout the 
thesis. In order to make it legible, when the information is available in a different 
language, an English translation is always provided, while the original text has been 
included in a footnote. All translations in this study have been done by the author. In 
most cases, the author tried to keep the translations as close to the original as possible, 
however there are instances where concepts have different meanings in different 
languages and they have been pointed out in the text. Also, the thesis is written following 
the South African English spelling norms. Other forms of English spelling might be found 
by the reader only in direct quotations.  
 
This thesis follows the Spanish convention in a number of issues. First, it is written in the 
third person in its entirety. Second, it considers the Spanish geographical division of the 
world in five and not six continents. Therefore, the ‘American continent’ refers to the 
whole of the Americas, namely North America, Central America and the Caribbean, and 
South America. Also, related to the previous issue and unless it is used in a direct quote, 
‘United States of America’ is used instead of ‘America’. Lastly, the thesis uses the word 
State – with a capital S – in the same way “Estado” – with a capital E – is used in Spanish. 
Using the word ‘State’ solves the ambiguity of the notion of the ‘nation-state’ which in 
International Relations is a much bigger concept. It also acknowledges that the State has 
an expression at the local level but, for the purposes of this thesis, the concept refers to 
the national level, the country. 
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Apart from interdisciplinarity and multilingualism, this thesis uses the case study 
method. According to Duminy et al, “what is distinctive about the case study method is 
the process of drawing conceptual, spatial and temporal boundaries around a case unit, 
and granting special prominence and interest to what occurs within these boundaries” 
(Duminy, Andreasen, Lerise, Odendaal, & Watson, 2014, p. 22). Furthermore, this notion 
of ‘boundedness’ is essential in the case study method (Flyvbjerg, 2011). These 
boundaries are clearly found in the two case studies of this thesis: Colombia (and Bogotá) 
and South Africa (and Johannesburg). Also, as the process of ‘emerging’ – both for States 
and cities – is made up of “operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than 
mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2009, p. 9), the case study method provides the 
necessary tools to address ‘dynamic processes’ such as the role of cities in the foreign 
policy of emerging powers from the Global South (Flyvbjerg, 2011).  
 
Following the works of Robinson (2002, 2006, 2011a, 2011b, 2016) and McFarlane (2010), 
the two case studies in this thesis abandon the traditional focus on the North in 
International Relations and Urban Studies. Instead, it assesses two Southern countries – 
Colombia and South Africa – and their largest cities – Bogotá and Johannesburg – in an 
effort to achieve four objectives: 1) to fill the previously identified gap both in the 
literature and in practice; 2) to come to terms about the distinctiveness of both cases; 3) to 
place them in the broader Southern context; and 4) to reveal the particularities of the 
emerging processes for Colombia (and Bogotá) and South Africa (and Johannesburg) 
(McFarlane, 2010). 
 
This thesis follows Robinson’s call to move beyond comparative studies and propose an 
account of ‘ordinary cities’ (Robinson, 2002). Consequently, this is not a comparison 
between Colombia and South Africa or Bogotá and Johannesburg. The case study method 
allows for an illustration of the importance of cities in the foreign policy of emerging 
powers of the Global South with reference to more than one example, but not in 
comparison to each other, partly because the data is not good enough and the metrics are 
not clear. Given the differences between Colombia and South Africa, the importance of 
having two case studies is that it demonstrates that the processes of emergence and the 
role cities play in them varies from one country to another.  
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Finally, in order to be able to understand the operational context of the interaction 
between national and local spheres of government in foreign policy in both Colombia 
and South Africa, interviews to people at both levels were conducted. The interviewees 
were selected mainly from government agencies involved in foreign policy such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Colombia, the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation in South Africa, the cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg and the Colombian 
Agency for International Co-operation. Scholars working on the international relations of 
both countries and cities were also interviewed. All interviews were semi-structured, 
conducted personally by the author in Bogotá, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Paris and 
Medellín, and interviewees were informed that their responses would be used as primary 
sources for this thesis. 
 
 
1.2. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
Following the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on the interface 
between the International Relations and the Urban Studies scholarships. It provides an 
interdisciplinary approach to the role of the city in International Relations and the role of 
the State in Urban Studies in order to understand the points of contact between them, or 
the lack thereof. By interrogating and critiquing the paucity of material linking the city 
and the State in foreign policy, this chapter discovers an embryonic relationship between 
the two bodies of literature that creates a gap in knowledge.  
 
Chapter 3 engages with a conceptual analysis of four key International Relations concepts 
that are crucial to understand the State as the main object of study for this thesis and its 
role in the International System. It then analyses the power shift in the world today with 
an emphasis on emerging powers from the Global South. Using data from international 
banks and organisations, the chapter demonstrates how emerging countries will overtake 
some of the traditional middle powers and increase their influence in the International 
System.  
 
Chapter 4 assesses the conceptual debate on power hierarchies in the International 
System. Given the lack of agreement in the literature, especially around emerging powers 
and other similar concepts, this chapter takes previous contributions on the topic and 
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adapts them to propose a hierarchy in the International System that responds to the 
particular needs of this thesis. The analysis includes Nolte’s three variables for 
understanding the power of countries in the world – power resources, leadership and 
international recognition – and uses them to build up on the concept of ‘emerging power’.  
 
The first part of the case study analysis starts in Chapters 5 and 6. By including the five 
dimensions of power resources – territorial, demographic, economic, socio-economic and 
military – proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al., these two chapters engage in a geopolitical 
analysis of the power resources of the two countries and cities. Colombia and Bogotá are 
assessed in Chapter 5, and South Africa and Johannesburg in Chapter 6. The aim of these 
chapters is to demonstrate that both countries and cities can be classified as ‘emerging’ 
and understand the importance of the city for national power resources.  
 
Chapter 7 is divided in two parts, each one of them assessing the leadership and 
international recognition of Colombia and South Africa respectively. After examining the 
power resources of each country in Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter analyses what 
Colombia and South Africa have done with what they have in terms of foreign policy and 
what consequences their power resources and leadership have had in their international 
recognition as emerging powers. Simultaneously, the chapter evaluates the role Bogotá 
and Johannesburg have played in their countries’ emerging strategies. 
 
Throughout the thesis, it becomes evident that neither countries nor cities are talking to 
each other in their emerging processes. This gap is not only present in the literature but 
it is also operational. By using predominantly primary sources to zoom in on the 
disconnection between national and local governments in foreign policy, Chapter 8 
addresses the constitutional and legal reasons that prevent cities and countries from co-
operating in foreign policy, while Chapter 9 analyses the operational and practical 
reasons for this disconnection. After acknowledging the crucial importance of Bogotá and 
Johannesburg in their countries’ power resources, leadership and international 
recognition, this chapter explores the practice of foreign policy in both countries to 
explain the mismatch and provides six reasons why it exists. 
 
Finally, Chapter 10 provides the key conclusions of this thesis. Evidence shows that the 
disconnection found between International Relations and Urban Studies literature is also 
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present in the practice. As the relationship between the city and the State in foreign policy 
has not been conceptualised, this translates into an operational gap. The cases of 
Colombia and South Africa show that cities and States are emerging in two parallel, 
disconnected processes; this final chapter explains the reasons behind that disconnection 




: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND URBAN 
STUDIES: TWO DISCIPLINES, AN EMBRYONIC 
RELATIONSHIP
 
Every city is the algebraic sum of its parts. Its ugly and its sad; its splendid and its squalid. 
This may be obvious, but that is precisely why we forget. Then, the city is subjected to the 
eye that expurgates it. And it lies there, solvent or prostrated, dazzling or shabby1 
(Translated by the author from Garcés González, 2010, p. 22). 
When analysing cities, Garcés González argues, it is usually difficult to look at the full 
picture; not every part of the city is included and, therefore, its dynamics cannot be fully 
understood. Now, his insight can also be used for subjects other than the city, and in this 
case, the way States have been analysed in the International Relations scholarship: Every 
country is the algebraic sum of its parts. And then the questions arise. Are the eyes that 
expurgate the role of the country in the International System neglecting the city as a 
fundamental part of the whole? The opposite question is also relevant: Are the eyes that 
expurgate the city in the International System neglecting its role as a fundamental part of 
a country’s power?  
 
These questions are crucial when trying to come to terms with the role played by cities in 
the official foreign policy of emerging powers as they link two of the key concepts in this 
thesis: cities and States. This is important because these two concepts tend to be presented 
as isolated, unlinked and not related to each other in the existing literature. In order to 
interrogate the problem, there are two bodies of literature or communities of academic 
practice that must be brought into a dialogue – International Relations and Urban Studies. 
To date, despite the widespread uptake of interdisciplinarity research, these are two 
realms that seem to act independently without having much regard for each other. 
Typically, the Urban Studies scholarship understands cities as actors that are powerful 
enough to act on their own in the International System. At the same time, the 
International Relations discipline is almost entirely State-centred leaving no place for the 
                                                 
1 Original text in Spanish: “Toda ciudad es la suma algebraica de sus partes. Sus feas y sus tristes; sus 
esplendorosas y sus paupérrimas. Esto puede ser obvio, pero por ello, precisamente, se nos olvida. 
Entonces la ciudad se somete al ojo que la expurga. Y queda solvente o postrada, deslumbrante o 
lamentable” (Garcés González, 2010, p. 22). 
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city in its analysis. A central concern for this thesis is to interrogate points of contact 
between them. 
 
Consequently, as this thesis falls on the interface between International Relations and 
Urban Studies, the present chapter rubs these two disciplines against each other. 
Moreover, it aims to build on this interaction using the concept of sovereignty that places 
cities within the framework of a State. The main objective of this chapter is thus to identify 
the points of contact between cities and States in international relations, or, if it is the case, 
to identify and analyse the lack of contact.  
 
Given the paucity of material linking the city and the State in foreign policy, this thesis 
engages in an interdisciplinary analysis (Connell, 2004; Jacobs & Frickel, 2009; Lawrence 
& Després, 2004; Merino Fernández, 1982; Reybold & Halx, 2012). Drawing on divergent 
bodies of work to address the role of cities in emerging powers allows for a better 
understanding of two key issues: First, the role played by cities in the International 
Relations literature, and second, the role played by States in the Urban Studies 
scholarship. At the end, it will be possible to understand whether they are two self-
absorbed, isolated disciplines that do not communicate, or if there are contacts but they 
are provisional and embryonic, or finally, if there is a fluent, but until now unlinked, 
dialogue between the fields of International Relations and Urban Studies. 
 
The global system is multilingual and, as such, the specific empirical cases that inform 
this thesis are grounded in different linguistic traditions. In other words, they include not 
only different linguistic sources but also various linguistic cultures and practices. This 
chapter draws in the available literature published mainly in English, Spanish and 
Portuguese with a few additional documents in French and German. Including 
documents in different languages allows for a more thorough understanding of the 
scholarship as it takes authors from Latin America, Europe, North America, Africa and 
Asia into consideration and, therefore, brings together a comprehensive international 
view on the subject (Fitzgerald, 2003; Leonard, 2013; Mabin, 2014).  
 
To highlight the traditionally unconnected accounts of cities and States in the global 
system, the remainder of this chapter is structured in three parts. The first one looks at 
International Relations as a State-centred discipline. It starts by analysing the 
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Westphalian concept of sovereignty in the almost entirely city-blind dominant 
International Relations theories. Then, it considers the changes brought into the world 
system by globalisation in the 20th and 21st centuries and how they have created a new 
place not only for cities but also for city leaders as actors in the international arena. This 
section ends with an analysis on emerging powers from the Global South and the existing 
silences on the role of cities in the literature. Noting the very broad terrain of Urban 
Studies and the extensive debate about which issues should be prioritised (Parnell & 
Pieterse, 2016; Robinson, 2016; Robinson & Roy, 2016), the second part highlights three 
specific trends in the Urban Studies scholarship that relate directly to the thesis’ central 
issue of the role of cities in emerging powers: the shift towards cities in the Global South; 
the way cities tend to bypass the State in today’s International System; and the cities as 
epicentres of a country’s power resources. Finally, the chapter ends with a third section 
on ‘paradiplomacy’, a useful interdisciplinary bridge that links cities and International 
Relations in the literature. The practice of paradiplomacy will be further explored and 
positioned in relation to official foreign policy of the States of Colombia and South Africa 
in Chapters 8 and 9.  
 
 
2.1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, A STATE-CENTRED DISCIPLINE 
 
2.1.1. WESTPHALIA AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE: NO PLACE FOR 
THE CITY 
 
Since the creation of the State and the subsequent concept of sovereignty2 at the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648 (Goss, 1948), scholars dealing with the dominant International 
Relations theories have been fascinated by the notion of the State as one of the key actors 
– if not the most important actor – in the International System. Realists such as Hans J. 
Morgenthau argue that “the nation-state appears as the main and almost exclusive 
referent in International Relations” and the “final point of reference of contemporary 
foreign policy” (Morgenthau, 1986, p. 20). Furthermore, Morgenthau understands the 
                                                 
2 Westphalia is commonly accepted as the birthplace for the concept of sovereignty. According to Daniel 
Philpott: “It made the sovereign state the legitimate political unit. It implied that basic attributes of 
statehood such as the existence of a government with control of its territory were now […] the criteria for 
becoming a state. Finally, as it came to be practiced, the Treaty removed all legitimate restrictions on a 
state's activities within its territory” (Philpott, 1995, p. 364). 
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State as the predominant and monolithic actor of International Relations, as a ‘black box’ 
whose actions are nothing but rational. He even goes as far as writing the word ‘State’ 
with a capital S to emphasise its importance as the sole actor in the International System, 
whereas ‘national interest’ – as opposed to ‘national interests’ – is written in singular, 
assuming there is only one interest and it is defined by and for the wellbeing of the State 
(Carvajal, 2007). Consequently, realists disregard the role of any actors other than the 
State in international politics.  
 
While realism is the quintessential State-centred International Relations theory, other 
important theories abandon the notion of the State as the only actor in International 
Relations but keep it at the core of the discussion. For example, institutionalists such as 
Robert Keohane share the realists’ vision that the International System is anarchic and 
States as its crucial actors (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005) are self-interested, but introduce new 
actors such as international institutions3 that can overcome the uncertainty that 
undermines co-operation between States (Keohane, 1984; Slaughter, 2011). Although 
institutionalists include other actors in the equation, these are limited to institutions and 
organisations that bring together a group of States. Therefore, their focus still lies on the 
Westphalian importance of sovereignty where States are the most important actor in 
International Relations. Cities and other non-State actors are not referred to in any of the 
institutionalist literature. 
 
Liberals have also included other players in the debate. Individuals and private groups 
are considered as fundamental actors of world politics and determinants of the behaviour 
of the State in the International System (Moravcsik, 1998). Amongst the liberals, Andrew 
Moravcsik in particular argues that “the relationship between states and the surrounding 
domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state 
behaviour by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences” (Moravcsik, 
1998, p. 516). This liberal fundamental premise can be restated in terms of three core 




                                                 
3 Slaughter defines these new actors as “a set of rules, norms, practices and decision-making procedures 
that shape expectations” (Slaughter, 2011). 








THE PRIMACY OF SOCIETAL 
ACTORS 
 
The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and 
private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and 
who organise exchange and collective action to promote differentiated 
interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting 




States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic 
society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state 





The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state 
behaviour. 
Source: Adapted from Moravcsik, A. (1998). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. 
International Organization, 52(1), p. 516-520. 
 
The preceding paragraphs show that, even if its role in the world is understood from 
different points of view and different levels of importance, the State and its relations with 
other States have been at the heart of almost every discussion in International Relations 
during the last few centuries. But why is this important? Because, being as State-centred 
as it is, the field of International Relations has continuously neglected cities – amongst 
other non-State actors – in its efforts to understand and explain the International System. 
Even in today’s world where cities are key actors of globalisation (Blank, 2006; Curtis, 
2011, 2014; Robinson, 2011a; Taylor, Hoyler, Walker, & Szegner, 2001), the main 
International Relations debates are still almost completely city-blind. 
 
It could be argued that cities have indeed been indirectly included – however, not 
mentioned – in the analysis by a small number of scholars with different interests in the 
International Relations field, such as Maxi Schoeman (2003), Joseph S. Nye (2008) and 
Detlef Nolte (2010), amongst others. They agree that the role of a State in the world 
depends on how powerful it is, and that power can be determined by analysing three key 
factors: its power resources; its leadership – either globally or regionally; and its 
perception in the world4 – both by the country itself and by other countries (Hurrell, 
                                                 
4 Even though Nolte talks about “self-conception”, that concept has been replaced in this thesis by “its 
perception in the world” because there is a need for a broader understanding of the concept. In fact, Nolte 
Chapter 2: International Relations and Urban Studies: Two disciplines, an embryonic relationship 
 
19 
Cooper, González González, Ubiraci Sennes, & Sitaraman, 2000; Nolte, 2010). And cities, 
especially those that concentrate a large portion of a nation’s GDP or are at the centre of 
international fluxes, are extremely important in determining not only a country’s power 
resources, but also the way it projects itself to the outside world and how it is perceived 
by other States. As proof of the importance of cities in today’s International System, 
Michele Acuto argues that “the progressive move to the city by most of humanity, two-
thirds of which is set to be residing in urban settlements by 2050, has made cities of central 
concern to analysts of world affairs” (Acuto, 2013, p. 483). 
 
However, despite cities being central not only to the analysis of world affairs but also in 
determining a country’s power resources, explicit references to the urban issue are of 
extremely rare occurrence in the traditional International Relations literature. As stated 
by Michele Acuto,  
 
for most of the 1990s and early 2000s there has basically been no consideration for the 
urban in the dominant debate of International Relations (IR) – whether in terms of security, 
climate change, or as to the rise of China. Yet for instance, it is now quite evident how, 
short of reducing international affairs to military strategy, the growth of the People’s 
Republic of China is intrinsically tied to impressive urbanisation to degrees so vertiginous 
that some commentators have tagged it as the rise of the ‘concrete dragon’ (Acuto, 2013, p. 
482). 
2.1.2. CITIES AND THE INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT STATE-CENTRIC 
MODEL 
 
Setting aside the dominant debate of International Relations, there has been a limited 
number of scholars who have, to a certain extent, introduced the urban issue into their 
research during the last decades of the 20th century and the first of the 21st. In 1976, 
Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert presented the innovative ‘complex conglomerate 
                                                 
quotes Andrew Hurrell when he introduces the concept of “self-conception”. Both Nolte and Hurrell argue 
that the status of a country as a power in the International System – be it middle power, regional power, 
super power or any other – not only depends on “a self-created identity”, but also “on recognition by others 
– by your peers in the club [of great or middle powers], but also by smaller and weaker states willing to 
accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy” (Hurrell et al., 2000, 
p. 2; Nolte, 2010, p. 892). 
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model’ that acknowledged the existence of ‘governmental noncentral’ actors in the 
International System (Mansbach, Ferguson, & Lampert, 1976). Mansbach et al. did not 
deny the ‘paramount position’ of the State in the world, but at the same time, argued that 
“the state-centric model is increasingly irrelevant” (Tucker, 1978, p. 692). However, even 
though the authors recognised the importance of these ‘governmental noncentral’ actors 
– where cities should have been included – in the International System, the cases used in 
their study focused on the Palestinian movement, multinational corporations and the 
European Economic Community (Tucker, 1978), leaving cities once again out of the 
International Relations debate. 
 
In 1985, Michael Timberlake, a sociologist focused on globalisation and the world system 
of cities, questioned the way cities had been studied in social sciences and noted that 
urbanisation processes had, so far, been limited to the boundaries of nations or regions 
within nations (Timberlake, 1985). He argued that, although urbanisation has been one 
of the most frequently studied features of the modern world, it could “be more fully 
understood by beginning to examine the many ways in which [it] articulates with the 
broader currents of the world-economy that penetrate spatial barriers, transcend limited 
time boundaries, and influence social relations at many different levels” (Timberlake, 
1985, p. 3). Furthermore, he stated that “there have not been attempts to interpret patterns 
of urbanisation in light of a world-system perspective” (Timberlake, 1985, p. 4) – a gap 
that his book Urbanization in the world-economy  (1985) sought to fill. Nonetheless, his work 
focused on mapping the world-system’s city system, neglecting, to a large extent, the role 
of the State in his analysis. 
 
In 1990, Chadwick Alger’s paper “The World Relations of Cities: Closing the gap between 
social science paradigms and everyday human experience” exposed once again the gap 
between the urban and the international studies scholarship. He argued that viewing the 
world as a ‘system of States’ has prevented not only the study but also the “perception of 
the linkages between human settlements and worldwide phenomena” (Alger, 1990, p. 
493). Alger stated that: 
This obstruction has encouraged a division of labour between those who study connections 
between states and those who study behaviour within states. International relations 
scholars are inclined to aggregate activity that crosses state borders into state totals. The 
state paradigm inhibits them from linking this activity to specific human settlements. At 
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the same time, urban scholars have been prevented from following the threads of urban 
behaviour across state borders (Alger, 1990, pp. 493–494). 
 
 
2.1.3. CITY LEADERS AS FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS 
 
20 years after “The World Relations of Cities” (Alger, 1990), in 2010, Alger published 
another article in the journal Global Governance in which he focuses on the expanding 
governmental diversity in participants in global governance through a close look at the 
role of the International Parliamentarian Union, the International Union of Local 
Authorities and their roles within the United Nations system (Alger, 2010). The focus for 
Alger was not on role the city itself has in the International System, but on the role city 
leaders play in the world. Michele Acuto’s work, probably one of the most important 
scholars linking the city with the International System, also analyses city leaders in the 
international arena. Acuto first argued that it is important to “understand the city not 
solely as a place but also as an agent in world affairs” (Acuto, 2010, p. 427), and that:  
 
For [International Relations], the importance of paying attention to global cities goes far 
beyond there being inspiration for a more urban-conscious theory of international politics. 
Contemporary global cities challenge our traditional and IR-dominated theoretical frames 
of reference, bypassing scalar (globe, state, region) as well as political (supranational, 
governmental, regional and local) hierarchies and disrupting the Westphalian system of 
sovereignty. In their activities, these cities stand as a reminder that the governmentality of 
the milieu in which humanity's political relations unfold is far more complex, multiscalar, 
and variable than [International Relations] theory presently makes evident (Acuto, 2010, 
p. 429). 
 
Furthermore, Acuto argues that there is a “need to pay some careful attention to the 
leaders at the helm of these cities as key drivers in this internationalization, both 
theoretical as well as diplomatic, of the city in the twenty-first century” (Acuto, 2013, p. 
482).  
 
Other important studies that focus on the role of city leaders in the world are Brian 
Hocking’s book Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered 
Diplomacy (Hocking, 1993), Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating with Paradiplomacy in 
Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments (Aldecoa & Keating, 1999) and 
Chapter 2: International Relations and Urban Studies: Two disciplines, an embryonic relationship 
 
22 
Heidi Hobb’s City Hall Goes Abroad: The Foreign Policy of Local Politics (Hobb, 1994). 
Hocking debates the ‘localisation’ as many sub-national actors – and their authorities – 
respond to pressures generated outside the national borders while, at the same time, they 
aim to enhance their possibility to manoeuvre in the International System. Aldecoa and 
Keating focus their work on the role local government leaders play in the constitution of 
international organisations such as APEC or the European Union, while Hobb takes a 
close look at the activism of city leaders within the framework of an ‘active city’ in the 
international arena.  
 
But even with some authors dealing with the increasing importance of cities and their 
leaders in global affairs, the International Relations literature on the role of cities in the 
world is still extremely limited. Acuto stated that “[a]lbeit still partly relegated to spare 
theorisations, the political scholarship on the growing importance of urban players in 
world affairs has seen a moderate resurgence in the past years, after more than two 
decades of conspicuous marginality” (Acuto, 2013, p. 482). This resurgence has taken 
mostly two forms: “magazines such as The Economist and popular fora such as Chatham 
House have focused on the relevance of urbanisation in world affairs” (Acuto, 2013, p. 
483). While these theorisations offer insights into the role of cities in globalisation, they 
do not speak to the role of cities within emerging powers in the International System. 
 
 
2.1.4. EMERGING POWERS AS CITY-LESS PLACES? 
 
If cities are almost absent in the main International Relations debates, they are even more 
so in the literature that aims to explain the rise of new emerging powers in the 
International System. When looking at the existing International Relations scholarship, it 
seems as if emerging economies such as Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, 
Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico or Colombia were city-less places. By exploring this literature, 
it is almost impossible to determine whether India’s growth is linked to its impressive 
urbanisation, or how many cities are fuelling China’s emergence as a world power, or 
even if Brazil’s economic capacity is only located in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, or if it 
is spread throughout its territory.  
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Therefore, in order to determine whether or not cities have been studied – or at least 
mentioned – as a foreign policy tool or as an international actor in the emerging powers 
literature, the academic sources in Table 2.2. were reviewed.  
 
TABLE 2.2. MULTILINGUAL SOURCES FROM THE GLOBAL NORTH AND GLOBAL SOUTH 
LANGUAGE FROM THE GLOBAL NORTH FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
SPANISH Nolte (Flemes, Nolte, & Wehner, 2011; Nolte, 1992, 2006); 
Flemes (Flemes et al., 2011; Pastrana Buelvas, Jost, & 
Flemes, 2012; Velosa Porras, 2012): Gratius (2008a, 2008b); 
Nye (1990a); Steinberg (2008); Sanahuja (2014); Freres 
(2013); Lamo de Espinosa (2010); Suárez Sipmann (2011) 
Pastrana Buelvas (Pastrana Buelvas, 2011b; 
Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012); Lechini 
(Lechini, 2006; Lechini & Giaccaglia, 2016); 
de Sousa (2007a, 2007b, 2008); Ardila 
(Ardila, 2014, 2015; Ardila, Cardona, & 
Ramírez, 2005); Guerra-Barón (2014); 
Carvajal (2009, 2012); Tokatlián (2007); 
Vieira (2011); Gutiérrez Sanín (2011); 
Bonilla Montenegro (2014); Salama & 
Fernández (2014); Alcalde Cardoza (2010) 
ENGLISH Gray (1988); Tammen (Tammen et al., 2000); Thies (2014); 
de Bruyn (2013); Patrick (2010); Huijgh (Huijgh, 2016; 
Huijgh & Warlick, 2016); Schirm (2006); Nolte (Nel & Nolte, 
2010; Nolte, 2008, 2010; Nolte & Hoffmann, 2007; Nolte & 
Wehner, 2013); Harris (2005); Chin (2010); Besada (Besada 
& Tok, 2014); Cooper (A. F. Cooper, 1997, 1998; A. F. Cooper 
& Antkiewicz, 2008; A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013; A. F. 
Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal, 1991; Hurrell et al., 2000; T. M. 
Shaw, Cooper, & Antkiewicz, 2007); Nye (1988, 1990, 1992, 
2002, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013); Schwengel (2008); Subacchi 
(2008); Prys (2010); Stewart-Ingersoll (Stewart-Ingersoll & 
Frazier, 2012); Flemes (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013; Ebert, 
Flemes, & Strüver, 2012; Flemes, 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Flemes 
& Castro, 2016; Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2011; Flemes & 
Wojczewski, 2010); Hurrell (Hurrell, 2006, 2008; Hurrell et 
al., 2000); S. MacFarlane (2006); Kappel (2010); 
Hawksworth (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015); Ryerson 
(Ryerson & Dewitt, 2006); Scholvin (2010); Goldstein 
(2001); Väyrynen (1979); Käkönen (2013, 2014); Stairs 
(1998); Hancock (2007); Morgenthau (1946, 1949, 1964, 
1967, 1973); Layne (1993); Destradi (2008, 2010); James 
(1990); Schraeder (2001); Turner (2009, 2011); Pape (2005); 
Ikenberry (2008); Glosny (2010); Huntington (1999); 
Roberts (2010); Jacques (2009); Dieckhoff (2014); Keohane 
(1969, 1984); Weitz (2012); Müller & Steyaert (2013); 
Allison (2008); Goble (2011) 
Bijian (2005); Mahbubani (2005, 2009); Tok 
(Besada & Tok, 2014); Van der Westhuizen 
(D. Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Van 
der Westhuizen, 1998); Vital (1967); Ružić 
(2013); Choi (2009); Cornelissen 
(Cornelissen, 2010; Cornelissen, Cheru, & 
Shaw, 2012); Gupta (1975); Chenoy & 
Chenoy (2007); de Almeida (2007); Sinha 
(Sinha & Dorschner, 2010); Korkut & 
Civelekoğlu (2012); Ogunnubi & Isike 
(2015); Zysk (2009); Kenkel & Martins 
(2016); Louw-Vaudran (2016); Rasheed 
(1995); Mohan & Kapur (2015); Malamud 
(2011); Harrison (2014); Alden (Alden & Le 
Pere, 2009; Alden & Soko, 2005; M. A. 
Vieira & Alden, 2011); Schoeman (2003); 
Pastrana Buelvas (2011a); Khilnani 
(Khilnani et al., 2012); Vigevani & 
Cepaluni (2007); Ismayilov (2012); Özkan 
(2010); Southall (1994); Cunha Leite (2011); 
Kaur & Kaur (2015); Landsberg 
(Landsberg, 2011; Landsberg & Georghiou, 
2016); Novăcescu (2013) 
OTHER 
LANGUAGES 
Flemes (Dördrechter, Flemes, Strüver, & Wojczewski, 2010; 
Flemes, 2010a, 2010b; Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2014; Flemes & 
Gomes Saraiva, 2014; Flemes & Seith, 2014); Humphrey & 
Messner (2006) 
Njoya (2010); Cunha Leite (2007); Pereira 
Pinto (2008); Moreira Júnior & Sérgio 
Figueira (2014); Brigagão & Seabra (2011) 
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A close look at the existing scholarship across languages that focuses on emerging powers 
and the issue of power in the International System, led to four key findings. First, 
irrespective of the geographical origin or theoretical background of the scholars, their 
focus is almost entirely on the State. Second, references to the countries’ economies, their 
national governments or their foreign policies can be found, while the urban has no 
relevance in their analysis. Third, only nine documents mentioned the word ‘city’ or 
made some kind of marginal reference to any city in the countries being analysed. And 
fourth, apart from world city rankings that usually include cities in the Global South such 
as Shanghai, Mexico City, Istanbul, Johannesburg or Bogotá, researchers and scholars 
working on emerging powers have failed to recognise the crucial role that the urban has 
played in the rise of countries of the global south. There is, therefore, a generalised silence 
that translates into cities being either overlooked or undervalued, especially in the 
International Relations literature dealing with emerging powers. 
 
 
2.1.5. EVEN IN SILENCE, CITIES ARE PRESENT – A FEW EXCEPTIONS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE 
 
Nonetheless, even in silence, cities are present. Very few references to the city have been 
made in the literature addressing the issue of emerging powers, but these are not only 
particularly specific and limited but also extremely scarce. Four different ways in which 
cities have been marginally included in this scholarship can be identified. It must be 
noted, however, that only the first one – mega-events and cities in the Global South – 
recognises the city as part of the power resources of emerging powers in the International 
System. 
 
The first, and probably the most important one, focuses on what Martin Müller and Chris 
Steyaert describe as “the geopolitics of organising mega-events” (Müller & Steyaert, 
2013). Mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic Games, the Rugby World 
Cup or even the Eurovision song contest “are considered the ultimate trophy in the 
intensified competition for public attention and investment” (Müller & Steyaert, 2013, p. 
139) because of their ability “to affect whole economies and […] receive sustained global 
media attention” (Müller & Steyaert, 2013, p. 139). As stated by Nolte (2010), two of the 
key requirements for a country to become an emerging power are its will to go global and 
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its international recognition, and as a consequence, the organisation of mega-events turns 
out to be an extremely useful tool for national governments as it has a direct impact on 
both indicators.  
 
The important issue on the topic of organising mega-events is the fact that many of them 
take place in one city and, although some of them are country-oriented, such as the FIFA 
or Rugby world cups, even then, the role of cities as hosts is crucial. Cities are, therefore, 
used by countries and are “indicative of this process of image construction often called 
‘imagineering’” (Müller & Steyaert, 2013, p. 141). Through the use of cities, States engage 
in nation-branding, “a process by which a nation’s images can be created or altered, 
monitored, evaluated and proactively managed in order to enhance the country’s 
reputation among a target international audience” (Fan, 2010, p. 101).  
  
What is also remarkable is the fact that, for decades, the organisation of mega-events was 
limited to powerful countries of the Global North and its close allies5. Then, since the 
2000s, the dynamics of power in the International System changed significantly in such a 
way that allowed emerging countries of the Global South not only to bid for the most 
important mega-events, but also to organise them successfully. As a consequence, 
starting in 2008, the majority of the three largest mega-events – FIFA World Cup, the 
Olympic Games and the Rugby World Cup (Cornelissen, 2008; Ren & Keil, 2018; Slater, 
2014) –, amongst other smaller ones, are taking place in cities and countries of the Global 
South and are being used by these emerging countries as a way to increase their exposure 
and power in the world.  
 
Scarlett Cornelissen talks about three of them in particular: the Olympic Games in Beijing 
in 2008; Cape Town, Johannesburg and other South African cities during the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup; and the 2010 New Delhi Commonwealth Games (Cornelissen, 2010), but 
these are not the only ones. There is extensive literature on other various examples 
throughout the Global South such as the 2012 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia 
                                                 
5 Since the commercialisation of mega-events in the decade of 1990, the FIFA World Cup was organised by 
Italy in 1990, the United States in 1994, France in 1998, Japan and South Korea in 2002 and Germany in 2006. 
As for the Olympics, the organisation by cities of the Global North dates back to 1984 in Los Angeles and 
continues in 1988 in Seoul, 1992 in Barcelona, 1996 in Atlanta, 2000 in Sydney and 2004 in Athens. Finally, 
apart from the 1995 Rugby World Cup in South Africa, every other edition has taken place in countries of 
the Global North since its beginning in 1987.  
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(Ostapenko, 2010); the 2022 FIFA World Cup mostly in and around Doha in Qatar (De 
San Eugenio Vela & Ginesta Portet, 2013); or even the 2012 Eurovision song contest 
(Erickson, 2012) that, according to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, put Baku 
and Azerbaijan “in a new league” (Goble, 2011, p. 1) as it created “an incredible influx of 
attention for a country that [was] known, if at all, as Europe’s backwater” (Ismayilov, 
2012, p. 833). With this, the existing scholarship on the organisation of mega-events 
becomes the largest body within the International Relations literature linking the city and 
emerging powers. 
 
The second reference to the urban in the emerging powers literature does not deal with 
cities themselves, but uses them as a replacement for the State. A large variety of authors 
mention the capital city of an emerging country as a synonym for the government of the 
country they are referring to. For example, Pastrana Buelvas et al. write that “Due to the 
fact that it is a shared problem, dealing with transnational crime along the Colombia-
Brazil border calls for joint efforts in both countries. It seems like this has been very well 
understood in Bogotá and Brasilia during the past few years”6 (Translated by the author 
from Pastrana Buelvas, Jost, & Flemes, 2012, p. 435). Here, the two capital cities refer to 
the governments of Colombia and Brazil respectively.  
 
Another example can be found in the work of Flemes and Wojczewski when they replace 
the governments of many African countries with their capital cities: “Pretoria’s NEPAD 
leadership (together with Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, and Abuja) is the lever with which it can 
claim economic jurisdiction over the African geographic entity” (Flemes & Wojczewski, 
2010, p. 24). It is important to note that this practise can be better understood as a writing 
tool than as an engagement between the author and any real issues regarding the city. 
 
A third reference can only be found in two of the 166 sources consulted and mentions the 
process of urbanisation in emerging powers. However, it does so in a very light way as 
these paragraphs do not really connect with the rest of the arguments. Käkönen argues 
that “Connected to this industrialization will also be fast growth in the urbanization of 
India. By 2020 it is estimated that 140 million people will have moved to urban areas” 
                                                 
6 Original text in Spanish: “Debido a que se trata de una problemática compartida, el tratamiento del crimen 
transnacional en la frontera Colombia-Brasil demanda una labor conjunta de ambas naciones. Esto parece 
que lo han entendido muy bien Bogotá y Brasilia en los últimos años” (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 435).  
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(Käkönen, 2014, p. 91). On the other hand, when Ellen Huijgh and Jordan Warlick discuss 
the emergence of Turkey in the International System, they state that 
Around 75% of the population lives in urban areas, as compared to 50% in 1990, and 
Istanbul has doubled in size from 7.2 million people in 1990 to 15 million people or more 
in 2010. This rural to urban migration, and the trend of people moving east to west, has 
drawn a greater number of members of the religious, conservative middle class to the cities 
(Huijgh & Warlick, 2016, p. 9). 
 
Two more further references by International Relations scholars to the urban are made 
by Huijgh and Warlick (2016) who mention that “as many as 2 million Kurds now live in 
Istanbul” (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016, p. 10) or when they discuss the Gezi Park protests 
stating that they “began as a peaceful sit-in at Istanbul’s Taksim Square on May 23, 2013, 
against the government’s decision to turn one of Istanbul’s last urban public parks into a 
mall or a museum” (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016, p. 30). Once more, it seems as if the urban 
issue was a secondary topic that does not contribute greatly to the emergence of countries 
of the Global South in the eyes of International Relations scholars. 
 
Finally, cities are only used as the place where a conference, workshop, meeting or 
embassy is hosted. “The Flemish government, whether using its own offices or those of 
the Belgian foreign service, has delegates […] in 64 countries, the most important ones in 
Berlin, The Hague, London, Vienna, Washington and Pretoria”7 (Translated by the author 
from Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 328); “At the IMF’s meeting in Singapore in September 2006, 
they agreed on reforms that will give China, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey a greater 
voice” (Ikenberry, 2008, p. 33) and “The three heads of government coordinated their 
standpoints and voting behaviour for the Non‐Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in 
Havana and the 61st UN‐General Assembly, where South Africa was elected as a non‐
permanent member of the UN Security Council (2007‐2008) for the first time” (Flemes, 
2007b, p. 6). Again, cities might be mentioned, but there is no in-depth information or 
analysis about them or the role they play in their countries’ emergence in the 
International System. 
                                                 
7 Original text in Spanish: “El Gobierno flamenco, bien con sus oficinas o usando el servicio exterior belga, 
tiene delegados —«representantes diplomáticos» según la página web oficial— en un total de 64 países, 
siendo las representaciones principales las sitas en Berlín, La Haya, París, Londres, Viena, Washington y 
Pretoria” (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 328). 




To conclude, after taking a close look at the existing International Relations scholarship 
on emerging powers, it can be argued that the vast majority of it is almost completely 
city-blind. The field of International Relations proved to be, once more, a city-less space; 
one that deals with the State as a central actor but, as stated by Garcés González (2010), 
fails to understand it as a sum of its parts. The city is, for the most part, neglected, rejected, 
overlooked or ignored both in the Southern and Northern literatures. It is not perceived 
as necessary when addressing the key issues of the field. Using the words of de Sousa 
Santos (2010), the State exists on this side of the line while the city has been sent to the 
other side of the line, a place of the unknown where its dynamics are disregarded and its 
knowledge is marginalised. Apart from very few exceptions, the city does not matter for 
scholars working in the field of International Relations. 
 
 
2.2. URBAN STUDIES: A SHIFT TOWARDS THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
BYPASSES THE STATE 
 
From the Urban Studies perspective, the initial tendency to focus on traditional 
megacities in the Global North has started to subside by giving way to an increasing 
number of scholars dealing with cities of the Global South, especially during the past two 
decades. The consequence has been that, increasingly, cities like Beijing, Mumbai, São 
Paulo, Mexico City or Johannesburg have started to appear next to New York, London, 
Tokyo or Paris as global centres of economic and political power. It seems as if Jennifer 
Robinson’s call to “bring more cities into view in urban studies […] through a 
postcolonial critique of generalized, abstract Euro-North American analytic categories” 
(McFarlane, 2010, p. 736) is actually being carried out. But the key issue for this thesis is 
not whether or not cities of the Global South are being studied by urban scholars; the key 
issue revolves around two central questions: first, are these authors granting any 
relevance to the role of the State as its cities emerge as important actors in the 
International System? And second, is the urban scholarship considering these cities as 
part of a country’s strategy to become an emerging power in the world? Part 2.2. 
addresses these two questions by analysing urban literature exclusively on cities in the 
Global South. 
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2.2.1. THE EMERGENCE OF SOUTHERN GLOBAL CITIES AND THE ERODING 
ROLE OF THE STATE 
 
One of the most important scholars dealing with the international projection of the city is 
undoubtedly Saskia Sassen. After her earlier works on the mobility of capital and labour 
(Sassen, 1990, 1999, 2000), she focused her research on the rise of private transnational 
legal codes and supranational institutions to show how sovereignty remains an 
important concept in today’s world, while at the same time, took an important step in 
urban literature by questioning the State as the only sovereign actor in the International 
System (Sassen, 1996).  
 
Sassen moved to take a close look at the city’s role in the world, publishing The Global 
City: New York, London, Tokyo in 2001, where she popularised the term ‘global city’ – as 
opposed to the previously coined terms ‘world-city’ or ‘megacity’– by arguing that “the 
organisational side of the global economy materialises in a worldwide grid of strategic 
places” (Sassen, 2002, p. 218) and that “we can think of this global grid as constituting a 
new economic geography of centrality, one that cuts across the old North–South divide” 
(Sassen, 2002, p. 218). This is the first relevant finding for this thesis in Sassen’s work. Not 
only does she mention traditionally important cities like New York, Tokyo or Sydney as 
the major international business and financial centres, but she also introduced a new set 
of crucial strategic places that participate in this world-city group by including cities in 
emerging countries such as São Paulo, Shanghai, Bangkok, Taipei and Mexico City 
(Sassen, 2002). With that, Sassen brings parts of the Global South into her analysis of cities 
with global profile.  
 
The second relevant finding in Sassen’s work could be described as an increasing 
autonomy of these global cities with respect to the States they are part of. She introduces 
this issue by stating that “globalisation and the international human rights regime have 
contributed to the creation of operational and legal openings for non-state actors to enter 
international arenas that were once the exclusive domain of national states” (Sassen, 2002, 
p. 217). She then argues emphatically that the new linkages between global cities in 
today’s globalised world are “creating a strategic cross-border geography that [has 
bypassed] national States” (Sassen, 2002, p. 217). The key verb in her argument is to 
bypass, meaning that cities are now acquiring the ability to function in the International 
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System as individual actors without the need to rely on their countries’ official foreign 
policies. These arguments are also present in her later works, most importantly her 2011 
book Cities in a World Economy (Sassen, 2011).  
 
A similar argument can be found in the work of Yishai Blank at Tel-Aviv University in 
Israel. He argues that “in an era of globalization, cities are, again, the most prominent 
sites of the reconfiguration of the global order in which supra-national and sub-national 
entities gain control and influence over area once dominated by nation-states” (Blank, 
2006, p. 879). He continues his analysis by stating: “one could roughly divide the impact 
of globalization on cities into two main categories: first, an evolution of the complicated 
relationship between cities and global forces; second, a transformation in the traditional 
relations between localities and states” (Blank, 2006, p. 880). As a consequence, by 
questioning the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty while granting the city an 
exceptional importance in today’s globalised economy, Sassen and Blank are only two of 
the many scholars have eroded even more the almost non-existent role of the State in the 
field of Urban Studies, especially when it comes to the international projection of cities. 
 
On a different approach, Neil Brenner abandons the perception that the rise of cities in 
the international system is eroding the power of the State and, instead, talks about a ‘re-
scaled’ configuration of State territorial organisation. His analysis is based on how 
globalisation and the emergence of global cities affects the relationship between the 
national and local levels within a State while largely bypassing the role of its cities in 
international relations or foreign policy. On this topic, he states that 
 
state territorial power is not being eroded, but rearticulated and reterritorialized in 
relation to both sub- and supra-state scales. […] Currently unfolding re-scalings of 
global social space cannot be grasped through unilinear notions of 'state decline' or 
through one-sided conceptions of globalization as a place-less dynamic of 
'deterritorialization'. Contemporary reconfigurations of both urbanization patterns 
and forms of state territorial organization are best conceived as contradictory, 
contested strategies of reterritorialization through which the place-based and 
territorial preconditions for accelerated global capital circulation are being constructed 
on multiple spatial scales. I interpret global city formation and state re-scaling as 
dialectically intertwined processes of reterritorialization that have radically 
reconfigured the scalar organization of capitalism since the global economic crises of 
the early 1970s. Global city formation is linked both to the globalization of capital and 
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to the regionalization/localization of state territorial organization (Brenner, 1998, p. 
3). 
 
Another important and more recent piece, the Routledge Handbook on Cities of the Global 
South by Parnell and Oldfield (2014) is focused on the “geographical alignment in urban 
studies” and “brings into conversation a wide array of cities across the Global South – the 
‘ordinary’, ‘mega’, ‘global’ and ‘peripheral’” (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014, p. i). While the 
book provides an analysis about how cities in the Global South are rapidly changing 
global and regional economic dynamics, references to how the southern urban affects the 
power of emerging powers in the International System are extremely scarce. In fact, the 
Handbook follows the same pattern as most Urban Studies publications on cities in the 
Global South: it considers the State when analysing domestic issues such as multi-layer 
governance or decentralisation but, like Sassen and Blank, bypasses it when it comes to 
international relations. At this point, the lack of points of contact between Urban Studies 
and International Relations is evident.  
 
Taking a different approach, Ed Glaeser, in making the case that cities drive development 
success (Glaeser, 2012), engages with some success stories from cities in the Global South, 
such as Singapore, Bangalore, Gaborone or Mumbai. Most of his book discusses the steps 
followed by these and other cities to achieve what he considers a success, not only in urban 
planning, but also in other aspects such as human interactions within the cities. However, 
it is important to mention that his approach to urbanisation and the path cities 
everywhere should follow nowadays to achieve that success is completely centred on the 
Western European and North American models. In his own words: “Urban governments 
in the developing countries must do what the cities of the West did in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries” (Glaeser, 2012, p. 94). The issue is not whether that statement 
is right or wrong but whether an analysis of cities in the Global South should be carried 
out through the eyes of the Global North. The result is Glaeser’s inability to understand 
Southern cities within their own contexts and realities and, instead, through a very 
colonial approach, suggests they look to the North for solutions.  
 
There are, however, two references in his book on the relationship between the success 
stories of these cities and the repercussions they have for their countries internationally. 
In the first one, Glaeser argues that “an open city cannot exist in a closed nation” (Glaeser, 
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2012, p. 251). He explains this point by referring to the effects a change in Argentina’s 
openness to the world had on the city of Buenos Aires: 
 
At the start of the twentieth century, when Argentina was one of the world’s most open 
countries, Buenos Aires was a vibrant, international city full of English and Spanish and 
Italian and even Swedish entrepreneurs. Over the course of the century, Argentina closed 
its borders, and Buenos Aires became an insular place, whose beautiful older buildings 
reminded visitors of a more dynamic, cosmopolitan past (Glaeser, 2012, p. 251). 
 
The second reference deals with migration policies of States and the impact they have on 
the country’s economy as well as their main cities. Using the example of the United States, 
he states that: 
 
While the biggest beneficiaries of immigration into prosperous countries are the 
immigrants themselves, the United States has benefited enormously from all the talented 
people who have settled here. Cities especially benefit from an influx of talent, because 
foreigners help urban areas play their crucial role of connecting countries (Glaeser, 2012, 
p. 252). 
 
Although not extensively and in a very limited manner, Ed Glaeser becomes one of the 
few urban scholars to address the consequences national policies have on the 
international projection of the cities. However, it is interesting to notice that, for him, it is 
an inwards phenomenon. One that starts in the decisions made by the State and ends up 
affecting the city positively or negatively, depending on the case. By stating that 
“foreigners help urban areas play their crucial role of connecting countries” (Glaeser, 
2012, p. 252), Glaeser acknowledges that there clearly is a link between the city and the 
international behaviour of countries. But that is a link that he – voluntarily or 
involuntarily – ignores and, thus, evades the State once more. 
 
 
2.2.2. CITIES AS THE EPICENTRES OF A STATE’S ECONOMIC POWER 
 
The connection between cities and a country’s power resources will be discussed 
extensively in Chapters 5 and 6; however, this is a topic that infuses the Urban Studies 
literature and so is noted here for its narrow economistic understanding of why cities are 
important for nations. The economic importance of cities in the Global South was 
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discussed in “The growing economic power of cities” by Cadena, Dobbs and Remes in 
2012 when they argued that, by 2025, “many of the six hundred cities expected to generate 
60 percent of global GDP growth will be in the South” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 1). They 
did not only focus on the well-known megacities of the South but also in what they call 
the ‘middleweights’, that is, “midsized cities that are among the most powerful forces for 
global growth today” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 1). However, their main aim was to 
“demonstrate how local governments can impact the scale and speed of economic 
development in their regions and how private investment in buildings and infrastructure 
today will shape the global economy in future decades” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 1). 
 
Nonetheless, Cadena et al. (2012) did establish a link between the urbanisation rate in 
emerging countries of the Global South and their performance in the international arena, 
but did so only from an economic perspective. For example, they argued that “Latin 
America experienced a rapid phase of urbanization and today, four out of five people 
live in cities. The region’s top ten cities alone generate 30 percent of GDP” (Cadena et al., 
2012, p. 9) and that “given the importance of the top ten Latin American cities to the 
region’s economy, overall growth depends on the capacity of these cities to continue 
generating growth and improving performance” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 9).  
 
The previous approach is present in many other books and articles in the field. In his 
article “Back to the city”, Elliot Sclar argued that “the economic strength of a nation is 
nothing more than the sum of the economic strengths of its metropolitan regions” (Sclar, 
1992, p. 30), whereas Ash Amin and Stephen Graham (1997) go further in their city-
centred analysis and state that 
US cities are the core of the metropolitan areas which play a pivotal role in the national 
economy. They provide work for millions and are the home to major private employers, the 
port of entry of foreign goods, capital and workers, and the port of exit of American goods, 
services and tourists. They house many of the world’s premier institutions of commerce, 
culture and learning (Amin & Graham, 1997, p. 414)
 
Considering the manner in which the analysis is presented by the authors discussed in 
this section, a country’s growth could be understood as a direct consequence of their 
cities’ growth, and not as part of a national strategy to improve the country’s economic 
performance, which is usually also the case. The city is, again, at the centre of the debate. 
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These authors ignore other extremely important economic activities within a State such 
as mining, agriculture or tourism which, in most cases, take place outside the city limits. 
Thus, by looking at the city as an ‘independent’ actor, the scholarship fails to see it as part 
of a bigger entity, the State, whose behaviour and public policy decisions have an 
enormous impact on the city itself. 
 
However, the recent book World Cities and Nation States by Clark and Moonen (2017) tries 
to fill this gap in the literature. According to the authors, there are four dimensions of 
what they call “successful national government and world city relationships” (Clark & 
Moonen, 2017, p. 8) which can be seen in Table 2.3.: 
TABLE 2.3. FOUR DIMENSIONS OF SUCCESSFUL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND WORLD 
CITY RELATIONSHIPS 
 
World city success in its own 
right 
World city contribution to the 
national economy 
Role of national government in 
helping the world city succeed 
and compete 
Role of national government in 
managing the consequences of its 
world city for the rest of the 
nation 
 
Source: Clark, G., & Moonen, T. (2017). World Cities and Nation States. Oxford, United Kingdom: Wiley Blackwell, p. 8. 
 
 
Clark and Moonen base their analysis on four different national systems of government 
– centralised unitary systems, federal systems, specially empowered cities and 
independent city-states – to assess the intergovernmental relations between cities and 
States. What is innovative in this work is the fact that the authors cover the traditional 
approach of cities’ contribution to the national economy but go further to determine the 
role of national governments in helping its cities succeed in the world and in integrating 
its world cities to the rest of the nation. However, as it is usually the case, the analysis 
mostly considers domestic dynamics between city and State, but largely ignores the role 
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2.3. PARADIPLOMACY, A DIFFERENT PATH 
 
In the 1980s, Ivo Ducháček went a different path and introduced the concept of 
‘multivocal actors’ through which he argued that there exists a polyphony in the 
International System (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005). He established through various case studies 
that there was no longer the single voice of the State in the international arena but, 
instead, there were other actors that were gaining a louder voice in the system: political 
opposition, ethnoterritorial communities, interests groups and subnational entities such 
as states or provinces (Ducháček, 1986). It was a first step towards a different, non-State-
centric understanding of the International System, although cities were not mentioned 
yet.  
 
A year later, Ducháček proposed an interesting political science analysis “on federalism 
[that concerned] 3 major forms of ‘trans-sovereign relations’ conducted by noncentral 
governments: (1) influencing external relations from within, (2) trans-border regionalism, 
and (3) direct contacts with foreign centres of power” (Ducháček, as cited in Alger, 1990, 
p. 494). Then, in 1988, Ducháček went back to dealing with the urban and included cities 
as the fourth perforator of the sovereignty of the State8 and thus, recognised them as actors 
that are able to “use different mechanisms of international activity”9 (Translated by the 
author from Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 287) outside of national borders. With this new 
approach to cities in International Relations, Ducháček became the first scholar in the 
field to systematically use the term ‘paradiplomacy’ throughout his work (Calvento, 
2014). A critical reading of the paradiplomacy concept provides the architecture for 
Chapters 8 and 9. 
 
Unlike the narrow international relations value given to cities by Glaeser and others, 
Ducháček’s “Global paradiplomacy consists of political contacts with distant nations that 
bring noncentral governments into contact not only with trade, industrial, or cultural 
centers on other continents… but also with the various branches or agencies of foreign 
national governments” (Ducháček, 1986, pp. 246–247). He also argues that 
                                                 
8  Alongside internal political opposition, private interest groups and migrants (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 
287). 
9 Original text in Spanish: “Estos perforadores emplean diferentes mecanismos de actividad internacional” 
(Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 287). 
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“‘paradiplomacy’ […] creates an image of a central route of diplomacy on which national 
governments ‘ride’, and a separate, peripheral route of diplomacy on which city actors 
‘ride’” (van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007, p. 9). With this, the paradiplomatic role of cities 
in the international arena was now clear. 
 
What must be noted is that much of the literature dealing with cities in the international 
arena now falls under the category of ‘paradiplomacy’. The concept appears in important 
works by Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (1999), Michele Acuto (2015), Édgar 
Zamora (2013), Alexánder Ugalde (2005), Panayotis Soldatos (1991), Rogier van der 
Pluijm and Jan Melissen (2007), Kaj Fischer et al. (2015), Eduardo Iglesias and Graciela 
Zubelzú (Iglesias, Zubelzú, & Iglesias, 2008), María Lis Rolandi and Marcos Merello 
(2017), Vanessa Marx (2009) and Leobardo Ruíz (2009), amongst others. The scholarship 
on this topic seems endless, both from the Global North and the Global South. The 
problem is that scholars working on paradiplomacy tend to look at the city as an isolated 
place, as one that does not have a relationship with the State it is in. It seems as if a focus 
on the foreign activities of subnational entities also means ignoring the role of the State 
and its official foreign policy. Consequently, regarding the topic of this thesis, so far, the 
paradiplomacy literature does not provide for any useful contact points between the 
International Relations and the Urban Studies fields. However, a few exceptions that link 
subnational entities and the State when engaging in international activities can be 
identified. Two of them are presented in the following paragraphs.  
 
In 1996, Caterina García Segura from the Universidad Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona drew 
on the work of Ducháček and contributed to the debate by identifying four different 
scenarios of what she described as the ‘behaviour of foreign activities of subnational 
entities’ (García Segura, 1996). In her words, cities and provinces can engage in 
International Relations:  
According to the level of implication on the international system (direct or indirect 
presence); according to the level of institutionalisation (formal or informal contacts); 
according to the nature of the relationship with the official foreign policy of the nation-state 
(cooperation, conflict or parallel action); according to the geopolitical criteria (trans-
borders, transregional or global)10 (Translated by the author from Calvento, 2014, p. 306).  
                                                 
10 Original text in Spanish: “Asimismo, Segura (1996) revela cuatro clasificaciones que se han utilizado para 
describir el comportamiento de las actividades exteriores de las entidades subnacionales: según el nivel de 
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Not only did she mention the possibility of co-operation, conflict or parallel action 
between national and local governments in foreign policy; García Segura went further 
and introduced the word ‘geopolitics’11 – a term used almost exclusively in the 
International Relations literature – in her analyses of foreign activity of subnational 
political entities (García Segura, 1996). By including the word ‘geopolitics’, García Segura 
built a clear bridge between the two bodies of literature. She also implied that the foreign 
relations of cities can be understood under a geopolitical perspective, a domain that had 
been exclusive to analyses of the State.  
 
The second exception can be found in a chapter by John Kincaid called “Constituent 
Diplomacy in Federal Polities and the Nation-State as Foreign-policy Actor” in the book 
Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units by Michelmann and 
Soldatos (1990). This chapter focuses on the conflict that could arise between local and 
national governments when they engage in foreign activities. Kincaid states that  
 
the patterns of co-operation and conflict that emerge from subnational diplomacy are not 
special or independent; on the contrary, they tend to be parallel to the patterns of conflict 
and co-operation that are present in other fields of the relationship between the central and 
subnational governments. [Kincaid] insists that it is only the novelty of these topics what 
can cause some unusual conflict in those areas in which the central government was used 
to have a power monopoly in foreign policy12 (Translated by the author from Kincaid, as 
cited in García Segura, 1996, p. 258)
 
                                                 
implicación en el sistema internacional (Presencia directa o indirecta); según el nivel de institucionalización 
(Contactos formales o informales); según la relación con la actividad exterior del Estado Nacional 
(Cooperación, conflicto o actuación paralela); según criterio geopolítico (transfronteriza, transregional y 
global) (Calvento, 2014, p. 306). 
11 Geopolitics can be understood as the “effects of geographical location and other geographical features on 
the foreign policy of a state and its relations with other states. It is also concerned with the strategic value 
of geographical factors (resources, access to the sea, etc.)” (Mamadouh, 1998, p. 238). 
12 Original text in Spanish: “afirma que el conflicto derivado de la actividad exterior de las entidades 
subestatales mantiene una relación directa con los patrones de cooperación/conflicto existentes en el seno 
del Estado. Según este autor, los patrones de conflicto y de cooperación que emergen de la diplomacia de 
las subunidades no son especiales ni independientes, al contrario, suelen ser paralelos a los patrones de 
conflicto y coope- ración presentes en otros campos de las relaciones ccntral-subestatales. Insiste en que es 
solamente la novedad de estos temas la que puede ocasionar algún conflicto inusual en aquellas áreas en 
las que el gobierno central estaba acostumbrado a ejercer el monopolio de los poderes de la política 
exterior” (Kincaid, 1990, p. 73). 
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The conflict mentioned in the previous paragraph becomes, then, the only reference in 
the paradiplomacy literature that engages with the relationship between local and 
national governments in the international arena. It does not deal, however, with cities 
and their paradiplomacy as part of the official foreign policy of the State. It presents them 
as two different phenomena, two different actors that go out in the world independently 
and then, there are consequences for the two levels of government within the State. It is 





As one of the contributions of this thesis, this chapter engages in a joint analysis of two 
bodies of literature that have rarely been studied together: International Relations and 
Urban Studies, and works across languages to present a more global and multilingual 
reading of the issues. This recasting is an important interdisciplinary exercise because of 
the currently fragmented nature of the scholarship in dealing with a common topic, the 
international activities of city actors.  
 
The careful review of the secondary literature suggests that concerns with common issues 
exist. This is not a fictitious link. International Relations and Urban Studies scholars 
should be connecting at a deeper level or, at least, should be talking to each other. 
However, evidence has showed that a siloed debate prevails. Even in the few places 
where there is an overlapping debate, it is extremely tentative and as a result, the analysis 
is provisional and fragile. This leads to the first finding of this chapter: that there is an 
embryonic interface between the city and International Relations, but it is one that has 
not been conceptualised in the literature. 
 
The disjuncture in theoretical ideas (across multiple languages) about the role of cities in 
International Relations practices of emerging nations is mirrored in policy, though not in 
practice. Chapters 8 and 9 will try to fill that gap and bridge the two bodies of literature 
by taking a close look at Bogotá and Johannesburg, two cities in emerging powers of the 
Global South, and their role in the official foreign policy of Colombia and South Africa 
respectively.  
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The reality is that cities of emerging powers do make a difference in today’s international 
arena and they are extremely important in the power resources of countries – as it will be 
further explained in Chapters 5, 6 and 7; but because academics are not thinking about it 
consciously, the relationship between cities and States in foreign policy has not been fully 









PART  2 
OVERCOMING ABYSSAL THINKING: AN 
ANALYSIS OF EMERGING POWERS OF 






Boaventura de Sousa Santos, director of the Centre for Social Studies at the Universidade 
de Coimbra in Portugal, has become an important point of reference – especially for the 
scholarship in Spanish and Portuguese – in understanding how modern Western 
thinking has hierarchised the production of knowledge in today’s world. According to 
him,  
 
Modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking. It consists of a system of visible and 
invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones. The 
invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into two 
realms, the realm of “this side of the line” and the realm of “the other side the line”. The 
division is such that “the other side of the line” vanishes as reality, becomes nonexistent 
and is indeed produced as nonexistent. Nonexistent means not existing in any relevant or 
comprehensible way of being. Whatever is produced as nonexistent is radically excluded 
because it lies beyond the realm of what the accepted conception of inclusion considers to 
be its other. What most fundamentally characterizes abyssal thinking is thus the 
impossibility of the copresence of the two sides of the line. To the extent that it prevails, this 
side of the line only prevails by exhausting the field of relevant reality. Beyond it, there is 
only nonexistence, invisibility, nondialectical absence (De Sousa Santos, 2007, pp. 45–
46). 
 
Though, de Sousa Santos’ theory is not exclusive for Western thinking. The International 
System has also been organised in an abyssal way. The North – or the West – is not only 
on top, but also at the centre of the world, leaving the rest – the Global South, the 
periphery (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2013; Flemes, 2007b; Robinson, 2011b) – as a place of 
the unknown; a place that cannot produce valuable knowledge and, therefore, has to rely 
on the North to find solutions to its many problems. Moreover, besides being the only 
side of the line that claims to exist, the North also allows itself to be the one that 
establishes which practices are acceptable and which are not, what is adequate and what 
is not, what is right and what is not – this can be clearly seen in the work of Ed Glaeser 
(2012). In that sense, countries and cities of the Global South are often perceived as failed 
for not being able – or not wanting – to follow the same path the North has and, therefore, 
their dynamics are disregarded and their knowledge marginalised (De Sousa Santos, 
2010). 
 
Consequently, if cities in the Global South are underdeveloped and problem-ridden, that 




Western thinking. However, if that is the case, a few questions need to be raised at this 
point. Why are some of these cities experiencing an outstanding growth in today’s world, 
not only in terms of population but also in terms of importance in the International 
System? Why are some of them increasingly becoming centres for global politics, trade 
and communications? Why are some of them even pushing their countries into a new 
and improved position within the international community?  
 
Thus, it is time to abandon the perception of cities in developing countries as second-class 
and start considering them as key actors not only in their own countries and regions, but 
also in the world as a whole. In the words of Jennifer Robinson, it means “to construct (or 
promote) an alternative […] theory which reflects the experiences of a much wider range 
of cities” (Robinson, 2002, p. 532) and countries; to widen our understanding of the world 
by including cities and countries of the Global South that, according to the distribution 
of power in the current International System, can no longer be disregarded. 
 
Part 2 follows Robinson’s call as it focuses on these emerging powers from the Global 
South. Chapter 3 provides four key concepts from the International Relations fields that 
are crucial to understand the State as the main subject for this thesis and its role in the 
International System. It also engages with the current radical shift of power in the world, 
takes a close look at the emergence of the Global South and analyses some of the new 
groupings of emerging countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Chapter 4 engages 
in the conceptual debate on power hierarchies in the International System and zooms in 
on the concepts of emerging powers and emerging middle powers.  
 
Consequently, Part 2 aims at providing the reader with a theoretical and conceptual 
framework that will serve as the basis for the analysis undertaken in Part 3 as to whether 
Colombia and South Africa can be considered emerging powers of the Global South and 





: RECLAIMING A PLACE FOR THE GLOBAL 
SOUTH: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF EMERGING 
POWERS 
This research explores the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers. As 
such, it is crucial at this point to focus the debate on the International Relations realm in 
order to contextualise and enrich the discussion that will take place in the following 
chapters. Consequently, Chapter 3 builds on the conceptual foundations for the case 
investigations by drawing from the International Relations, Political Science and 
Sociology literatures in order to explain four key concepts that are directly or indirectly 
present in the title of this thesis: 
 
 It starts by looking at the State as the only actor capable of conducting official 
foreign policy according to International Law.  
 It continues to explain what will be understood as foreign policy and why it can 
only be implemented by the national government of a State.  
 As this thesis is focused on emerging powers, it introduces the concept of 
international insertion, that is, the positioning of a State within the international 
community.  
 It explains and analyses the concept of Global South as the geopolitical framework 
for this thesis. 
 
Finally, Chapter 3 ends with a close look at the International System and the way the 
emergence of the Global South is affecting the current world order and its power 
dynamics. It looks at literature from both the Global South and the Global North to 
discuss some of the countries that are rapidly becoming the world’s most important non-
Western powers. Then, it continues to explore some of the main groupings of emerging 
powers from the Global South according to different international banks and 
organisations and it ends with some economic projections on the role these countries are 
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3.1. THE STATE AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
3.1.1. THE STATE 
 
Attempting to define the State is no easy task. Niccolò Machiavelli mentioned the word 
for the first time in the 16th century in his book The Prince (Maquiavelo, 2004) and, from 
there, a large number of works have followed suit, addressing the concept not only from 
a Political Science point of view, but also from the fields of Sociology and International 
Relations, amongst others. The following section will briefly discuss some of the most 
important scholars from different disciplines dealing with the issue of the State and will 
conclude by examining the definition of the State according to Public International Law.  
 
Jean Jacques Rousseau understands the State from a sociological point of view. In his 
book The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right (2003), he does not present the State 
as a political actor or as an international actor, but instead, he understands it as the natural 
evolution of social and community life. Furthermore, in The Spirit of the Laws (2003), 
Charles de Secondat Montesquieu approached the concept from a legal point of view. For 
him, the State is an organic legal organisation incorporated under legal principles in 
which power no longer depends on the ruler but it is regulated by law and is governed 
by objective criteria. In Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (2007), the State is considered a 
necessary evil for society that, by the monopolisation of the use of force, constitutes itself 
as an authoritarian and repressive figure. In a similar way, Karl Marx positions himself 
against the State as he believes it to be a tool of oppression between classes (K. Marx, 
1975).  
 
The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries brought about further 
analyses of the State. Hermann Heller’s Staatslehre [Theory of the State] (1942) argues that 
the State is a centralised bureaucratic organisation whose social function is the assurance 
of coexistence and co-operation amongst men. At the same time, he includes other 
additional elements in the analysis such as sovereignty and territorial supremacy that are 
crucial for the role of the State in the International System.  
 
While the previous authors discuss different issues about the State, Max Weber provides 
a more comprehensive definition of the concept in his book Politics as a Vocation: 




we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one 
of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical 
force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state 
permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence. Hence, 
'politics' for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of 
power, either among states or among groups within a state (Weber, 1959, p. 83). 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, however, the most appropriate definition of the State does 
not come from the previous debates, but from the field of Public International Law. 
Taking into account that this thesis deals with the role of cities in the official foreign policy 
of countries in the Global South, Public International Law is the umbrella under which 
States function in the International System.  
 
In 1933, the member countries of the Organisation of American States (OAS) met in 
Montevideo, Uruguay to discuss the rights and duties of the States in the American 
continent13. The result of that meeting was the Montevideo Convention which provides 
not only a definition of the State but also establishes the different components that are 
needed for a State to be recognised as such in the International System. The Convention 
has 16 articles but only the six in Table 3.1. are relevant at this point, Article 1 being the 









                                                 
13 This thesis uses the widespread understanding of the “American continent” in the Spanish Language. 
The American continent (or América as it is known in Spanish) comprises all three sub-continents: North 
America, Central America and the Caribbean, and South America. As such, all 35 independent States of the 
American continent are members of the Organisation of American States and signatories of the Montevideo 
Convention (Organization of American States, 2017). 
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TABLE 3.1. SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION OF THE RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES OF STATES 
 
ARTICLE 1 The state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined 
territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with 
the other states. 
ARTICLE 3 The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by 
the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to 
defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its 
conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as 
it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and 
to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. 
The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise 
of the rights of other states according to international law. 
ARTICLE 4 States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal 
capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend 
upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon 
the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law. 
ARTICLE 5 The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being 
affected in any manner whatsoever. 
ARTICLE 6 The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which 
recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights 
and duties determined by international law. Recognition is 
unconditional and irrevocable. 
ARTICLE 7 The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results 
from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new 
state. 
Source: Adapted from Organization of American States. (1933). Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention). Montevideo, Uruguay: Organization of 
American States - OAS.  
 
It must be noted that, even though the Montevideo Convention should, at least in theory, 
only legally bind the States in the American continent as it was signed within the OAS, it 
has been recognised as Customary International Law, that is, “an international obligation 
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arising from established state practice” (M. N. Shaw, 2003) or “a general and consistent 
practice of states that they follow from a sense of legal obligation” (M. N. Shaw, 2003). 
On this issue, Thomas Grant argues:
 
The Montevideo Convention is just a definition. On its face, it is simple: four succinct 
elements. Moreover, it arose from a convention. The principle underlying international 
agreements – pacta sunt servanda – is probably the oldest rule of international law. Writers 
have counted treaties and conventions as a source of international law from the beginning 
of modem treatment of the subject. The statute of the International Court of Justice 
identifies treaties and conventions as a favored source of international law (Grant, 1998, 
p. 454). 
 
Based on the Montevideo Convention, and for the purposes of this thesis, a State will be 
understood as a person of international law with permanent population, a defined 
territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other States. In 
addition, a fifth element must be included: sovereignty – both internal and external –, a 
key pillar of the current International System. According to Daniel Philpott: 
 
Another relevant pair of adjectives is “internal” and “external,” which are not distinct 
types of sovereignty, but complementary, always coexistent, aspects of sovereignty. 
Supreme authority within a territory implies both undisputed supremacy over the land’s 
inhabitants and independence from unwanted intervention by an outside authority — a 
church, an empire, another state or a United Nations. It is to the external aspect of 
sovereignty that modern international legal scholars and political scientists refer. In a 
broader historical perspective, however, in which the state becomes the legitimate polity 
at Westphalia or colonies attain independence in the 20th century, both internal and 
external sovereignty are at issue (Philpott, 1995, p. 357). 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, understanding the State as the sovereign legitimate polity 
in the International System is key at this point. This framing, rather than Sassen’s, makes 
it possible to look at Southern cities in a global context without having to address Jennifer 
Robinson’s concerns that every city is different and, thus, Southern cities must be studied 
through a post-colonial critique that distances itself from Western analytic categories 
(McFarlane, 2010). Therefore, by focusing the analysis on States, the thesis is able to 
address its main objective: the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging 
powers. In other words, it is about the States’ role in the world and how its cities 
contribute to it, not about the international ranking of its cities. 
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3.1.2. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Emerging not only from the State’s sovereignty, but also from its capacity to enter into 
relations with other countries – as stated by the Montevideo Convention –, is the State’s 
ability to conduct foreign policy. According to Christopher Hill, foreign policy can be 
understood as “the sum of external official relations conducted by an independent actor 
(usually a state) in international relations”14 (Translated by the author from Hill, as cited 
in Velosa Porras, 2012, p. 61). On the previous statement, Eduardo Velosa Porras stresses 
the importance of the word official, meaning that not all members of the State can 
implement it. Therefore, “international actions carried out by individuals or groups of 
individuals who have not been endowed with some degree of authority or legitimacy, 
could not be considered as foreign policy”15 (Translated by the author from Velosa Porras, 
2012, p. 61). 
 
Given the fact that States are not autistic or autarchic, Gyngell and Wesley include an 
additional characteristic of foreign policy by stating that it is a special public policy as it 
does not have a defined thematic. As a consequence, it may deal with issues of 
international co-operation, the environment, trade, or human trafficking, depending on 
the particular needs of a country at a given time (Gyngell & Wesley, 2007).  
 
A more comprehensive definition of foreign policy can be found in the works of Rubén 
Vergara and Martha Ardila. The former understands foreign policy as “the 
implementation of domestic policy across national borders, visualising it as a means to 
achieve the interests that different social groups pursue independently, through the 
government”16 (Translated by the author from Vergara Crespo, 2012, p. 154). The latter 
adds that foreign policy is an extension of national or internal policy, or of hegemonic 
sectors within the country, whether jointly or fragmented. She argues that there is no one 
                                                 
14 Original text in Spanish: “la suma de las relaciones oficiales externas conducidas por un actor 
independiente (usualmente un Estado) en relaciones internacionales” (Hill, as cited in Velosa Porras, 2012, 
p. 61). 
15 Original text in Spanish: “acciones internacionales de individuos o grupos de individuos que no hayan 
sido investidos con algún grado de autoridad o legitimidad, no podrían ser consideradas como política 
exterior” (Velosa Porras, 2012, p. 61). 
16 Original text in Spanish: “la implementación de la política doméstica fuera de las fronteras nacionales, 
visualizándola como un medio para alcanzar los intereses que los diferentes grupos sociales persiguen de 
manera independiente, a través del gobierno” (Vergara Crespo, 2012, p. 154). 
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single national interest but, instead, there are many interests in permanent interaction 
(Ardila et al., 2005). 
 
Ardila includes in her definition a key concept within foreign policy: national interest, 
understood as “the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world” 
(Nye, 1999, p. 23). In that regard, Narnia Bohler-Muller explains the importance of 
national interest for the international relations of countries: “Despite all the peripheral 
rhetoric, it is no secret that in the world of realpolitik, international relations are driven 
primarily by national interests. […] [N]ational interests, values and identity should be 
paramount in informing foreign affairs” (Bohler-Muller, 2012, p. 5). Finally, and also 
related to national interest, foreign policy is the result of a rational analysis of the 
country’s role in the International System (Velosa Porras, 2012) and the way in which 
States identify themselves in order to interact with the rest of the world (Steele, 2008).  
 
 
3.1.3. INTERNATIONAL INSERTION 
 
‘International Insertion’ is a term that has been widely used in International Relations 
literature. There is, though, a major problem with it as most academics and researchers 
use it assuming the reader knows what it means and very few take the time to explain or 
define it. It is noteworthy to see many articles – especially in Spanish – in which the 
concept is even used in the title but no explanation of it is given throughout the text. This 
phenomenon can be seen in the works of Jorge Mario Martínez Piva and Esteban Pérez 
(2003), Ángeles Sánchez-Diez and David Matesanz (2011), Mariana Calvento (2014), Jean 
Njoya (2010), Marta Ardila (2014), Sandra Borda (2012) and Didier Ramousse (2007). 
When analysing the literature in English, two different phenomena stand out. First, 
authors from Anglophone countries do not tend to use the concept and, therefore, 
‘international insertion’ is absent from their works. And second, scholars from non-
Anglophone countries writing in English do include the concept of ‘international 
insertion’ in their articles. A few examples of this situation are found in the works of Tullo 
Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007), Andrés Malamud (2011), Detlef Nolte and Bert 
Hoffmann (2007) or Juliana Aldana Díaz (2012). Consequently, it seems as if the concept 
was limited to the scholarship produced by authors whose native language is not English. 
Chapter 3: Reclaiming a place for the Global South: A conceptual framework of emerging powers 
 
50 
Definitions, however, are provided by Alexandre César Cunha Leite and Juan Scartascini 
del Río, two Latin American scholars who have dealt with the issue of international 
insertion of countries, the former for the People’s Republic of China and the latter for the 
Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania –. According to Leite,  
[I]t can be said that international insertion is the interaction and integration that a country 
has with the international environment. Thus, to analyze the international insertion of a 
country, it should be taken into consideration its positioning in front of the many current 
international agendas and its (political, economic, social, environmental, juridical etc.) 
relations with other countries (Leite & Máximo, 2011, p. 4). 
Furthermore, Scartascini provides a more comprehensive definition of international 
insertion. In his words, international insertion  
 
is the positioning of a certain state, as a result of state action in a given context in the 
contemporary international community. It is determined by multiple variables, such as: its 
political and diplomatic negotiations; its strategic and defensive alliances; its political and 
economic partners; the degree of cooperation (political, economic, military or scientific-
technical), its concertation and integration with other States; the quantitative and 
qualitative level of trade with other/s state/s; the fluidity and depth of its relationships with 
its peers, and especially their selection (following political and economic criteria, regional 
or historical proximity, its neighbourhood, socio-cultural identification, etc.)17 (Translated 
by the author from Scartascini del Río, 2010, p. 3). 
3.1.4. GLOBAL SOUTH 
 
After the end of the Cold War, the so-called Third World or Non-Aligned countries 
struggled to find a new identity. The main reason for their existence as a concept – an 
                                                 
17 Original text in Spanish: “El posicionamiento que obtendrá un Estado determinado, como resultado de 
su accionar estatal en el contexto dado en la Comunidad Internacional que le es contemporánea. La misma 
estará determinada por múltiples variables, como pueden ser: sus negociaciones político-diplomáticas; sus 
alianzas estratégicas y defensivas; sus socios políticos y económicos; el grado de cooperación (política, 
económica, militar o científicotécnica),concertación e integración con otros Estados; el nivel cuantitativo y 
cualitativo del intercambio comercial con otro/s Estado/s; la fluidez y profundidad de las relaciones con 
sus pares, y en especial la selección de los mismos (siguiendo un criterio político, económico, de cercanía 
regional o histórica, de vecindad, de identificación socio-cultural, etc.) (Scartascini del Río, 2010, p. 3) 
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alternative to the East–West confrontation – had disappeared and the ‘end of the Third 
World’ as we knew it became a possibility (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003). However, even 
though the concept itself could disappear, it was evident that the problems faced by this 
grouping of countries still existed and, in some cases, were even deepening (Delgado 
Caicedo & Sáenz Peñas, 2013). 
 
With the changes in the post-Cold War International System,  
 
it became necessary to reconfigure the construction of the concept and shift the identity 
issue from the vertical and confrontational to the horizontal and cooperative, making a 
renewed South-South dialogue possible that allows for a different frame of action for the 
foreign policy of the African, Asian and Latin American countries. This new way of 
categorising the international reality of those States would fall within the concept of Global 
South18 (Translated by the author from Delgado Caicedo & Sáenz Peñas, 2013, p. 112). 
When trying to come to terms about the true nature of the Global South, some of the most 
important scholars such as Comaroff & Comaroff agree with Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
and his abyssal thinking theory (De Sousa Santos, 2007, 2009, 2010). In their article 
“Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa”, they state 
that 
 
‘The Global South’ has become a shorthand for the world of non-European, postcolonial 
peoples. Synonymous with uncertain development, unorthodox economies, failed states, 
and nations fraught with corruption, poverty, and strife, it is that half of the world about 
which the ‘Global North’ spins theories. Rarely is it seen as a source of theory and 
explanation for world historical events. Yet, as many nation-states of the Northern 
Hemisphere experience increasing fiscal meltdown, state privatization, corruption, and 
ethnic conflict, it seems as though they are evolving southward, so to speak, in both positive 
and problematic ways (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, p. 113). 
 
However, given the role countries from the Global South are playing in today’s world, it 
would probably be inadequate to refer to it as a negative concept associated with 
                                                 
18 Original text in Spanish: “Fue necesario reconfigurar la construcción del concepto y de trasladar la 
identidad de lo vertical y confrontacionista a lo horizontal y cooperativista, haciendo posible un renovado 
diálogo Sur-Sur que ofreciera un marco de acción diferente para la política exterior de los países africanos, 
asiáticos y latinoamericanos. Esta nueva forma de categorizar la realidad internacional de dichos Estados 
se enmarcaría dentro del concepto de Sur Global” (Delgado Caicedo & Sáenz Peñas, 2013, p. 112). 
Chapter 3: Reclaiming a place for the Global South: A conceptual framework of emerging powers 
 
52 
underdevelopment or failed States or simply as “the geopolitical concept replacing ‘Third 
World’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union” (Levander & Mignolo, 2011, p. 3). Instead, 
a more positive approach is required. For Levander and Mignolo, “the ‘Global South’ is 
the location where new visions of the future are emerging and where the global political 
and de-colonial society is at work” (Levander & Mignolo, 2011, p. 3). 
 
Finally, in 2004, the United Nations Development Programme – UNDP – produced its 
report ‘Forging a Global South’ in which it explains not only the concept but also states 
which countries are located in this new grouping (See Figure 3.1.). According to the 
UNDP,  
 
The use of the term “South” to refer to developing countries collectively has been part of 
the shorthand of international relations since the 1970s. It rests on the fact that all of the 
world’s industrially developed countries (with the exception of Australia and New 
Zealand) lie to the north of its developing countries. The term does not imply that all 
developing countries are similar and can be lumped together in one category. What it does 
highlight is that although developing countries range across the spectrum in every 
economic, social and political attribute, they all share a set of vulnerabilities and challenges 
(UNDP, 2004, p. Cover). 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1. COUNTRIES OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH ACCORDING TO UNDP 
 
 
Note: Data adapted from “Forging a Global South”, by United Nations Development Programme, 2004, 
(http://www.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH-PR-Publications-UNDay-for-South-South-
Cooperation.pdf), Copyright 2004 by the United Nations Development Programme - UNDP. In the public domain. 
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3.2. A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
SOUTH 
 
There has been an overwhelmingly large debate on the distribution of power in the 
International System amongst scholars ever since the study of International Relations 
became a scientific discipline. In fact, as it has been explained in Chapter 2, every 
International Relations theory has considered the issue of power as key for its debates 
and analyses. From works focused on super powers and their influence in the 
International System by well-known authors in the field such as Hans Morgenthau (1945, 
1946, 1949, 1964, 1967, 1986), Robert Keohane (1969, 1984) or Joseph Nye (1984, 1988, 
1990a, 1990b, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013) to research on the role of 
emerging countries in world politics by scholars from or focused on the Global South 
such as Daniel Flemes (2007a, 2007b, 2010a, 2010b), Esteban Actis and Julieta Zelicovich 
(2016), Martha Ardila (2014), Kamal and Anuradha Chenoy (2007), Young Choi (2009) 
and Umut Korkut and İlke Civelekoğlu (2012), the literature on the topic is endless. 
 
However, even though the literature is as varied as it is immense, the majority of the most 
recent scholarship agrees on one particular issue: a profound change in the power 
dynamics of the International System during the past two to three decades. As stated by 
Daniel Flemes, “the global order is in the midst of a fundamental transformation. Not 
many experts would have imagined something like this just twenty years after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall”19 (Translated by the author from Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 26). As 
a consequence, governments and scholars from both sides of the line have increasingly 
started to engage with the so-called “emergence of the South”. The world is now being 
understood as a different place, one that differs greatly from the traditional Western-
centric approach by bringing a wide range of Southern actors into the equation. For 
example, researchers funded by the Indian Centre for Policy Research described the 
current International System as follows: 
The United States remains the single biggest power, and projections of American GDP do 
not show any diminution in its relative pre-eminence. At the upper tier, China and India 
                                                 
19 Original text in Spanish: “El orden global está en medio de una transformación fundamental. No muchos 
expertos hubieran imaginado algo así tan sólo veinte años después de la caída del Muro de Berlín” 
(Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 26). 
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will continue to rise as will Brazil. Russia and Japan may experience marked declines, while 
Europe will decline more slowly. Middle rung powers like South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, 
Egypt, Iran and South Africa will become increasingly important. Over the horizon, Africa 
and Latin America will experience rapid growth (Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 31). 
Another example can be found in ‘Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a 
Multipolar World: an introductory review’ by Cooper and Flemes. In their article, the 
authors argue that 
 
The rise of emerging countries beyond the West is pivotal to understanding how the global 
system is being reshaped in the first quarter of the 21st century. The ascent of these states 
is addressing imbalances in the global system—and in the globalisation process—that up 
until now have mainly reflected the greater influence of traditionally powerful states and 
commercial actors. The rise of new groupings of states from the global South (groupings 
that cross regions and exercise considerable influence, especially in international economic 
and social policy negotiations) is starting to overcome the disorganisation that in the past 
has tended to mute emerging countries’ contributions in global policy debates. The 
emerging states that grab most of the attention—China, India, Brazil and to some extent 
South Africa—are beginning to reverse the historically weak mechanisms of collective 
action associated with forums such as the G77, and the splintering effects of the policy 
competition that has often arisen among developing states as a consequence of economic 
globalisation (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013, p. 944) 
 
Indeed, the transformation is evident. “Since 2000, the world has experienced the largest 
shift of power in history, and this is not limited to the BRICS” (S. M. Patrick, personal 
communication, February 2, 2016). This argument needs to be highlighted at this point. 
While the BRICS countries have been under the spotlight for years, they are not the only 
ones in the process of achieving a new and improved position in the International System. 
Patrick includes Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Iran as part of “the world’s main 
non-Western powers” (Patrick, 2010, p. 45); Nolte (2010) talks about new dynamics of 
power in the world for Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa and Turkey, whereas Hawksworth and Chan (2015) include Bangladesh, 
Colombia, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, Nigeria, Argentina and Thailand 
on the list of new emerging countries.  
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Many international banks and economists have also started to use acronyms to identify 
other sets of countries that are beginning to challenge the structure of power in the 
International System. Some of these are: MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) 
(Huijgh, 2016; Wright, 2014); the Next Eleven (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam) (Bloomberg 
Business, 2012; A. F. Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008); and CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa) (Huijgh, 2016; Ramírez, 2012; Russell, 2010), 
amongst others. On the same topic, since 2010, the Spanish Bank BBVA has produced an 
annual report called “EAGLEs Economic Outlook”. It started with the coinage of the term 
EAGLEs (Emerging and Growth Leading Emerging Economies) and then the analysis 
grew to include a different category of “smaller emerging powers” called the NEST 
countries. According to BBVA,  
 
[Their] goal was to identify which emerging economies would be contributing more to 
world growth in the next ten years than the largest developed economies, i.e. the G7 
countries. For the EAGLEs threshold [they] excluded the US due to its extraordinary size, 
while [they] set the G6 member with the smallest contribution as the Nest threshold 
(BBVA, 2014, p. 7).  
 
As a result, the BBVA Research Unit 2015 report included the following countries in their 
EAGLEs category: China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, 
Turkey, Philippines, Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh and Thailand. Also, the NEST category 
included: Malaysia, Egypt, Colombia, Vietnam, Poland, United Arab Emirates, Iran, 
Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Algeria, Peru, Argentina, South Africa, Chile and Sri 
Lanka (BBVA, 2015). For all of the above, both EAGLEs and NEST, their contribution to 
world growth during the next ten years will be greater than that of Italy, the G7 country 
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FIGURE 3.2. EAGLES AND NEST COUNTRIES IN 2015 ACCORDING TO BBVA RESEARCH 
 
 
Note: Data from “BBVA EAGLEs Emerging and Growth Leading Economies Economic Outlook Annual Report 2015”, 
by BBVA Cross-Country Emerging Markets Analysis Unit, 2015, (https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/BBVA-EAGLEs-2015_eng_final6.pdf), Copyright 2015 by BBVA Research. Reprinted with 
permission. 
The conclusions in BBVA’s 2015 report are extremely relevant for this thesis. They found 
that “emerging markets will account for 78% of global growth between 2014 and 2024, 
with EAGLEs contributing up to 62%, the NEST group 9% and other emerging countries 
another 7%” (BBVA, 2015, p. 9). Furthermore, “China and India will lead global growth 
contributing 28% and 14% respectively between 2014 and 2024” (BBVA, 2015, p. 12); 
“Russia, Mexico and Nigeria will contribute more than any developed country. Saudi 
Arabia, Brazil and Turkey will add more to the increase of world GDP than Germany and 
the United Kingdom” (BBVA, 2015, p. 13) and, “while Malaysia ranks at the top of the 
NEST group, Egypt, Colombia, Vietnam and Poland show contributions to global growth 
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TABLE 3.2. SUMMARY OF EMERGING COUNTRIES GROUPINGS 
 
COUNTRY BRICS MINT NEXT 11 CIVETS EAGLES NEST 
 Algeria      ✓ 
 Argentina      ✓ 
 Bangladesh   ✓  ✓  
 Brazil ✓    ✓  
 Chile      ✓ 
 China ✓    ✓  
 Colombia    ✓  ✓ 
 Egypt   ✓ ✓  ✓ 
 India ✓    ✓  
 Indonesia  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
 Iran   ✓   ✓ 
 Iraq     ✓  
 Kazakhstan      ✓ 
 Korea (Rep.)   ✓    
 Malaysia      ✓ 
 Mexico  ✓ ✓  ✓  
 Myanmar      ✓ 
 Nigeria  ✓   ✓  
 Pakistan   ✓  ✓  
 Peru      ✓ 
 Philippines   ✓  ✓  
 Poland      ✓ 
 Qatar      ✓ 
 Russia ✓    ✓  
 Saudi Arabia     ✓  
 South Africa ✓   ✓  ✓ 
 Thailand     ✓  
 Turkey  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
 U. A. Emirates      ✓ 
 Vietnam   ✓ ✓  ✓ 
The emergence of categories of nations and the role of new emerging powers in today’s 
International System can be further understood by looking at the evolution of the 30 
largest economies in the world in 2000 and 2016 in the following tables drawn from the 
World Bank data. The first noticeable change is at the very top of Table 3.3. In 2000 the 
largest economy in the world was the United States, whereas in 2016 it was replaced by 
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China, one of the emerging economies from BRICS. The traditional middle powers in 
Europe also saw a decrease in their economic power from 2000 to 2016. Germany dropped 
from the fourth position to the fifth, France from the eighth to the tenth and the United 
Kingdom suffered the biggest decline by going from the sixth position to the ninth. The 
third largest economy in 2000, Japan, was also relegated to the fourth position by India, 
another emerging economy from BRICS. Furthermore, other traditional middle powers 
such as Italy, Canada and Spain all lost between two and four positions, while Belgium 
simply disappeared from the top 30. At the same time, the number of positions gained 
by other emerging countries of the Global South is impressive: Russia went from 11th to 
6th, Indonesia from 12th to 8th, the Republic of Korea from 15th to 14th, Saudi Arabia from 
17th to 15th, Turkey from 18th to 13th, Thailand from 21st to 18th and Colombia from 30th to 
29th. 
 
But the growth experienced by countries of the Global South cannot only be seen in terms 
of their place in the top 30 ranking. When looking at the change in GDP, China’s economy 
was approximately seven times bigger in 2016 than it was in 2000 going from USD 3,6 to 
21,4 billion in just 16 years. The Indian economy grew approximately four times in the 
same period; Russia grew 3,3 times; Nigeria grew four times; Turkey, Colombia and 
Saudi Arabia grew three times; the Egypt and Pakistan grew 2,5 times while the Republic 
of Korea and Thailand were twice as big in 2016 as they were in 2000.  
 
If the global GDP ranking projected for 2050 by PwC in Table 3.4. is included, there is a 
significant decline in the number of traditional Western countries in the top 30 going from 
12 in 2000 to ten in 2016 and then to nine in 2050. Furthermore, the projection for 2050 
shows some additional relevant data: India surpasses the United States as the second 
largest economy in the world while Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Nigeria climb 
to the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 9th positions respectively displacing some traditional powers such 
as Germany and the United Kingdom down to the 10th and 11th positions. At the bottom 
of the table, the economies of two traditional middle powers like Spain and Australia end 
up having approximately the same size as South Africa and Colombia, two of the new 
emerging powers from the Global South. All the previous data goes back to the common 
ground in the current International Relations literature: the increasing importance of 
countries of the Global South in today’s world order. 
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TABLE 3.3. COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) (PPP) 
FOR 2000 AND 2016 
 
 
Note: Data not available for the Islamic Republic of Iran for 2016.  
Note 2: Data for 2000 table adapted from “GDP, PPP (current international $)”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2000+wbapi_data_value+wba
pi_data_value-last&sort=desc&page=3) and data for 2016 table adapted from “GDP, PPP (current international $)”, by 
The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wba
pi_data_value-last&sort=desc&year_high_desc=true). Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain. 
 
2000  2016 
   
RANK COUNTRY GDP (USD)  RANK COUNTRY GDP (USD) 
       
1.  United States 10,284,779,000,000  1.  China, P.R. 21.417.149.856.080 
2.  China, P.R. 3,681,133,749,299  2.  United States 18,569,100,000,000 
3.  Japan 3,290,078,495,532  3.  India 8,702,900,012,352 
4.  Germany 2,189,918,931,363  4.  Japan 5,266,443,919,742 
5.  India 2,105,369,974,081  5.  Germany  4,028,362,431,411 
6.  United Kingdom 1,616,501,540,098  6.  Russia 3,397,368,441,152 
7.  Brazil 1,585,205,951,881  7.  Brazil 3,141,333,107,725 
8.  France 1,582,452,951,605  8.  Indonesia 3,032,090,005,363 
9.  Italy 1,517,958,032,295  9.  United Kingdom  2,796,731,825,411 
10.  Mexico 1,060,833,552,415  10.  France 2,773,931,830,825 
11.  Russia 1,000,581,673,013  11.  Italy  2,312,559,334,097 
12.  Indonesia 973,477,182,951  12.  Mexico 2,278,072,027,969 
13.  Canada 894,658,117,917  13.  Turkey  1,927,693,211,930 
14.  Spain 880,773,581,563  14.  Korea, Rep  1,832,073,483,290 
15.  Korea, Rep 850,446,556,726  15.  Saudi Arabia  1,756,793,436,986 
16.  Iran 621,359,989,136  16.  Spain 1,686,372,919,950 
17.  Saudi Arabia 599,266,227,159  17.  Canada 1,597,516,516,505 
18.  Turkey 589,614,306,790  18.  Thailand  1,164,928,290,123 
19.  Australia 504,330,170,749  19.  Australia 1,128,908,014,064 
20.  Netherlands 502,235,090,244  20.  Nigeria 1,091,227,625,574 
21.   Thailand 458,572,949,080  21.   Egypt 1,065,179,267,161 
22.   Egypt  409,278,963,385  22.   Poland 1,055,353,929,932 
23.  Poland 405,951,968,212  23.  Pakistan 1,014,180,695,173 
24.  Pakistan  383,732,563,387  24.  Argentina 874,071,002,223 
25.  South Africa 346,205,491,128  25.  Netherlands 866,204,439,716 
26.  Malaysia 299,737,631,489  26.  Malaysia 863,287,467,785 
27.  Belgium 289,965,380,050  27.  Philippines  806,539,481,635 
28.  Venezuela 279,759,803,714  28.  South Africa 739,419,184,416 
29.  Nigeria 276,212,746,140  29.  Colombia 688,817,300,979 
30.   Colombia 266,073,563,933  30.   U. A. Emirates 671,292,424,231 
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It must be noted that all the previous tables and projections are based entirely on the 
economic performance of the State. They do not disaggregate the domestic components 
of a country’s GDP and, therefore, are completely city-blind. Attention is brought to this 
issue because all these rankings are oblivious to three important dynamics involving the 
influence of cities in their countries’ economic performance in the current International 
System. First, they ignore the fact that the world is shifting, although somewhat 
ambiguously, from national to city economies (McGranahan & Martine, 2014). Second, 
while they acknowledge the shifting in the location of economic power from the Global 
North to the Global South, they ignore the fact that urbanisation plays a key role; in other 
words, it is not just shifting from the Global North to the Global South but from “the 
urbanised North to the urbanising South” (McGranahan & Martine, 2014, p. 1). And third, 
they fail to recognise the importance of the relationship between urbanisation and 
economic growth, especially for countries of the Global South (Chen, Zhang, Liu, & 
Zhang, 2014; Turok & McGranahan, 2013). 
 
TABLE 3.4. TOP 30 COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST PROJECTED GDP (PPP) FOR 2050 
(DATA IN 2014 USD BILLIONS) 
 
RANK COUNTRY GDP  RANK COUNTRY GDP 
1.  P.R. of China 61,079  16.  Egypt 4,239 
2.  India 42,205  17.  Republic of Korea 4,142 
3.  United States 41,384  18.  Italy 3,617 
4.  Indonesia 12,210  19.  Canada 3,583 
5.  Brazil 9,164  20.  Philippines 3,516 
6.  Mexico 8,014  21.  Thailand 3,510 
7.  Japan 7,914  22.  Vietnam 3,430 
8.  Russia 7,575  23.  Bangladesh 3,367 
9.  Nigeria 7,345  24.  Malaysia 3,327 
10.  Germany 6,338  25.  Iran 3,224 
11.  United Kingdom 5,744  26.  Spain 3,099 
12.  Saudi Arabia 5,488  27.  South Africa 3,026 
13.  France 5,207  28.  Australia 2,903 
14.  Turkey 5,102  29.  Colombia 2,785 
15.  Pakistan 4,253  30.  Argentina 2,455 
 
Note: Data from “The World in 2050: Will the shift in global economic power continue?”, by PwC, 2015, 
(http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf), Copyright 2015-2016 by 
PwC. Reprinted with permission.  
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3.3.  CONCLUSION 
 
Conventional concepts from International Relations provide a framework that is crucial 
for the advancement of this thesis, although the city is not a traditionally considered 
object of study by the discipline. Nevertheless, as the main aim of this research is to 
analyse the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global 
South, four concepts that provide analytical precision to the case investigations were 
addressed in this chapter:  
 
The State, not only as the most important actor for this thesis, but also as the only one 
capable of pursuing an official foreign policy in the International System. Also, although 
it might seem obvious, defining the State is crucial as all emerging powers are indeed 
States. In other words, actors other than the State cannot be considered as emerging 
powers in the International System under the International Relations umbrella.  
 
Foreign policy as the official tool available to the State to pursue and defend its national 
interests abroad. As it was explained previously, even though sub-national entities may 
indeed go overseas and establish relationships with foreign entities, those dynamics 
cannot be understood as foreign policy as they are not implemented by the national 
government of a State.  
 
The concept of international insertion becomes relevant as this thesis explores the 
emergence of countries from the Global South. In other words, when a country emerges, 
it gains international importance and power as it inserts itself in new dynamics and 
engages with a wider variety of international actors. Consequently, it would be 
impossible for a country to emerge without inserting itself internationally.  
 
Finally, as it was explained throughout this chapter, the Global South serves as a 
geopolitical framework for the thesis. The case studies do not come from the Global 
North, from the already industrialised world; they come from the developing world, 
from the Global South. And again, although it might seem obvious, the only countries 
that can emerge in the current International System are those that have not yet emerged, 
that is, countries of the Global South.  
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After engaging with the conceptual framework, the discussion continued to address 
power relations in today’s International System. By analysing various groupings of 
emerging powers and the economic projections proposed by international banks and 
organisations, it was possible to prove that the world is experiencing the single largest 
shift of power in history. As a consequence, it is expected that, during the following 
decades, the influence of traditional powers of the Global North decreases considerably 
while that of new emerging powers from the Global South increases steadily. This shift 
is so evident that PwC projects a world in which only 9 out of the 30 largest economies in 
2050 will be in the Global North.  
 
A clear issue that stands out in this chapter is the fact that most – if not all – economic 
rankings are done by international banks, organisations or consulting firms while the 
academic literature in the International Relations field largely ignores the need to 
produce such rankings. In fact, academics seem to be concerned about defining the 
different categories in the hierarchy of power in the International System and how 
individual countries are located in each one of them, but they do not appear to be 
interested in the mobility between these categories provided by the rankings. This can be 
clearly seen in the literature. For example, Cooper and Antkiewicz (2008) refer to the 
study produced by Goldman Sachs, Subacci (2008) uses data from the World Bank, 
Flemes (2007b) cites the UNDP, Käkönen (2013) refers to PwC and Scholvin (2010) to the 
OECD. Therefore, since the tracking of these rankings is not made by academics, practice 
simply runs ahead.  
 
After addressing the key concepts and the emergence of the Global South in the world 
today, Chapter 4 will engage with a debate around the power hierarchies in the 
International System and the increasing role of emerging powers. It will provide a 
theoretical approach to the different categories of power and the characteristics of each 
one of them. The final aim is to allow the reader to come to terms with the concept of 




: POWER HIERARCHIES IN THE 





“Power in international politics is like the weather.  
Everyone talks about it, but few understand it”  (Nye, 1990b, p. 177) 
 
The available literature on power hierarchies in the International System is extremely 
vast, reflecting the International Relations concern with the ranking of nations and how 
they rise or fall. For the purposes of this chapter, the main focus will be on emerging 
powers and its related concepts. The problem, however, is that there is no consensus 
amongst scholars on when and how to use the term ‘emerging powers’ (Flemes & Gomes 
Saraiva, 2014; Gratius, 2008b; Nolte, 2006).  
 
In fact, during the last few decades, the field of International Relations has been flooded 
with the appearance of alternative concepts that could lead to confusion when referring 
to emerging powers. Some of these are: ‘global powers from the south’ (Lennon & 
Kozlowski, 2008), ‘middle powers’ (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013; Ryerson & Dewitt, 2006; 
Van der Westhuizen, 1998), ‘emerging middle power’ (A. F. Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008; 
A. Malamud, 2011; Schoeman, 2003), ‘southern middle power’ (Flemes, 2007b), ‘regional 
power’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Destradi, 2008; Korkut & Civelekoğlu, 2012; Nolte, 2010), 
‘secondary power’ (Ardila, 2014; Huntington, 1999), ‘intermediate powers’ (A. F. Cooper, 
1997; R. W. Cox & Sinclair, 1996; Hurrell, 2006; Keohane, 1969; Schoeman, 2003), ‘new 
intermediate power’ (Flemes, 2009; Juan G Tokatlián, 2007), ‘would-be great powers’ (A. 
F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013; Hurrell, 2006) or ‘ascending power’ (Y. J. Choi, 2009; Hurrell 
et al., 2000) amongst others. The result, according to Daniel Flemes (Pastrana Buelvas et 
al., 2012), is that this multiplicity of terms darkens the debate more than it illuminates it. 
Therefore, the following section will aim to explain the power hierarchies in the world 
today, define the terminology around emerging powers and its related concepts, and 
provide the definitions that will be used in this thesis. 
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4.1. THE POWER HIERARCHIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
As it was mentioned previously, the issue of power has been at the core of every 
International Relations debate. Since the establishment of the Westphalian world order, 
“there has always been a wide variety of hierarchical relationships within the 
International System, including empires, protectorates, spheres of influence, 
dependencies, and other relationships” (Lake, 2007, p. 48). What is remarkable is that, 
even though the structure of power affects every single State as an equally sovereign 
entity, the emphasis in the different studies on the topic is almost entirely based on 
countries considered ‘super powers’ or ‘great powers’ and their relationship with ‘the 
rest’20.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the radical line that divides the world into two realms – as stated by 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) – is also present in these studies as most of them have 
been carried out in the current or past ‘super powers’, namely the United States, the 
United Kingdom or France. In this regard, Daniel Flemes claims that the debates have 
focused on either the rise and fall of ‘hyper-powers’ or the power transition theory based 
on the specific forms of conflict between ‘ascending’ and ‘hegemonic’ powers (Pastrana 
Buelvas et al., 2012). He further draws on authors such as Chua (2009), Organski and 
Kugler (1981), Gilpin (1981), Tammen et al. (2000), Overholt (2008), Lake (2007), Kagan 
(2008), Haass (2008), Humphrey and Messner (2006), Friedberg (1993) and Nolte (2008) 
amongst others to argue that, in their works, the role of emerging powers and the link 
between regional and global orders has been largely ignored, and when it has not, it has 
been analysed in a comparative way and in a very superficial manner (Pastrana Buelvas 
et al., 2012).  
 
In 2013, Cooper and Flemes deal again with the structure of power in the International 
System and state:  
 
Significantly, however, this image of marginalisation in the scholarship is contradicted by 
a revival of interest in the middle power model predicated on alternative sources of capacity 
and agency in international politics. With a focus on such attributes as GDP and other 
                                                 
20 For one of the most notable exceptions, refer to Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputian’s Dilemmas: Small 
States in International Politics. International Organization, 23(2), 291–310. 
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dimensions of economic and demographic weight, a number of reports has pointed to the 
appearance of an ‘emerging middle’ in the global economy (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013, 
p. 956). 
 
In the previous paragraph, Cooper and Flemes subscribe to Nolte’s idea that “neither 
global or regional power hierarchies are stable” (Nolte, 2010, p. 887) and that the world 
is in a constant power shift. They also agree with recent literature by recognising the fact 
that the emergence of the South can no longer be marginalised in the debates. There is, 
then, an explicit need to further understand how power is organised in the world today.  
 
Keohane proposed a power hierarchy in 1969 that included the most important concepts 
– great, secondary, middle and small powers – and has been widely used and analysed 
in the International Relations scholarship for decades. Table 4.1. provides a ranked 
overview of Keohane’s concepts and categories. 
TABLE 4.1. CATEGORIES OF POWER ACCORDING TO KEOHANE (1969) 
TYPE OF POWER CHARACTERISTICS EXAMPLES 
GREAT POWER System-determining states: a state whose leaders 
consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps 
decisive, impact on the International System. 




System-influencing states: a state whose leaders 
consider that alone it can exercise some impact, 
although never in itself decisive, on that system. 
United Kingdom, France, 
West Germany, Japan, 
Communist China and 
perhaps India. 
MIDDLE POWER System-affecting countries: a state whose leaders 
consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may 
be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or 
through international institutions. 
Canada, Sweden, Pakistan, 
Brazil and Argentina. 
SMALL POWER System-ineffectual countries: a state whose leaders 
consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small 
group, make a significant impact on the system. 
Lesotho and an array of other 
states21 – most of which would 
fall into Vital’s population / 
development categories. 
 
Source: Adapted from Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputian’s Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. International 
Organization, 23(2), p. 293, 296. 
                                                 
21 David Vital draws the ‘rough upper limits’ for ‘small states’ as “a) a population of 10-15 million in the 
case of economically advanced countries; and b) a population of 20-30 million in the case of 
underdeveloped countries” (Vital, 1967, p. 8). What is noteworthy at this point is the fact that; even though 
Vital admits that this categorisation is “frankly subjective, if not arbitrary” (Vital, 1967, p. 8), he is still 
quoted in Keohane’s Lilliputian’s Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics as a valid parameter to 
classify countries in the International System. For more information, see Vital, D. (1967). The Inequality of 
States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations. New York City (NY), United States: Oxford 
University Press. 
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However, the world has changed radically since 1969 and, therefore, a few questions 
emerge at this point. After the fall of the Soviet Union, can the United States of America 
be considered as the sole superpower (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Huntington, 1999; Pape, 
2005) or have other emerging countries from the Global South like China or Russia joined 
the United States as superpowers located at the top of the pyramid (Bijian, 2005; Hancock, 
2007; Jacques, 2009)? Where are former superpowers – secondary powers according to 
Keohane (1969) – like France or Great Britain located in the current structure of power? 
What place do middle powers have in today’s world? Is there a difference between new 
middle powers like Brazil or South Africa and traditional middle powers like Australia 
or Canada? Are they on the same level? Is it accurate to place two microstates like 
Singapore and the Comoros in the same group even though their influence in the 
International System is radically different? Is it still possible to refer to other less powerful 
countries as the ‘mediocre rest’ (Flemes, 2007b)?  
 
TABLE 4.2. CATEGORIES OF POWER ACCORDING TO SÖREN SCHOLVIN (2010) 
TYPE OF POWER CHARACTERISTICS EXAMPLES 
SUPERPOWERS / PRIMARY 
POWERS 
Decisive influence all over the world United States / (Soviet 
Union)22 
GREAT POWERS /  
SECONDARY POWERS 
Relevant influence all over the world, decisive in some 
regions only 
France / Russia 
MIDDLE POWERS Too weak for independent global politics, relevant 
partners of great powers, focus on specific policies and 
peaceful means 
Australia / Canada 
REGIONAL POWERS / 
REGIONAL GREAT POWERS 
Strong focus on their regions, leading role in their 
region, relevant partners of great powers 
Brazil / South Africa 
SECONDARY REGIONAL 
POWERS 
Limited to their regions, face stronger states nearby and 
thus seek external partners for balancing, relevant 
partners of superpowers 
Argentina / Ukraine 
MINOR POWERS Limited to their regions, face stronger states nearby and 
thus seek external partners for balancing, relevant 
partners of superpowers 
(Cuba) / Egypt / Israel 
REGIONAL STATES Limited influence on direct neighbours, otherwise 
irrelevant 
Ethiopia / Tanzania 
MICROSTATES No relevant influence beyond their borders Malta / Haiti 
Source: Scholvin, S. (2010). Emerging Non-OECD Countries: Global Shifts in Power and Geopolitical Regionalization 
(GIGA Research Programme: Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations No. 128). Hamburg, p. 9.  
                                                 
22 Scholvin argues that “The USSR and Cuba are both included in this table as examples taken from 
Cantori’s and Spiegel’s work. This reflects the situation of 1970. Both countries have experienced a decline 
in power since the end of the Cold War” (Scholvin, 2010, p. 9). 
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To try to give an answer to all these questions, Sören Scholvin (2010) reviewed the works 
of important authors in the field such as Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, Detlef Nolte, 
Joseph Nye and Samuel Huntington, and developed a table that aimed to provide an 
accurate power hierarchy for the International System in 2010. According to Scholvin, the 
current categories are found in Table 4.2. 
 
In his table, Scholvin proposed what can be understood as the power hierarchy in the 
International System in 2010, the being the key word as he argues there is only one. 
However, Douglas Lemke (as cited in Nolte, 2010) suggests the existence of a multiple 
hierarchy model in which 
 
Instead of one international hierarchy of power, the international power hierarchy consists 
of a series of parallel and superposed power hierarchies. The subsystems function according 
to the same logic as the overall power hierarchy – each of the regional or sub-regional 
systems has a dominant state at the top of the regional or sub-regional power pyramid. The 
regional or sub-regional subsystems are subordinated to the global power hierarchy. The 
dominant power in the global hierarchy, and also other great powers, can interfere in the 
sub-systems, especially if the local status quo is at odds with the global dominant power’s 
preferences or the global patterns of political and economic resource allocation. Other issues 
– such as the delimitation of boundaries and territorial control in the region/sub-region – 
can be resolved within the framework of the regional/sub-regional power hierarchy. They 
are part of the regional/sub- regional status quo (Lemke, as cited in Nolte, 2010, p. 886). 
 
In order to examine the hierarchy in the International System today, this thesis will focus 
on the three criteria that determines a country’s power according to Detlef Nolte: power 
resources, leadership and self-conception (Nolte, 2010). It is important to mention at this 
point that, even though Nolte only uses these criteria when discussing what he calls a 
‘leading power’, the three elements are present in the works of a large number of authors 
in the field when defining any country’s role in the world, namely Joseph Nye (Nye, 
2008), Andre Hurrell (2006), Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier (2012), William 
Wohlforth (1999), Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Daniel Flemes (2012), Marijke Breuning 
(2007) and Sören Scholvin (2010), amongst others. 
 
But defining these three concepts is not an easy task. Most authors use the terms 
extensively throughout their works, assuming the reader knows what each one of them 
means, especially when it comes to power resources. Allusions to this concept are 
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everywhere but the definition is nowhere to be found. For example, in his article ‘How to 
compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics’, Nolte uses the concept 
of power resources as a fundamental part of his argument, but only defines it in a 
parenthesis when he states that it should be understood as “hard and soft power or smart 
power – the right combination of hard and soft power” (Nolte, 2010, p. 892). He includes 
“legitimacy and prestige” (Nolte, 2010, p. 896) in the definition a few pages later. There 
is no further explanation as to what hard and soft power actually are or what should be 
understood by legitimacy or prestige. Andrew Hurrell follows the same path when he 
argues that power resources mean the “possession of material, organisational and 
ideological resources for regional and international projection of power (power over 
outcomes)”23 (Translated by the author from Hurrell, as cited in Pastrana Buelvas et al., 
2012, p. 144). Again, no further reference is made as to what constitutes material, 
organisational or ideological resources and how they can contribute to the international 
projection of power. 
 
In contrast, Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego Vera Piñeros are two of the few scholars 
that have gone beyond the common approach to the concept of power resources in most 
of the literature. In their book Colombia y Brasil: ¿socios estratégicos en la construcción de 
Suramérica? (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012), the authors engage in a thorough analysis of 
Colombia’s power resources that provides an explanation of the concept. According to 
them, the power resources of a country can be understood in the following terms:  
 
1. Territorial Dimension: including size and location – absolute and relative to other 
centres of power. 
2. Demographic Dimension: size of the population and levels of education. 
3. Economic Dimension: including GDP size, GDP growth, unemployment, national 
production of goods and services, resources available within the national borders, 
exports and imports, industrialisation and levels of commercial diversification. 
4. Socio-economic Dimension: national income, poverty rates, Gini index, 
corruption, tax collection and human development index. 
                                                 
23 Original text in Spanish: “la posesión de recursos materiales, organizacionales e ideológicos para la 
proyección regional e internacional de poder (Power over Outcomes)” (Hurrell, as cited in Pastrana Buelvas 
et al., 2012, p. 144). 
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5. Military Dimension: military capacity, military expenditure, ability to guarantee 
internal public order and to defend the national borders against foreign threats.  
 
In contrast, the second term, leadership, is clearly defined in the literature. Nolte’s initial 
definition is short and simple when he states that “leadership refers to political influence 
in diplomatic forums” (Nolte, 2010, p. 890). He later elaborates on the concept by drawing 
on the works of Dirk Nabers on regional leadership: 
 
Nabers emphasises that leadership must be conceptualised as an activity (including leaders 
and followers) in an institutionalised context. Leadership also has a normative dimension 
because it depends on the ability of a regional power (or its leaders) to present its own 
particular worldview as being compatible with the aims of the regional followers. 
Leadership is conceptualised by Nabers as discursive hegemony (Nabers, as cited in Nolte, 
2010, p. 899). 
 
As for the concept of ‘self-conception’, Nolte not only gives a definition but also uses 
Andrew Hurrell to link it with the previous two determinants of power: power resources 
and leadership. In his words: 
 
Most authors do not refer to specific objective criteria or resources (GDP, military power, 
etc.) to differentiate middle powers from great powers or less powerful states. Rather, they 
define a middle power from a constructivist point of view as a self-created identity or an 
ideology for the conduct of foreign policy. Therefore, what applies for great powers is also 
true for middle powers and regional powers: ‘You can claim Great Power status but 
membership of the club of Great Powers is a social category that depends on recognition by 
others – by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept 
the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy. So a 
constructivist approach would view power hierarchies in terms of shared understandings 
that develop amongst groups of states.’ The status of middle power or regional power is a 
social category that depends on the recognition of this status and the corresponding power 
hierarchy by other states. Nevertheless, inclusion in this social category also presupposes 
the corresponding material resources (Nolte, 2010, p. 892). 
 
After a close look at these three concepts, it is possible to argue that a country’s position 
in the international power hierarchy depends on the amount of power resources it has, 
the will and ability to exercise its leadership in the world and whether or not it is 
recognised by other countries as a member of one of the different existing power 
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categories in the world. However, further analysis is required at this point to determine 
what the various categories of power are in the current International System. And at this 
point is where the existing literature becomes problematic as there is no consensus on 
what these categories should be. Nolte explains this problem very clearly when he argues 
that apart from  
the US as the only remaining superpower […], there is much less consensus as to the 
further characteristics of the international power hierarchy. Not even with regard to the 
terminology – secondary powers, second-tier states, great powers, intermediate states, 
middle powers, middle-tier states, regional (great) powers, to enumerate some examples – 
do the different authors or scientific approaches agree. The same applies to the semantic 
discrimination with regard to the concepts of great power, regional power and middle 
power (Nolte, 2010, p. 885). 
As a consequence of the abundance of terms and the lack of agreement in the scholarship, 
for the purposes of this thesis, a few alterations will be made to the categories of power 
established by Sören Scholvin in Table 4.2. in order to adapt the theoretical framework to 
the particular needs of this analysis. By doing so, the objective is not to ignore the 
contributions of many scholars in the field, but to select the terms needed to create a 
classification that allows for a better understanding of the world and the interface 
between cities and nations within this particular thesis. The selected hierarchy is 
presented in the following figure: 
 
FIGURE 4.1. SELECTED CATEGORIES OF POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Superpowers 
Middle Powers (Traditional & Emerging) 
Secondary Emerging Middle Powers 
Small Powers & Microstates 
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4.2. SELECTED CATEGORIES OF POWER IN  THE INTERNATIONAL 
SYSTEM 
 
Figure 4.1. includes the four categories of power selected by the author in an effort to 
understand the power hierarchy in the current International System. In the following 
paragraphs, each one of the four categories will be defined and explained. Also, reasons 





Being at the top of the pyramid, the superpower category is probably the least 
problematic of all the concepts as it usually refers to the role played by the United States 
of America in the world today. Samuel Huntington defined a superpower as a “state with 
pre-eminence in every domain of power – economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, 
technological, and cultural – with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in 
virtually every part of the world” (Huntington, 1999, p. 36). Robert Pape includes a few 
additional characteristics to the concept of superpower, using the United States as an 
example. He argues that 
 
The distinct quality of a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is 
powerful enough to balance against it. As a unipolar leader, the United States is also more 
secure than any other state in the world, able to determine the outcome of most 
international disputes, and has significant opportunities to control the internal and 
external behaviour of virtually any small state in the system (Pape, 2005, p. 11). 
In other words, using Nolte’s three criteria, a superpower is a country: a) whose power 
resources are, in every possible aspect, notably higher than those of any other State in the 
International System; b) its leadership and influence can be exercised in a decisive 
manner all over the world; and c) it is recognised as being part of the club of the most 
powerful countries on earth by all other countries.  
 
Today, it is clear that the United States of America is a superpower (Buzan & Wæver, 
2003; Nye, 2013). Its pre-eminence in the International System as the most powerful 
country in the world has been discussed and proved by almost every author in the field 
Chapter 4: Power hierarchies in the International System and the improving role of emerging powers 
 
72 
since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Hurrell et al., 2000; R. 
Mohan & Kapur, 2015; Pape, 2005). However, more and more, references to the decline 
of the United States as the only superpower can be found in the literature (M. Cox, 2007; 
Glosny, 2010; Hirsch, 1995; Nye, 2010; Schweller, 2011) giving way to the rise of possible 
new superpowers in the International System. Nolte mentions “a growing literature on 
[the United States of] America in decline and the post-American world” (Nolte, 2010, p. 
885), while Michael Cox goes further in the analysis to explain why the United States’ 
power is declining: 
 
We are still left with a [United States of] America that looks a little less like the great 
omnipotent portrayed in the 1990s. We are also confronted by something that only a few 
years ago some would have thought inconceivable: namely a serious debate – once again – 
about the future of American foreign policy in a world in which it is no longer able to shape 
events on the basis of its pre-existing international assets. […] Of course there are […] 
many things the United States can still do, and indeed ought to do, in the world. The one 
thing it is unable to do, though, is avoid the single most important law of international 
history: the one which insists that, however singular and exceptional a powerful nation's 
qualities might be, it cannot, for ever, expect to determine the way in which the 
international system operates. The question then is not whether decline is going to happen 
– it already is – but how successfully the United States will adjust to the process. There is 
no formulaic answer (M. Cox, 2007, pp. 652–653). 
 
However, the concept of decline needs to be put in perspective. Nye argues that “the 
word ‘decline’ mixes up two different dimensions: absolute decline, in the sense of decay, 
and relative decline, in which the power resources of other states grow or are used more 
effectively” (2010, p. 3). And it is the latter that seems to be happening in the world today. 
As it is commonly agreed in the literature, the most serious candidate to join the United 
States in the club of superpowers is China (Goldstein, 2001; Hu, 2011; Mahbubani, 2005, 
2009; Nye, 2010; Yueh, 2013). There are even authors that predict a world where China is 
more of a superpower than the United States. Zheng Bijian talks about ‘China’s ‘peaceful 
rise’ to great-power status’ (2005) while Martin Jacques goes beyond that statement with 
his book When China Rules the World: The rise of the middle kingdom and the end of the Western 
world (2009). The arguments to place China as a potential superpower evolve around its 
rising economy expected to surpass the United States by 2026 (Holodny, 2015), its 
growing military muscle (Goldstein, 2001) and its expanding diplomatic capability in the 
world (Bijian, 2005; Dördrechter et al., 2010; Glosny, 2010; J. Harris, 2005).  




The other candidate to join the United States in the superpowers club is Russia. According 
to Cynthia Roberts,  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has tried to deny the realities of unipolarity while 
grudgingly adjusting to its constraints. Now that American primacy is waning, Russia, 
the perennial outsider, aims to become an insider and a rule maker in the international 
system. Despite questioning the existing order's durability and legitimacy, Russia and the 
other BRICs seek to be among its managing directors, not to overthrow it (Roberts, 2010, 
p. 38). 
 
What is remarkable about Russia’s projection in the world today is that, even with power 
resources notably smaller than those of the United States or China, Vladimir Putin has 
managed to implement a foreign policy that may well be understood as one of a 
superpower (Allison, 2008; Hancock, 2007; Lo, 2003; Ružić, 2013). Moscow’s recent 
military incursions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria (MacFarlane, 2006; Nye, 2013), its 
alliance with China (Goldstein, 2001; Ong, 2009; Turner, 2009, 2011; Weitz, 2012), its 
dominant position in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Allison, 2008; Jonson, 2004; 
Turner, 2011) and its military power (Monaghan, 2016; Tsvetov, 2016; Zysk, 2009) have 
taken Russia to a new and improved position in the International System. However, as 
Hancock (2007) argues, the economy will be Russia’s biggest downfall, making it difficult 
for Moscow to maintain its leading role in the world in the following years. 
 
It must be noted at this point that none of the debates around which countries are 
superpowers and which countries are not consider cities as a determining variable. Cities 
are implicitly included in the countries’ power resources but they are not recognised as a 
separate contributing force to superpowership. Perhaps one of the reasons that could 
explain this phenomenon is the fact that neither Washington nor Beijing are the largest 
cities in the United States and China respectively. This, in turn, would mean there is a 
disconnection in the literature between the capital city where political power resides on 
one side and the largest cities where economic power is concentrated on the other. 
However, the situation is quite different for Moscow as it is the only city in a would-be 
superpower that holds both political and economic power. The city then comes close to 
having an urban image or proxy of the State in the analysis of Russia as a superpower. 
This can be clearly seen in the works of Allison (2008), Hancock (2007) and Lake (2007). 
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4.2.2. MIDDLE POWERS (TRADITIONAL AND EMERGING) AND SECONDARY 
MIDDLE POWERS 
The middle powers category is both the most important for this analysis and the most 
difficult to define. And it is difficult because, as it was mentioned previously, there is no 
agreement in the literature as to what terms should be used and what each one of them 
means. The term middle power – as well as other related terms such as secondary powers, 
second-tier States, great powers, intermediate States, middle-tier States and regional 
powers – has been extensively studied and, what is more problematic, interchanged in 
the scholarship. As stated by Andrew Hurrell,  
Many people have tried to construct a theory of middle powers but without conspicuous 
success. On the one hand, it has proved very hard to decide what the shared attributes of 
middle powers should be and which states are to be included in the category. On the other, 
it has proved harder still to associate a set of plausible shared attributes (GNP, military 
resources etc.) with common patterns of foreign policy behaviour. Putative middle powers 
end up as a very diverse group subject to a wide range of external circumstances. It has 
been very difficult to identify common patterns as to what they will do; and indeed as to 
what they can do (consider in our sample the degree to which India has sought to develop 
sizeable military capabilities whilst Brazil has largely downplayed hard military power). 
There are, then, few, if any, common patterns of behaviour as to how a particular group of 
middle or intermediate powers will [behave] internationally, because the variation in the 
types of states involved, the categories of power that they possess, and the arenas within 
which they operate are all so various (Hurrell et al., 2000, p. 1). 
The starting point for the concept of middle power was at the founding of the United 
Nations in 1945. Denis Stairs explains that, in preparation for the Conference of San 
Francisco, the concept was propagated by Canada and Australia to “provide a foundation 
for the claim of certain states – not great powers, but not pip-squeak powers, either – to 
an enhancement of their influence within the new United Nations Organisation under 
the terms of its constitutional ‘Charter’” (Stairs, 1998, p. 272). He then argues that the 
concept emerged just as “‘positional politics’, and nothing more” (Stairs, 1998, p. 272) 
from a group of countries that refused to have the same power as small countries, 
considered by them as ‘the rest’. 
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Though, since 1945, the concept of middle power has evolved, and more often than not, 
it has been used as a synonym for regional power. Adam Chapnick (as cited in Ardila, 
2014) argues that both terms are ambiguous and confusing. They are not static or 
permanent, and instead, their place in the structure of power can increase or decrease in 
time. In the same article, Marta Ardila also states that there are no reliable methods to 
examine the behaviour of middle powers. That is why most of the literature focuses on 
the characteristics of a regional power while ignoring those of a middle power. 
 
As a consequence, when trying to determine the nature of a middle power, most of its 
characteristics have been drawn and adapted from the definition of regional powers by 
the large majority of scholars (Ardila, 2014; Bonilla Montenegro, 2014; A. F. Cooper & 
Flemes, 2013; Nolte, 2006, 2010; Van der Westhuizen, 1998). However, there seems to be 
at least one exception. Maxi Schoeman distances herself from the rest by engaging in an 
analysis of the concept of middle power. In her article ‘South Africa and the world’ (2003), 
she starts by disregarding the importance of the region for the concept by arguing that  
 
Middle powers, as defined in the literature, would seem to exclude the regional position of 
a state aspiring to or enjoying the status of being a middle power. Another interpretation 
would be that a middle power is defined vis-à-vis the existence of a major power(s) and is 
therefore not seen as a major power writ small in its own region – the examples of Canada, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden support this interpretation. Cox notes that 
middle powers had no ‘special place in regional blocs’ (1996: 245) during the Cold War era 
and Wight (1979) distinguishes between regional powers and middle powers, the former 
having a geographically more restricted range (Schoeman, 2003, p. 350). 
Then Schoeman discusses the international capabilities of middle powers by claiming 
that the concept  
 
refers to their size and rank which places them in an international division of labour in 
which they have the opportunity of exerting a type of moral influence on the international 
system, a role they accept and actively seek to play. Although their position or rank is 
determined by the structure of the international system, their role and functions are not. 
Structure gives them the room or opportunity to take up a certain role (Schoeman, 2003, 
p. 350).  
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Finally, she addresses the participation of middle powers within the existing world order. 
As a middle power, she argues, a country “cannot impose its own vision of […] an ideal 
world in the presence of big or superpowers, it chooses, almost logically, to exert 
influence at the multilateral level where it can build consensus around certain issues” 
(Schoeman, 2003, p. 351). In other words, “a middle power is one active in international 
organisations, supporting the objectives of international peace and security, also as one 
of its defined ‘national interests’” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 351). 
 
To sum up, and once more taking Nolte’s three criteria into consideration, a middle 
power is a country whose power resources are big enough to allow for an influence at a 
global scale, but at the same time, that influence is not strong enough to alter the existing 
power structure. Also, it has the will to become an important actor in the world and acts 
accordingly; and its leadership and legitimacy are recognised by most actors in the 
system, even superpowers. A preference to act within the existing international 
organisations can be added to the definition. 
 
But another problem arises at this point: not all middle powers are the same and not all 
of them have the same influence in the International System. The previous statement is 
not only true because there are no two States in the world with exactly the same power 
resources, leadership and self-conception; it is also true because there are radical 
differences between the different groupings of middle powers. The following paragraphs 
will explain the two types of middle powers in the second level of the pyramid – 
traditional and emerging – as well as secondary middle powers located in the third level 
of the pyramid. 
 
The middle powers group is made up of two subcategories: Traditional and Emerging 
(D. R. Black & Hornsby, 2016; Nel, Taylor, & Van der Westhuizen, 2000), and the 
difference between the two is what makes the current International System different from 
the one that arose after the Cold War. As it was explained previously, the concept of 
middle power emerged in the midst of the creation of the United Nations in 1945 (Stairs, 
1998) and, as a consequence, the existence of middle powers has not been a strange 
phenomenon in the post Second World War period. The countries that can be classified 
as middle powers during the second half of the twentieth century – traditional middle 
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powers – differ greatly from those that can be classified as middle powers in the twenty 
first century – emerging middle powers –.  
 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries are 
located in the first group – the traditional middle powers (Nolte, 2010). These countries 
have achieved an extremely high standard of living for their populations and, through a 
focus on particular topics, have succeeded in obtaining important levels of influence in 
the International System. For example, Canada started with the ‘human security’ 
discourse in the decade of 1990 (Delgado Caicedo, 2007) and then modified the concept 
to introduce a new and improved one called ‘the responsibility to protect’ (McRae & 
Hubert, 2002). New Zealand, on the other hand, used the ‘denuclearisation of the world’ 
as the key tool in its foreign policy (Robson, 2000; R. Smith, 2002). So important was the 
anti-nuclear discourse for New Zealand that, in the mid-1980s, the government in 
Wellington forbid the United States to deploy nuclear submarines in its waters. The event 
was known as the ‘New Zealand – United States nuclear dispute’ and ended with New 
Zealand exiting the ANZUS military treaty with Australia and the United States (Tow & 
Albinski, 2002). 
 
In today’s world, the traditional middle powers are perceived as important because they 
emphasise “the promotion of international peace and security and therefore highly value 
participation in international organisations, particularly those concerned with arms 
control and disarmament and with socio-economic issues” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 363). 
However, this perception has started to change. Ryerson and Dewit explain the current 
situation in the following paragraph:  
The middle power governments continue to use the language of being internationally 
engaged, and of promoting the traditional set of middle power issues. Yet the actions and 
capabilities of these states became increasingly disconnected with the discourse of 
middlepowermanship. The international stature of these states was then affected by this 
perceived gap between public diplomacy and the capabilities and policy choices of such 
states. At the same time as there was a decline in the middle power role of the first 
generation of states [that is, traditional middle powers], the post-cold war period saw the 
emergence of several states in the South (Ryerson & Dewitt, 2006, pp. 17–18). 
And with that, Ryerson and Dewitt introduce the next category: emerging middle 
powers. In a world where the traditional middle powers are experiencing a clear decline 
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(Käkönen, 2013; Nolte, 2010), a new set of countries from the Global South are 
experiencing an outstanding increase in power in the International System. In regards to 
these new emerging powers, Jyrki Käkönen considers that “the issue is no longer about 
small or medium-sized capitalist success stories, but about states that also have the 
potential for political influence and are not satisfied with their current roles in the 
international order” (Käkönen, 2014, p. 94). Furthermore, Daniel Flemes proposes an 
approach that contradicts Nolte’s three criteria when he argues that in most of the 
scholarship, the accepted definition of emerging middle power is based mostly “on their 
international behavior rather than on their material power” (Flemes, 2007b, p. 8). That 
means that the focus of power for these new emerging powers is both on the leadership 
and the self-conception and not in the power resources, as it is usually the case in the 
International System. 
 
Some additional characteristics of emerging middle powers can be found in Schoeman’s 
‘South Africa and the world’ (2003):  
 
a) Emerging middle powers are part of the developing world and, furthermore, they 
are regional powers: “in their own regions, they are considered powerful, 
irrespective of whether they represent regional relationships of enmity or amity” 
(Schoeman, 2003, p. 351). 
b) While traditional middle powers played their role on a world scale, “emerging 
middle powers seem to play or are expected to play the role of regional 
peacemakers and police; they have the responsibility for keeping their backyard 
neat and orderly with a measure of support from the big powers” (Schoeman, 
2003, p. 351). 
c) It seems “that emerging powers face and exhibit a dual role. On the one hand, due 
either to their economic size, military power or geopolitical importance, the role 
of regional leader seems to be specific, if not special, and they are supported by 
the major powers. On the other hand, because moral standing may be a defining 
characteristic of their power status […] emerging powers would also seem, in turn, 
to strive for broader roles in the global system” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 353). 
For the purposes of this thesis, where Colombia and South Africa are the geographical 
focus, the category of emerging middle powers has also been divided in two: (primary) 
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emerging middle powers and secondary emerging middle powers. The former includes 
the three members of IBSA – namely India, Brazil and South Africa – as the countries that 
have been internationally recognised as the regional powers and leaders of the Global 
South for a longer period of time (Flemes, 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, Käkönen, 2013, 2014; 
Ryerson & Dewitt, 2006). On the contrary, the latter includes countries of the Global South 
that are actually ‘emerging’ – which means they have not yet achieved that status, but 
have started to be recognised as future middle powers. The countries that are located in 
this category are: Turkey (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016; Korkut & Civelekoğlu, 2012), Saudi 
Arabia (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015; Väyrynen, 1979), Mexico (Ardila, 2015; A. F. Cooper 
& Flemes, 2013), Indonesia (Kaur & Kaur, 2015), Colombia (Guerra-Barón, 2014; Pastrana 
Buelvas et al., 2012), Vietnam (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015; Kaur & Kaur, 2015), Egypt 
(Guerra-Barón, 2014; É. Vieira, 2011), Iran (Dördrechter et al., 2010) and Nigeria 
(Hawksworth & Chan, 2015), amongst others.  
 
However, it is essential to mention that, considering the international behaviour, 
particularities and recent history of this new set of emerging middle powers – or 
secondary emerging middle powers –, not all the characteristics mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs are applicable to them. In that sense, for example, it is extremely 
difficult to perceive Colombia as a regional peacemaker or police, as stated by Schoeman 
(2003), as its internal armed conflict has created tensions with its neighbours, particularly 
Venezuela and Ecuador, during the past few decades (Ardila, 2014; Borda & Tickner, 
2011; Carvajal, 2012; Ramírez, 2012). The same is true for countries like Iran or Saudi 
Arabia. Far from being peacemakers in the Middle East, the governments of these two 
countries have created a “sharp geopolitical divide between [them] and their respective 
allies and clients” (Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 22) since the United States military intervention 
in Iraq.  
 
Another characteristic that can be questioned is their role as regional powers. Schoeman 
states that “in their own regions, they are considered powerful, irrespective of whether 
they represent regional relationships of enmity or amity” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 351). This 
is certainly true for countries such as Nigeria or Turkey, but it is not so clear for others 
like Colombia or Vietnam. Since the regional power concept is not absolute, but depends 
on a given region and the countries located there, the fact that the former borders Brazil 
and the latter borders China brings a new parameter into the analysis. Can Vietnam truly 
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be considered as a regional power when the region includes more powerful countries like 
China, Indonesia, the Philippines or even Japan? Similarly, is Colombia a regional power 
when compared to Brazil or Mexico which are also in the same region? Probably the best 
way to address this problem is by introducing the concept of ‘secondary regional powers’ 
(Ardila, 2014; Ebert et al., 2012; Flemes & Castro, 2016; Nolte & Wehner, 2013). With this, 
taking into account that the difference in power between the main regional power and 
the secondary regional powers may be extremely significant, as it is between Colombia 
and Brazil or Vietnam and China, some of the emerging middle powers may not even be 
considered as regional powers at all as they might be overshadowed by the most 
powerful countries in their regions. 
 
As a consequence, the definition of middle power using Nolte’s three criteria (2010) needs 
to be put in perspective. The three elements are clearly visible in traditional middle 
powers and emerging middle powers, but as soon as the secondary emerging middle 
powers appear in the picture, Nolte’s criteria might become blurry. The reason for this is 
the fact that these countries are not middle powers just yet. As a result, their power 
resources may still not be big enough to have influence at a global scale; their 
international projection may still have some flaws; and its leadership and legitimacy may 
still not be recognised by most actors in the system. They are still in the journey to 
middlepowermanship and some of them may even fail in the process, while some others 
might become the next middle powers from the Global South in the near future. 
 
A summary of the traditional, emerging and secondary emerging powers discussed in 
this section can be found in Table 4.3.: 
 
TABLE 4.3. SUMMARY OF SELECTED MIDDLE POWERS BY CATEGORY 
TRADITIONAL EMERGING SECONDARY EMERGING 
 Australia  Brazil  Colombia 
 Canada  India   Egypt 
 Finland  South Africa   Indonesia 
 Netherlands   Iran 
 New Zealand   Mexico 
 Norway   Nigeria 
 Sweden   Saudi Arabia 
   Turkey 
   Vietnam 
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4.2.3. SMALL POWERS AND MICROSTATES 
 
The last two categories, small powers and microstates, could easily be defined by 
exclusion, that is, every country that is not included in the previous categories. 
Nevertheless, a further explanation is needed. What is interesting, however, is that the 
literature often refers to these States in rather derogatory terms. For example, Doug Lieb 
wrote an article in which even the title would undoubtedly upset a few presidents: ‘The 
Limits of Neorealism: Marginal States and International Relations Theory’ (2004). The 
words used by Lieb in his article to describe these countries range from “less powerful 
nations” to “small states” to “impotent states at the margins of broad military coalitions” 
(Lieb, 2004, p. 26).  
 
It is difficult to provide an accurate definition for small powers as the category includes 
countries and territories with extremely high standards of living such as Latvia, Slovenia 
or Taiwan, as well as very poor countries like Mauritania, Afghanistan, Honduras or 
Haiti. What is common to both cases, however, is their inability to make a significant 
impact on the International System, either alone or in a small group (Keohane, 1969). This 
characteristic is, of course, shared with microstates which are also small powers but, at 
the same time, are further limited by an extremely small territory, scarce resources and 
very few inhabitants (Armstrong & Read, 2000). However, the difficulty mentioned 
earlier in this paragraph arises again as microstates with very high standards of living 
and a considerably large international involvement like Singapore, Andorra or 
Liechtenstein are placed in the same category as some other microstates where poverty 
rates are high and international involvement extremely low like the Comoros, Kiribati or 
the Solomon Islands (The World Bank, 2016k).   
 
The previous paragraph demonstrates that, at least for small powers and microstates, a 
high Human Development Index or GDP per capita may have a significant impact in the 
way the country engages with the world, but they do not prevent it from being placed in 
the same category with the poorest and smallest countries in the International System. A 
small country, even if it is extremely rich, will always have limited power resources and, 
therefore, its place in the international hierarchy of power will most likely be affected by 
its inability to significantly impact world politics. 
 





After drawing from scholars rooted in International Relations, Sociology, Political Science 
and Economics to define and enrich the concepts needed for this thesis, and after 
analysing the emergence of the Global South in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 provides the reader 
with an analysis of power hierarchies in the International System. It was evident that the 
wider literature tends to use concepts such as ‘emerging powers’, ‘middle powers’ or 
‘regional powers’ indistinctively, but there is no consensus as to what the characteristics 
of each one of them are. The limits between them are blurry and academics agree that it 
is not clear what exactly constitutes an emerging power.  
 
This ambiguity of concepts and the difficulty to provide accurate definitions pose an 
important problem for the field of International Relations because authors tend to ignore 
the need for definitions or simply avoid the debate. As it was shown in Chapter 4, most 
academics talk about ‘regional powers’ because the geographic component makes the 
term easier to define, while, at the same time, they make mention of ‘middle powers’ or 
‘emerging powers’ but few actually engage with the concept and try to provide a 
definition. 
 
Since a definition of emerging powers – also known as emerging middle powers – is 
crucial for this research, a combination of the works of Pastrana Buelvas and Vera 
Piñeros, Nolte, Hurrell, Schoeman and Scholvin amongst others was used to solve the 
conceptual ambiguity around ‘emerging powers’. Chapter 4 also draws on the works 
previously mentioned to provide a power hierarchy that meets the needs of this thesis 
while keeping the most significant contributions from the field.  
 
However, the most important point raised by this chapter is the fact that the hierarchy of 
States in the International System is fluid. The rise of potential superpowers like China 
(Goldstein, 2001; Hu, 2011; Mahbubani, 2005, 2009; Nye, 2010; Yueh, 2013) or Russia 
(Allison, 2008; Hancock, 2007; Lo, 2003; Roberts, 2010; Ružić, 2013) and an “emerging 
middle” in the global economy (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013), as well as the decline of 
the United States (M. Cox, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Nye, 2010; Schweller, 2011) are clear proof 
of this fluidity. To suggest that the place of a State in the system can and will change over 
time implies a fundamental realignment of global power. It provides a departure from 
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the idea of a permanent hegemonic Global North and becomes the way in which the 
current North–South divide can be modified. This is an essential notion for this thesis as 
it acknowledges the possibility of countries from the Global South to become emerging 
powers and alter their place in the international hierarchy of States.  
 
Overall, the chapters that comprise Part 2 of this thesis provide the background for the 
analysis of the power resources of Colombia and South Africa as emerging powers in Part 
3. By taking into consideration the definitions already provided in this Part, the next two 
chapters will apply both the emerging powers theory and a geopolitical analysis to the 
two case studies of this thesis to determine whether Colombia and South Africa can 
indeed be considered emerging powers and what role the cities of Bogotá and 






PART  3 
THE POWER RESOURCES OF 
EMERGING POWERS: DO CITIES 
MATTER? THE CASES OF BOGOTÁ, 






Thus far, several important findings have emerged from the thesis. By analysing the 
International Relations and Urban Studies scholarship, Chapter 2 was able to 
demonstrate that the two bodies of literature do not recognise the importance of each 
other and, therefore, make the practice of interdisciplinarity extremely difficult. This, in 
turn, means that the theoretical ideas are not translating to inform the practice. Since the 
interface between the city and International Relations has not been conceptualised in the 
literature, there is a need for further exploration that allows for a better understanding of 
the role of cities in their country’s emerging status and its official foreign policy.  
 
Then, the thesis moved to analyse the current International System. Chapter 3 showed 
conclusively that the State, as the single actor legally capable of having sovereignty, is the 
only one allowed to have a foreign policy and thus, becomes the main subject both for 
International Relations and in the International System. This, in turn, means that cities 
are bypassed, overlooked or ignored as fundamental parts of the States and, as such, also 
of their foreign policy. This chapter also reinforced the idea that the world is experiencing 
the single largest power shift in history created by the rise of emerging powers from the 
Global South that, now, are starting to shape the way in which the International System 
functions.  
 
There was also a need to analyse the concept of ‘emerging power’. Chapter 4 compared 
it with other similar concepts such as ‘regional powers’, ‘middle powers’ or ‘secondary 
middle powers’ to conclude that there are no clear limits between all of them. Since very 
few academics engage in the definition of these concepts, there is no consensus on what 
each one of them really means. This conceptual ambiguity was solved by using the work 
of Detlef Nolte (2010) and expanding it to satisfy the particular needs of this thesis. 
 
At this point, the discussion shifts to ground Nolte’s contributions for two case studies: 
Bogotá, Colombia and Johannesburg, South Africa. The investigation is structured 
around the question of whether Colombia and South Africa can currently be regarded as 
emerging powers from the Global South. From this primary assessment, the secondary 
discussion deals with the questions of if and how the cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg 
matter in the international projection of both countries. Having demonstrated that 
Colombia and South Africa are, indeed, emerging powers from the Global South and that 




the international arena, the last Part (Part 4) seeks to explain that there is nevertheless a 
constitutional, institutional and operational mismatch in the role of cities in the official 
foreign policy of emerging powers. 
 
To understand the emerging and fluid status of Colombia and South Africa in the global 
system, the chapters in this Part engage, first, in a comprehensive geopolitical analysis of 
the countries and second, with their major cities (Bogotá and Johannesburg) in the world 
today. Drawing on the works of Detlef Nolte (2010) and his theory on leading powers, 
the role of the State in the world is assessed against three key factors: its power resources, 
its leadership – either globally or regionally – and its perception in the world – both by 
the country itself and by other countries. 
 
Nolte’s framing, and the body of International Relations literature from which it draws, 
is flawed in suggesting specific metrics of relevance to determine a country’s place in the 
international hierarchy of power and is even less useful in applying the conventional 
understandings of power in the global system to measuring the impact of cities as global 
actors themselves or as contributors to their countries’ upward global trajectory. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, many scholars in the International Relations field use 
and explain the concepts of ‘power resources’, ‘leadership’ and ‘international perception’ 
or ‘self-conception’, but very few make the effort to explain how to measure them.  
 
In trying to identify the dynamics of emerging nations and in scaling these concepts to 
take on board the role of cities in the growing international profile of these nations, there 
is both less discursive coherence and the metrics that might help to bring the conceptual 
objects into view are weak. That said, there is value in making legible and comparable 
the global dimensions of city and national performance, especially for Southern contexts 
where countries’ status and influence are shifting rapidly. To this end, still drawing on 
Nolte’s broad framing, Chapters 5 to 7 lay bare the information on Colombia (Bogotá) 
and South Africa (Johannesburg) in the International System. 
 
While Nolte is unspecific about the application of his ideas and the empirical 
substantiation that might be necessary to verify or refine the conceptual framework he 
posits, there is other work that takes up the issue of a more appropriate empirical 




can be found in the works of Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas, Stefan Jost and Daniel Flemes 
(2012) and Marijke Breuning (2007). The overall development of metrics on power 
resources in the wider State literature is still embryonic; nonetheless, Pastrana Buelvas et 
al. and Breuning provide a valuable starting point. The situation is less robust when 
dealing with metrics of ‘leadership’ and ‘international perception’. As it was explained 
in the previous chapter using the work of Hurrell et al. (2000), for these two concepts, the 
metrics are almost non-existent and that creates a clear gap in the scholarship.  
 
But the fact that it is difficult does not mean that it cannot be done. Building on the 
emerging practices to assess national and city power, and developing this for the city 
scale, Chapters 5 and 6 engage with the power resources analysis for Colombia and South 
Africa based on the works already conducted by Pastrana Buelvas et al. Also, expanding 
the methodological approach to accommodate the cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg 
creates a geopolitical perspective which allows for a better understanding of the link 
between the power resources of the city and the country in the international projection of 
emerging powers. In other words, these two chapters explore the connection between 
urbanisation, development (Turok & McGranahan, 2013) and economic growth (Chen et 
al., 2014). 
 
Chapter 7 on ‘leadership’ and ‘international perception’ for both Colombia and Bogotá, 
and South Africa and Johannesburg is somewhat more problematic. Considering there 
are no quantitative metrics, there is a need for a better understanding on whether cities 
have an impact on the leadership and international perception of emerging powers, and 
thus, this chapter will be almost entirely based on a qualitative analysis. The city profiles 
and analysis will aim at filling the gap in the literature on formal metrics by drawing on 
interviews, newspapers and journal articles, information on international meetings and 
summits, and official documents.  
 
This Part will show that there is a clear imbalance between the availability of metrics for 
‘power resources’ on one side and that of ‘leadership’ and ‘international perception’ on 
the other. The reason behind this imbalance is the difficulty to assign specific metrics to 
abstract, and oftentimes unquantifiable, issues related to the behaviour of a State in the 
world (leadership) or how it is perceived by itself and other international actors. 




better formed than that of the other two concepts, the reader will find, on one side, two 
chapters dedicated to the analysis of power resources for Colombia and Bogotá (Chapter 
5) and South Africa and Johannesburg (Chapter 6), and, on the other, only one chapter 
(Chapter 7) dealing with the leadership and international recognition for both case 
studies.  
 
The structure for this Part allows for a better engagement with the three variables and 
their application to the two case studies. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the power resources 
of Colombia and South Africa respectively in order to come to terms on what these 
countries have to back up their emergence in the world and how Bogotá and 
Johannesburg contribute in this process. Then Chapter 7 deals with two issues. First, it 
analyses the countries’ leadership in the International System to understand what they do 
with their power resources – including their largest cities – to emerge in the world. And 
second, the chapter focuses on the effects or consequences of what they have and how they 
have used it, that is, how they have influenced their international recognition to 
demonstrate that Colombia and South Africa can indeed be considered emerging powers 
and that Bogotá and Johannesburg play a key role in their countries’ emergence in the 
world. Finally, since this thesis does not engage in a comparative analysis, Chapter 7 
deals with both case studies separately: first with Colombia on Section 7.1. and then with 
South Africa on Section 7.2. 
 
One additional issue must be highlighted at this point. Given the fluid nature of the 
hierarchy of power in the International System, States can change their place in the world 
by modifying their power resources, leadership and international recognition. The key 
verb is to modify. However, not all three variables can be modified in the same way. In 
turn, Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the power resources of Colombia and South Africa which 
are in some senses fixed. Components such as size and geography are almost immutable 
while others like demography or the economy are somewhat more flexible. Power 
resources can be modified and these two chapters demonstrate it. Nonetheless, the 
process of modifying them is slow and oftentimes quite difficult.   
 
On the contrary, when dealing with the questions of leadership and international 
recognition in Chapter 7, there is a lot more flexibility. Governments – both national and 




country’s foreign policy tools as well as both State and city promotion can have an 
outstanding impact in their leadership and international recognition as it is demonstrated 
in the Colombian and South African cases. These are two variables that can be turned 
around, influenced and even manipulated in much quicker and easier ways by 
governments. Consequently, the reader will find that the pace of the change for power 





: COLOMBIA, AN EMERGING POWER IN SPITE 
OF ITS PAST. BOGOTÁ, ITS POWERHOUSE 
 
Even with the widespread disagreement amongst scholars on what constitutes an 
emerging power, a common meeting point for most of them is the fact that the size of its 
power resources is indeed a crucial determinant (Actis & Zelicovich, 2016; A. F. Cooper 
et al., 1991; Hurrell, 2006; Nolte, 2010; Nolte & Hoffmann, 2007; Nye, 1990b; Pape, 2005; 
Stewart-Ingersoll & Frazier, 2012). In other words, the way a State interacts with the rest 
of the world depends greatly on its power, which, in turn, is determined by all the 
resources it possesses within its borders.  
 
When analysing the power resources of a State, a comprehensive approach that covers 
all possible variables is needed. Spykman made it clear when he stated that the power of 
States depends not only on their military capacities, but also on the “size of territory, 
nature of frontiers, size of population, absence or presence of raw materials, economic 
and technological development, financial strength, ethnic homogeneity, effective social 
integration, political stability, and national spirit” (Furniss, 1952, p. 385).  
 
This chapter engages with the nascent metrics on power resources proposed by Pastrana 
Buelvas et al. (2012) and, to a lesser extent, Breuning (2007). It first draws from the 
authors’ five dimensions – territorial, demographic, economic, socio-economic and 
military – to undertake a geopolitical analysis of the power resources of Colombia. Also, 
taking into consideration that the field of geopolitics focuses on the State, it innovates by 
expanding this analysis to the city and examines the five dimensions for Bogotá. The final 
aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the power resources of Colombia are indeed 
those of an emerging power and that Bogotá is a crucial component of them. 
 
 
5.1. UNDERSTANDING THE TERRITORY: A GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS 
OF COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ 
 
The first dimension proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al. (2012) is related to the territory 
as a fundamental part of the State. In fact, according to Article 1 of the Montevideo 
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Convention (Organization of American States, 1933), a State cannot exist without a 
territory. Furthermore, in the words of Agnew and Corbridge, “The merging of the state 
with a clearly bounded territory is the geographical essence of the field of international 
relations” (As cited in Death, 2016, p. 72). In turn, a State’s territory defines its boundaries 
and contains all its population, resources and economic activities. It also contains its cities 
as drivers of an important share of the country’s economy. This part focuses on an 
analysis of the Colombian territory, what it means in terms of its power resources and 
how the city of Bogotá contributes to this territorial dimension of the State. 
 
Colombia is the 25th largest country in the world (CIA, 2016a) with a land area of 
1,141,748 square kilometres and a maritime area of 928,660 square kilometres (Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016b). It is the fourth largest country in South America, the 
seventh largest in the Americas and is slightly smaller than South Africa, the other case 
study in this thesis (CIA, 2016a). When considering the total internal area – land area plus 
inland water bodies – plus the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ)24, Colombia is the 29th 
largest country on earth (CIA, 2016a; Marine Regions, 2016).  
 
Located in the North-West corner of the South American landmass, with coasts in the 
Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea and right next to the Panama Canal, Colombia is 
undoubtedly one of the best strategically located countries in the Americas. Its territory 
is one of the most varied on earth, ranging from the snow-capped peaks of the Andes to 
the rainforests on the Pacific coast and the Amazon in the South, Colombia’s five clearly 
identified geographical regions (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016b) make the 
country a megadiversity hotspot in the world. According to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 
 
Colombia is listed as one of the world’s “megadiverse” countries, hosting close to 10% of 
the planet’s biodiversity. Worldwide, it ranks first in bird and orchid species diversity and 
second in plants, butterflies, freshwater fishes and amphibians. With 314 types of 
                                                 
24 Because it includes the Exclusive Economic Zone (EZZ), this ranking is quite problematic as it states that, 
overall, insular micro-states such as Micronesia, the Marshall Islands or Kiribati are much bigger than 
countries like Colombia or South Africa. For example, the Federated States of Micronesia has an EEZ that 
covers roughly 2,939,300 km2 while only having a land area of 701 km2. Thus, for Micronesia, only 0.023% 
of its territory is land (Bell et al., 2011, p. 35) whereas, for Colombia, 55.14% of its territory is land (Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016b). Therefore, this ranking must be analysed carefully as the land area for 
Colombia is 1,628.74 times bigger than that of Micronesia. 
Chapter 5: Colombia, an emerging power in spite of its past. Bogotá, its powerhouse 
 
92 
ecosystems, Colombia possesses a rich complexity of ecological, climatic, biological and 
ecosystem components. Colombia was ranked as one of the world’s richest countries in 
aquatic resources, which is explained in part by the fact that the country’s large watersheds 
feed into the four massive sub-continental basins of the Amazon, Orinoco, Caribbean, 
Magdalena-Cauca and the Pacific. The country has several areas of high biological diversity 
in the Andean ecosystems, characterized by a significant variety of endemic species, 
followed by the Amazon rainforests and the humid ecosystems in the Chocó biogeographical 
area (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2016a). 
 
Most of Colombia’s cities are located on the Andean region that starts on the border with 
Ecuador in the South-West and crosses the country diagonally all the way to the 
Venezuelan border in the North-East. Unlike other countries in South America, the 
Colombian Andes spread into three different mountain ranges as soon as they enter the 
country. This fact constitutes a biodiversity advantage but it has also halted the 
development of an adequate roads and train infrastructure. The building of highways 
and train tracks is extremely difficult given the nature of the Colombian territory (Pérez, 
2005). Even with the current efforts being made by the government to build an 
appropriate road network in the country, land travel between the major urban centres is 
still slow and inefficient (Franco García, 2012) and almost half of the national territory, 
especially the South-East Departments in the Amazonía and Orinoquía regions, is yet to 
be connected to the network (Instituto Nacional de Vías, 2016).  
 
The islands of San Andrés and Providencia, 16 keys and 5 banks in the Caribbean 
(Gobernación del Archipiélago de San Andrés Providencia y Santa Catalina, 2016) and 
the Island of Malpelo in the Pacific Ocean expand the Colombian Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) considerably. Consequently, the country has control over large portions of 
the Southern Caribbean, starting at the maritime border with Nicaragua on the West to 
just South of the Dominican Republic on the East. That also means that most of the ships 
that go through the Panama Canal must use Colombian waters at some point (See Figures 
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FIGURE 5.1. MAP OF COLOMBIA 
 
 
Note: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi [cartographer]. (2001). Mapa Oficial de la República de Colombia [map]. 
1:2’500.000. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/Contenidos-mapa-general-Colombia-
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FIGURE 5.2. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES (EEZ) OF COLOMBIA 
 
 
Note: Flanders Marine Institute [cartographer]. (2016a). Sovereign: Colombia · MRGID 8426 [map]. Retrieved from 
http://marineregions.org/eezdetails.php?mrgid=8426&all_territories=1&zone=eez. Reprinted with permission. 
 
Bogotá, the capital city, is located 2,625 metres above the sea level on a plateau on top of 
the Eastern Andes (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2015). With an area of 1,578 square 
kilometres (Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas, 2017), Bogotá accounts only 
for 0.1382% of the national territory. Out of the 1,578 km2, 780 km2 belong to the Sumapaz 
Páramo25, the only rural area within the limits of the Capital District of the city of Bogotá 
(Secretaría de Cultura Recreación y Deporte, 2016). Also, within the Sumapaz Páramo, an 
area of 2,231.79 km2 constitutes the Sumapaz Páramo National Park which represents 
approximately 43% of the world’s largest páramo complex in the world (Parques 
Nacionales Naturales de Colombia, 2016) making the city itself a biodiversity hotspot. 
 
Considering the geographical location of Colombia, Bogotá is strategically located right 
at the heart of the Americas. Consequently, most of the major economic centres on the 
                                                 
25 A páramo is “a high treeless plateau in tropical South America” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). Furthermore, 
Zdravko Baruch describes them as follows: “The páramo is a neotropical high mountain biome with a 
vegetation composed mainly of giant rosette plants, shrubs and grasses. Latitudinally, it extends from 
Colombia to northern Peru; altitudinally, it forms a belt between the upper treeline and the perpetual 
snowfields” (Baruch, 1984, p. 115) . 
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continent can be reached by plane in 6 hours or less. A flight to New York City takes 5.30 
hours, 5.15 hours to Washington, 5.45 hours to Mexico City, 5.40 to Santiago and 5.00 to 
São Paulo (See Figure 5.3.a.)  (Invest in Bogotá, 2012). Also, all the other economic centres 
in the country such as Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena or Bucaramanga can be 
reached by plane in 1.30 hours or less (See Figure 5.3.b.). Most national routes start in 
Bogotá (Instituto Nacional de Vías, 2016) and the government is currently increasing the 
connectivity of the city with a USD 12,5 billion investment in 30 highways known as 
“Autopistas 4G” (See Figure 5.4.) (El Tiempo, 2016a). Also, the national railway network 
is currently being rehabilitated and expanded in order to connect the centre of the country 
– where Bogotá is located – with the port city of Santa Marta on the Caribbean coast 
(Blanco Ríos, 2016). It is expected that the city will be able to take a greater advantage of 
its geographical location once all these projects are finished within the next five years. 
  





Note 1: Data as of May 19, 2017 
Note 2: Data from “Un Aeropuerto. 70+ destinos directos”, by Aeropuerto Internacional El Dorado, 2016, 
(https://eldorado.aero/sobre-el-aeropuerto/destinos/) Copyright 2016 by Aeropuerto Internacional El 
Dorado. Produced by author. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.3.A. INTERNATIONAL ROUTES 
FROM EL DORADO INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT IN BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA 
FIGURE 5.3.B. DOMESTIC 
ROUTES FROM EL DORADO 
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN 
BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA 
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                               FIGURE 5.4. NATIONAL ROUTES OF COLOMBIA 
 
 
Note: Logistics Cluster / World Food Programme [cartographer]. Colombia Road Network [map]. (2015). Retrieved 
from http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.3+Colombia+Red+Carretera;jsessionid=CCCE6E8B9F7D3C6 
9611663FF63A23A82. Reprinted with permission. 
 
Apart from the infrastructural difficulties that the varied and diverse Colombian territory 
poses for the government, in a world where globalisation and climate change are key 
issues of the global agenda, its outstanding geostrategic location and megadiversity are 
not only advantageous for the country but also a fundamental part of its power resources. 
Furthermore, due to the current environmental degradation in the world, it could be 
argued that these two elements will increase the importance of Colombia in the 
International System in the following decades.  
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5.2. DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
PEOPLE 
 
The second dimension deals with demography and involves not only the size but also the 
characteristics of a country’s population. The relationship between population and 
economic power seems to be clear. Perkins and Syrquin (1989) demonstrated that the size 
of a country’s population has a dominant influence on its economic structure and 
performance, and thus, on its ability to become an emerging nation in the International 
System.  Furthermore, given the rapid growth of large cities in many Southern nations 
(Parnell & Oldfield, 2014), Bogotá being a case in point, a demographic analysis of 
Colombia and Bogotá provides for a better understanding of the national and local 
emergence in the world.  
 
With an estimated population of 47,220,856 inhabitants, Colombia is the 30th most 
populated country on earth, the second most populated in South America after Brazil and 
the third in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico (CIA, 2016d). It is also slightly less 
populated than South Africa, the other case study in this thesis, which comes in number 
26 on the list (CIA, 2016d). More than a quarter of the country’s population is younger 
than 15 years old (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016) and the largest age 
group is located between 25 and 51 years old with approximately 41.82% (CIA, 2016e). 
Even though the population growth rate has slowed down during the past decades going 
from 3.0% in 1961 to 0.9% in 2015 (See Figures 5.5.a. and 5.5.b.) (The World Bank, 2016q), 
Colombia’s rate is still more than twice as high as the average of the OECD countries (See 
Figure 5.6.) (OECD, 2016a). 
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FIGURE 5.5. POPULATION GROWTH IN COLOMBIA (1960-2016) 
 
 
FIGURE 5.6. POPULATION GROWTH IN THE OECD COUNTRIES AND COLOMBIA (2014) 
 
 
Note: Data from “ALFS Summary tables: Population growth rate”, by OECD.Stat, 2016, 
(http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=27482) Copyright 2016 by OECD.Stat. In the public domain. 
Colombia is mainly an urban country. Approximately 76% of its inhabitants live in cities 
whereas urbanisation rates largely vary from one region to another. Out of the 1,122 




































































































































































































Note: Data from “Population growth (annual %)”, by The 
World Bank, 2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
SP.POP.GROW? locations=CO) Copyright 2016 by the 






































































Note: Data from “Population, total”, by The World Bank, 
2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL? 
locations=CO) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the 
public domain. 
FIGURE 5.5.A. POPULATION GROWTH 
IN COLOMBIA (IN MILLIONS) (1960-
2016) 
FIGURE 5.5.B. POPULATION GROWTH 
RATES IN COLOMBIA (IN %) (1960-
2016) 
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de Educación Nacional, 2016). Four cities – Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla - 
currently have more than one million inhabitants. Bogotá has a population of 7,963,379 
in the city alone, but it goes up to 8,502,443 inhabitants if the city of Soacha – located 
within same conurbation – is included (DANE, 2016e). It must be noted that there is a 5.5 
million people difference between Bogotá, the most populated city in the country, and 
Medellín, the city in second place (See Figure 5.7.) (DANE, 2016e). Consequently, Bogotá 
is extremely important for Colombia in demographic terms as it accounts for 
approximately 17% of the country’s population. If the city of Bogotá was a country, it 
would have a similar number of residents as Jordan, Switzerland or Israel (CIA, 2016d). 
 




Note: Data for 2015 adapted from “Proyecciones Población Municipales por Área - DANE”, by Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE, 2016, 
(http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/poblacion/proyepobla06_20/ ProyeccionMunicipios2005_2020.xls) 
Copyright 2016 by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE. Reprinted with permission. 
In terms of education, Colombia has shown outstanding improvements during the last 
decade. According to the OECD and the Ministry of Education, between 2000 and 2013, 
the proportion of children attending pre-school increased from 36% to 45%; from 59% to 
70% for grades 6 to 9; from 30% to 41% for grades 10 to 11; and from 24% to 48% for 
graduate studies (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016). Colombia has also 
been able to increase the retention rate in school by 2 years, going from 11.4 years in 2001 
to 13.5 in 2010 (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016). But there are still 
problems to be faced. The constant desertion rates and a weak transition rate between the 
different education levels result in a considerably high rate of 36% of young people 
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between the ages of 15 and 19 that are not attending school. That rate is similar to that of 
Mexico (35%) but more than double the rate of OECD countries (13%) (OECD & 
Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016). 
 
As for Bogotá, the city has 1.5 million people attending pre-school and grades 1 to 9, 
approximately 14% of the students in the same grades in the country. Furthermore, 
between 2002 and 2011, Bogotá increased the number of students in its schools by 21% 
(Delgado Barrera, 2014), however, 30% of students dropped out of school after grade 9 
(Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2015). The city is also the powerhouse 
for higher education in the country. In 2012, Bogotá had 115 higher education institutions 
that offered 2,300 different graduate programmes to 861,000 students. Also, 
approximately 94,000 students finish their higher education degrees in the city every 
year, more than the entire countries of Peru or Chile (Invest in Bogotá, 2012). The 
education infrastructure and capacity in Bogotá is so developed that only the graduate 
student population in the city is larger than the whole population of Cúcuta, the sixth 
largest city in Colombia (DANE, 2016e; Invest in Bogotá, 2012). 
 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), calculations for 
Colombia indicate that twelve or more years of schooling increase the chances of not 
falling into poverty by 80%. This objective is about to be achieved in Bogotá for people 
between the ages of 15 and 24 as the average years of schooling for the city is 1.7 years 
higher than the national average (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2015). 
To sum up, both Colombia and Bogotá still have a long way to go in terms of education, 
however, the improvements in the sector during the past decade are outstanding. There 
are currently joint efforts being carried out by both the private and the public sectors to 
increase the funding for education in the country. In fact, between 2000 and 2013, the 
public spending in education went from 3.5% to 4.9% of the national GDP, which is 
slightly lower than the average of 5.0% for OECD countries in 2011 (OECD & Ministerio 
de Educación Nacional, 2016).  
 
Finally, as part of the demographic dimension, there is a need to analyse the implications 
of language for Colombia. According to Cristine Severo, there is a direct relationship 
between language and power, especially when it is a widely spoken language in the 
world, as it allows its speakers to have a better understanding of the available information 
Chapter 5: Colombia, an emerging power in spite of its past. Bogotá, its powerhouse 
 
101 
and empowers them to engage with other actors at the international level (Severo, 2013). 
With Spanish as the second language with the most native speakers in the world (See 
Figure 5.8.a.) and the third with the most overall speakers (See Figure 5.8.b.) (Ethnologue, 
2016b), Colombia gains a linguistic and geopolitical importance as the second largest 
Spanish speaking country by number of speakers after Mexico and before Argentina and 
Spain (Ethnologue, 2016a). 
 









































































































FIGURE 5.8.B. COUNTRIES WITH THE 
MOST SPANISH SPEAKERS IN THE 
WORLD (2016) 
Note: Data for 2016 adapted from “Spanish”, by 
Ethnologue – Languages of the World, 2016, 
(https://www.ethnologue.com/language/spa) 
Copyright 2016 by Ethnologue – Languages of the 
World. Printed with permission. 
Note: Data for 2016 adapted from “Languages with at 
least 50 million first-language speakers”, by 
Ethnologue – Languages of the World, 2016, 
(https://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/size) 
Copyright 2016 by Ethnologue – Languages of the 
World. Printed with permission. 
FIGURE 5.8.A. LANGUAGES WITH THE 
MOST FIRST LANGUAGE SPEAKERS IN 
THE WORLD (2016) 
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An analysis of the demographic dimension for Colombia shows a growing population 
which, according to Perkins and Syrquin (1989), facilitates a country’s emergence in the 
world. Also, a clear improvement in the quality and coverage of education generates a 
human capital that is both more abundant and better prepared to contribute to the 
emerging role of Colombia in the International System. This section showed that Bogotá 
is at the heart of these improvements. The city has almost four times more people than 
Medellín, the second largest city, and concentrates a great share of the country’s 
education infrastructure. In fact, most data for Bogotá show better results that those of 
Colombia and, therefore, it is clear that the city is largely contributing to improve the 
country’s overall demographic dimension results.  
 
 
5.3. ECONOMIC DIMENSION: A KEY VARIABLE FOR EMERGENCE 
 
Economy is perhaps the most important determinant of the power resources of a country. 
States have been ranked according to the size of their economy for decades, and for that, 
the GDP is the variable of choice. The higher a country’s total GDP, the more powerful it 
is in the International System. But the economy is not only a national matter. Ed Glaeser 
acknowledges the importance of cities in a country’s economic emergence by stating that 
“there is a near-perfect correlation between urbanisation and prosperity across nations” 
(Glaeser, 2012, p. 7). Furthermore, Glaeser recognises cities have a significant impact on 
a country’s economy as they tend to improve the city-dwellers income considerably. On 
this topic, Turok agrees by stating that “many governments now support investment in 
their major cities because they offer the best prospects for raising productivity, innovation 
and tackling their greatest social and environmental problems” (Turok in McGranahan 
& Martine, 2014, p. 163). In turn, this section focuses on the increasing economic resources 
of Colombia and the role the city of Bogotá plays within the country and also for its 
international emergence.  
 
Colombia had the world’s 30th largest economy in 2015 with a GDP (PPP)26 of USD 
666,958,000,000. The country’s GDP is slightly smaller than South Africa’s (number 29th) 
                                                 
26 Unless otherwise specified, every reference to GDP in this thesis should be understood as GDP 
(Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)). GDP measures the value of all final goods and services produced within 
a nation in a given year. When corrected to PPP exchange rates, the adjusted GDP controls for the price 
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and bigger than that of the United Arab Emirates and Algeria (numbers 31st and 32nd 
respectively) (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Also, taking into account the 
fluctuations of the Argentine Peso in the past few years, between 2012 and 2016, 
Colombia has become the third largest economy in Latin America – after Brazil and 
Mexico – for limited periods of time (El País, 2014; Portafolio, 2012; Revista Semana, 2012). 
 
Colombia’s economic growth has been very positive since its recovery from a crisis in 
1999 when it sank to -4,20%. After that, growth has always been positive, reaching its 
highest values in 2006 with 6,69%, 2007 with 6,90% and 2011 with 6,59%. Considering a 
general decline in the world’s economic growth since 2010, Colombia has followed the 
same path with a growth rate of 3,08% for 2015 (See Figure 5.9.), which ranks the country 
at number 89 in the world (The World Bank, 2016f). Nonetheless, and even with the recent 
decline in global growth, the IMF projected an economic growth for Colombia of 4.89% 
for 2017, 6.26% for 2018, 6.66% for 2019 and 6.45% for 2020 (International Monetary Fund, 
2016). With that, Colombia is expected to surpass the South African economy by 2020 
(International Monetary Fund, 2016). 
 
FIGURE 5.9. GDP GROWTH (ANNUAL %) FOR COLOMBIA (1961-2016) 
 
 
Note: Data from “GDP growth (annual %)”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CO) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In 
the public domain. 
 
                                                 
level, valuing all goods and services at the same price level, usually that of the United States. This makes 
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In 2015, Bogotá had a GPD of USD 138,443,000,000 which accounted for 20.75% of the 
national GDP (DANE, 2016d; Revista Dinero, 2016a); however, that percentage varies 
from trimester to trimester. For instance, the fourth trimester of 2015, the city’s economy 
accounted for 26.2% of the national GDP for that period (Revista Dinero, 2016a). 
Furthermore, Bogotá’s contribution to Colombia’s GDP is larger than that of the next four 
largest contributing cities combined: Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga 
(Solano, 2015). If Bogotá were a country, it would have the 75th largest economy in the 
world and it would be larger than Bulgaria, Tunisia, Guatemala, Uruguay, Costa Rica or 
Panama (International Monetary Fund, 2016; Invest in Bogotá & EY, 2016).  
 
Also in 2015, Bogotá grew 1.75 percentage points more than the Colombian economy, 
reaching an overall yearly growth of 3.90%. The city’s GDP growth has had a positive 
performance during the past years. Between 2010 and 2015, the lowest growth rate was 
3.60% in 2010 and the highest was 5.70% in 2011 (See Figure 5.10.) (DANE, 2016d; Revista 
Dinero, 2016a). Consequently, and considering the demographic dimension mentioned 
in part 5.1.2., the 17% of Colombian population that lives in Bogotá produces 
approximately a quarter of the country’s GDP, making the capital city the unquestionable 
powerhouse of Colombia. 
 
FIGURE 5.10. GDP GROWTH (ANNUAL %) FOR BOGOTÁ (2001-2015) 
 
 
Note: Data from “Cuentas Trimestrales de Bogotá, D.C. – Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) – Primer Trimestre de 2014”, by 
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE, 2014, (http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/ 
boletines/pib/Bogota/Bol_PIB_Bta_I_trim_14.pdf) Copyright 2014 by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – 
DANE; “Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) Trimestral de Bogotá, D.C. – Primer Semestre de 2016”, by Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE, 2016, (https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/Bogota/ 
Bol_PIB_Bta_I_trim_16.pdf) Copyright 2016 by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE; “Cuentas 
Trimestrales de Bogotá, D.C. – Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) – Primer, Segundo y Tercer Trimestre de 2013”, by Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE, 2014, (https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/Bogota/ 
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Colombia reported a rate of 8.93% unemployment for 2015 which locates it in 69th place 
in the world and is comparable with the unemployment rates of Belgium, Brazil, Nigeria 
or Slovenia. This shows a notable reduction from 2002 when the unemployment rate was 
15.58%. Nonetheless, there is still place for more improvement as Colombia currently 
doubles the unemployment rates of other Latin American countries like Bolivia (4%), 
Honduras (4%) or Mexico (4.35%) (International Monetary Fund, 2016).  
 
On the same line, Bogotá has historically had rates a few points below the national 
average. For 2015, 8.7% of its inhabitants were unemployed, making it the city with the 
fifth largest unemployment rate in Colombia after Montería, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla 
and Cartagena (Guerrero Albarracín, 2016). While jobs are being permanently created, 
with a current annual average population growth rate of 1.28% (Alcaldía Mayor de 
Bogotá, 2012a), the population in Bogotá usually grows faster. Consequently, the city 
receives approximately 104,000 new residents every year, making it harder for the 
economy to absorb the incoming labour force (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2012a).  
 
In terms of foreign trade, Colombia exported a total of USD 35,690,775,971.27 in 2015, 
approximately 59.36% of what the country exported in 2012 and 65.13% of the total for 
2014 (DANE, 2016b). For 2015, the most important sector in the economy was oil and 
mining with 48.4% followed by the manufacturing sector with 44.6%, leaving only 6.8% 
for the primary sector (DANE, 2016b). Considering the national economy is highly 
dependent on oil27, the recent fall in international oil prices has had a considerable impact 
on the country’s imports income which went from USD 31,518,166,522 in 2014 to 
17,266,444,748 in 2015 (DANE, 2016b). It also affected the government’s budget 
negatively as it had to be cut in more than 3.5 billion pesos for 2016 (Revista Dinero, 
2016b). 
 
Regarding imports, the total amount for 2015 was USD 54,057,599,471 (DANE, 2016c) 
leaving the country with a commercial deficit of USD 18,366,823,500, which means a 
198.91% increase from the previous year (USD 9,233,559,977) (DANE, 2016b, 2016c). With 
95.4%, most of Colombia’s imports for 2015 fell under the industrial category, being 
chemical products the most important one with 18% (DANE, 2016c).  
                                                 
27 Colombia is currently the 20th largest oil producer in the world. Its production has ranged between 
950,000 and 1.5 million barrels a day since 2014 (Trading Economics, 2016) 
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As shown in the previous paragraphs, Colombia is still highly dependent on the export 
of commodities making the country vulnerable to sharp fluctuations in international 
prices. The recent decrease in exports of manufactured goods is happening at the same 
time as industrial products dominate the country’s imports, thus translating in a 
reprimarisation of the economy (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012). A combination of the 
exports and imports dynamics for Colombia explains the government’s urge to diversify 
its trading partners by signing various Free Trade Agreements (FTA). Consequently, the 
list of existing agreements with the United States, Canada and the members of the Pacific 
Alliance – Mexico, Peru and Chile – and Mercosur – Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
Paraguay and Venezuela –, is currently being expanded into new markets by negotiating 
and signing new FTAs with Panama, Costa Rica, Israel, South Korea and Turkey, 
amongst others (Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d). Also, 
as part of the government’s strategy to increase international trade and investments, 
Colombia is currently South America’s second most economic liberalised country after 
Chile (Baena Rojas & Fernández Pons, 2016) 
 
Nonetheless, even with the current contracting trade perspective, there is a positive 
outlook for Colombia in the following years, as it was explained at the beginning of 
section 5.1.3. The first reason is the increasing participation of the service sector in the 
GDP, growing from 55.57% in 2011 to 59.18% in 2015 (The World Bank, 2016v). 
Consequently, regardless of lower international commodity prices which affect trade 
income, the Colombian economy has been able to compensate as the sector grew from 
USD 161.33 billion in 2011 to USD 193.02 billion in 2015 (The World Bank, 2016w). The 
items that registered the highest growth in the sector since 2014 were banking services, 
auxiliary transport services, information technologies, real estate, rental of machinery 
and administrative and business support activities (ANDI, 2016; El Tiempo, 2016b). 
 
The second reason is the growing confidence in the economy by foreign investors. It must 
be noted that, for decades, the armed conflict in Colombia scared investments away and 
only in 2003 (The World Bank, 2016d) did the country start to receive considerable 
amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (See Figures 5.11.a. and 5.11.b.). Currently, 
that confidence is supported by the World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) Index which 
locates Colombia as 53rd in its ranking, only second in Latin America after Mexico (47th) 
and ahead of Peru (54th) and Chile (57th). With that, the four member countries of the 
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Pacific Alliance are at the top of investor confidence in the region (The World Bank, 
2016a). Also, according to the DB Index, Colombia is tied with the United States and 
Rwanda as the second easiest country in the world to get credit after New Zealand (The 
World Bank, 2016a). As a direct consequence of these improvements, Colombia was the 
26th largest recipient of FDI in the world and the 5th in Latin America in 2015 with USD 
11,942,001,264 (The World Bank, 2016d).  
 




Bogotá is also one of the reasons behind Colombia’s positive performance. The city has a 
diversified economy with an emphasis in services accounting for 82.2% of its GDP, 
followed by manufacturing with 11.8%, construction with 5.8% and agriculture and 
mining with 0.2% (Invest in Bogotá, 2012). In 2015, Bogotá was responsible for 33% of the 
country’s foreign trade, it hosted 30% of the companies and 53% of all banking 
transactions (Invest in Bogotá & EY, 2016). Also, the city’s place in international rankings 
has improved dramatically over the past decade. Bogotá is currently the 5th best city to 
do business in Latin America and the first in the Andean region (Revista América 
Economía, 2016), and the 57th Global City in the world and the 5th in Latin America 
FIGURE 5.11.B. NET INFLOWS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
COLOMBIA, (% OF GDP) (1970-2016) 
Note: Data from “Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DIN
V.WD.GD.ZS?locations=CO) Copyright 2016 by the 
World Bank. In the public domain. 
Note: Data from “Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (BoP, current US$)”, by The World Bank, 
2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT. 
DINV.CD.WD?locations=CO) Copyright 2016 by 



























































FIGURE 5.11.A. NET INFLOWS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
COLOMBIA (IN USD BILLIONS) (1970-
2016)  
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(ATKearney, 2016). Consequently, Bogotá is undoubtedly a hub, not only for the 
Colombian economy but also for Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, the 
diversification of the city’s economy has contributed greatly to Colombia’s ability to 
overcome the price fluctuations of its export commodities, mainly oil.  
 
 
5.4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION, IMPROVING HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The fourth dimension is the socio-economic. It goes beyond the merely demographic 
approach and considers the characteristics of the population in terms of human 
development, corruption and inequality. It measures Colombia’s achievements in 
overcoming the common development problems of countries in the Global South. Also, 
as cities become the epicentre for the State’s provision of services, Bogotá’s performance 
in these indicators will be analysed as they become crucial for Colombia’s overall 
performance. 
 
The UNDP classified Colombia as a country with ‘high human development’ in its 
Human Development Index (HDI)28 for 2015 (UNDP, 2016). Even though the country is 
currently number 95 in the world with an HDI of 0.727, it has escalated 5 places since the 
first report in 1990 when it had an HDI of 0.596 – considered a medium HDI similar to 
Vanuatu’s today (UNDP, 2015b). Furthermore, the current HDI for Colombia is 
comparable to that of South Korea or Malta in 1990 but the average annual HDI growth 
for Colombia is 0.79, slightly smaller than South Korea’s 0.86 and higher than Malta’s 0.59 
(UNDP, 2015b).   
 
                                                 
28 The Human Development Index (HDI) is defined by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) as “a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long 
and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean 
of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy 
at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and 
more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension 
is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the 
diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices 
are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean” (UNDP, 2015a). 
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Bogotá, however, is far more advanced than Colombia with a ‘very high human 
development’ score of 0,904 for 2010 in the last available data (PNUD, 2011). If Bogotá 
was a country and its 2010 HDI was to be compared with the world rankings of that same 
year, the city would be the fourth entity with the highest HDI in the world below New 
Zealand (Number 3 with 0,907) and above the United States (Number 4 with 0,902) 
(UNDP, 2010). This, in turn, means that the quality of health and education services as 
well as the quality of life in Bogotá are radically better than in the rest of the country. 
 
FIGURE 5.12. GDP PER CAPITA AND POVERTY HEADCOUNT RATIO FOR COLOMBIA 
 
 
Colombia’s GDP (PPP) per capita reached USD 13,800 for 2015 (number 82nd in the 
world), more than double than the USD 6,585 the country registered in 2000 (See Figure 
5.12.a.) (The World Bank, 2016i). Its poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines has 
been descending steadily for more than two decades, going from 49.7% of the population 
in 2002 to 27.8% in 2015 (See Figure 5.12.b.) (The World Bank, 2016s). If the poverty 
headcount ratio were disaggregated, the rural population considered as poor went from 
61.7% in 2002 to 40.3% in 2015 (The World Bank, 2016t) while the percentage of urban 
poor went from 45.5% in 2002 to 24.1% in 2015 (The World Bank, 2016z). The progress in 
FIGURE 5.12.A. GDP PER CAPITA 
GROWTH IN COLOMBIA (IN USD 
THOUSANDS) (1990-2016) 
Note: Data from “GDP per capita, PPP (current 
international $))”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCA
P.PP.CD?+locations=CO&locations=CO&year_high_
desc=true) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the 
public domain. 
Note: Data from “Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty lines (% of population)”, by The World Bank, 
2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
SI.POV.NAHC?locations=CO&year_high_desc=true) 










































































FIGURE 5.12.B. POVERTY HEADCOUNT 
RATIO FOR COLOMBIA, (% OF 
POPULATION) (2002-2015) 
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Colombia’s socio-economic indicators has been outstanding for the past two decades; 
however, there is still much to be done, especially in three main indicators: poverty 
reduction, corruption and distribution of wealth.  
 
One feature that can hold a country back from becoming an emerging power is 
corruption, as it affects both political and social institutions and economic stability 
(Hawksworth & Chan, 2015). The Corruption Perception Index (CPI)29 locates Colombia 
as the 83rd least corrupt country in the world – tied with Benin, China, Liberia and Sri 
Lanka (Transparency International, 2016c) with 37 points. The same index shows that the 
corruption indicators have worsened as the country was number 60 in 2000 
(Transparency International, 2016a) and 78 in 2010 (Transparency International, 2016b). 
Corruption is indeed a serious problem in Colombia. As stated by The Guardian, “in 
Colombia, an estimated 1,380 local Mayors have been charged with corruption over an 
eight-year period” (Shenker, 2016).  
 
Figure 5.13. compares the CPI of Colombia with that of three groups of countries. First, 
the least corrupt countries of Denmark (91), Finland (90), Sweden (89) and New Zealand 
(88) are on the left part of the graph. Then, in the middle are some Latin American 
countries and some selected emerging powers from other continents. Finally, on the right 
part of the graph, are the most corrupt countries in the world, namely Somalia (8), Korea 
DPR (8), Afghanistan (11) and Sudan (12) (Transparency International, 2016c). As it is 
shown in Figure 5.13., Colombia’s CPI is very similar to that of Brazil, Peru or Mexico, its 
Latin American neighbours; however, it is much lower than Chile’s (70) and more than 
two times higher than Venezuela’s (17). It is also almost three times lower than the CPI 





                                                 
29 The CPI measures corruption from 0 (most corrupt) to 100 (least corrupt). 
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FIGURE 5.13. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES (2015) 
 
 
Note: Data adapted from “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015)”, by Transparency International, 2016, 
(http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015) Copyright 2016 by Transparency International. Printed with permission. 
 
In contrast, inequality, measured using the Gini index, for Colombia in 2015 was 0.502 
(DANE, 2016a). According to the CIA’s ranking, Colombia had the eleventh highest Gini 
coefficient in the world in 2012. In fact, in Latin America, only Haiti (5) and Honduras (8) 
had higher rates than Colombia. However, inequality seems to be a problem for most of 
the region as Colombia is closely followed by Paraguay (12), Guatemala (13), Chile (14), 
Panama (15) and Brazil (16), and the difference between Brazil and Colombia is only 0,016 
points (CIA, 2016b).  
 
Data for Bogotá is somewhat contradictory. While the GDP per capita for 2014 was USD 
12,091 (Invest in Bogotá, 2016), that is USD 1,285 lower than the national value for that 
year (The World Bank, 2016i), the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines for 
the city was only 10,4% for 2015, 17,4% lower than the national data (DANE, 2016a). The 
inequality index (Gini index) was also lower with 0,498 for Bogotá and 0,502 for Colombia 
(DANE, 2016a). In terms of corruption, there is no CPI index available for cities, however, 
the NGO Bogotá cómo vamos conducted a survey in 2014 in which 76% of the participants 
believed the city administration was corrupt (Bogotá cómo vamos, 2014). Furthermore, 
in their 2015 survey, 50% believed corruption had increased in the last year and only 15% 
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Indeed, corruption is currently one of the biggest problems for Bogotá. Former Mayor 
Samuel Moreno has been sentenced to 18 years in prison for his ‘contract carousel’ 
(Carrusel de la Contratación), one of the most significant corruption scandals in the country 
in recent history (El Tiempo, 2016c). His successor, Gustavo Petro, is also being 
investigated for several corruption cases (Blu Radio, 2015; Revista Semana, 2015c, 2016c) 
and five of his local Mayors are currently being prosecuted (El Espectador, 2016a). It is 
interesting, however, to see the remarkable improvement in Bogotá’s indicators, even 
with these high levels of corruption.  
 
An analysis of the socio-economic dimension shows an interesting phenomenon as the 
strengths and weaknesses of Colombia and Bogotá seem to be closely linked. On one side, 
the national and local HDIs and their GDP per capita have experienced an outstanding 
growth during the past few decades, but, on the other, city and national levels share the 
problems of widespread corruption. This reinforces the fact that Colombia and Bogotá 
are highly connected, they depend on each other and they benefit from each other. But 
when something goes wrong, the connection means that they also suffer from each 
other’s failures. It is both a top-down and bottom-up relationship. Nonetheless, the 
improvement in most indicators shows the socio-economic dimension is increasing its 
contribution to the overall power resources of Colombia and Bogotá and thus, helping 
them in emerging in the world. 
 
 
5.5. THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF POWER 
 
Finally, the military dimension, often recognised as ‘hard power’, has been at the core of 
the International Relations debates on power since the beginning of the field. In fact, the 
concept of power is often first understood as ‘military power’ and then as other types of 
power (Nolte, 2010). Due to the Colombian armed conflict, the military dimension has 
both a domestic and an international application. This section explores the security and 
defence situation in Colombia and emphasises how the peace agreement with 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia) (FARC) has allowed for a better international emergence of the country. Given 
that the military is strictly a responsibility of the national government, very few 
references to Bogotá are made in this section. 
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More than five decades of armed conflict in Colombia have transformed the role of the 
Armed Forces in the country. As stated by Ferreyra and Segura, “the Latin American case 
[…] has been a challenge to theoretical conceptions that restrict the military's role to the 
defense of national sovereignty from external enemies” (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000, p. 19). 
Consequently, in Colombia the military force was used by the State as a way to resolve 
the conflict and guarantee the public order within the national borders (Ferreyra & 
Segura, 2000; Pastrana Buelvas & Gehring, 2016), a task usually undertaken by the police, 
and thus altering the general purposes served by Armed Forces around the world. 
 
In terms of military expenditure as percentage of the GDP, Colombia ranked 19th in the 
world in 2015 with 3,38%, 0,06% more than the United States, the next country on the list 
(The World Bank, 2016n). As seen in Figure 5.14., the military expenditure for Colombia 
has been stable between 3,0% and 4,0% for the period 1998-2015. Nonetheless, it has been 
the highest in the Western Hemisphere during most of these years. Furthermore, since 
2014, Colombia has been the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean where the 
military expenditure has been higher than 3,0% of the GDP (Otero Prada, 2016) and, as 
shown in Figure 5.15., the only one in the region to appear in ranking of the Top 20 
countries in the world with the highest military expenditure as percentage of GDP (The 
World Bank, 2016n). 
FIGURE 5.14. MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN COLOMBIA (PERCENTAGE OF GDP) 
 
Note: Data from “Military expenditure (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=CO&year_high_desc=true) 
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FIGURE 5.15. COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS 
PERCENTAGE OF GDP (2015) 
 
 
Note: Data from “Military expenditure (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?downloadformat=excel) Copyright 2016 by the 
World Bank. In the public domain. 
 
The explanation behind the large military expenditure in Colombia during the past few 
decades is found in the national security and defence strategy. The Ministry of Defence 
stated in 2009:  
[I]n Colombia, there is a situation of domestic insecurity and low levels of public safety (drug 
trafficking, subversion, corruption, kidnappings, homicides), amongst others, that force the 
defence and security spending to be relevant over time. In addition, in order to continue with 
the efforts to preserve the security conditions achieved up to now and to recover those that 
are still lacking in some areas of the country, it requires at least the sustainability of the level 
of resources invested so that the results of the [National Security and Defence Policy] are 
guaranteed and irreversible over time30 (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2009, p. 41).  
 
Consequently, the existence of illegal armed groups such as the FARC, the ELN and the 
Paramilitaries (Borda & Tickner, 2011; Sánchez & Chacón, 2005; Ugarriza & Nussio, 2015), 
                                                 
30 Original text in Spanish: “[E]n Colombia subsiste una situación de inseguridad interna y un nivel 
deficiente de seguridad ciudadana (narcotráfico, subversión, corrupción, secuestro, homicidios), entre 
otros, lo cual obliga a que el gasto en defensa y seguridad siga siendo pertinente en el tiempo. 
Adicionalmente, para continuar con el esfuerzo para preservar las condiciones de seguridad alcanzadas 
hasta ahora y recuperar las que aún faltan en algunas zonas del país, exige al menos la sostenibilidad del 
nivel de recursos invertidos, de manera que los resultados de la PSD sean garantizados e irreversibles en 
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the consolidation of Colombia as one of the most important sources of illegal drugs in the 
world (Ardila et al., 2005; Puyana Valdivieso, 2005) and the high homicide and 
kidnapping rates (Casas Dupuy & González Cepero, 2005) forced the government to 
allocate a large portion of the national budget to the security and defence sectors, 
especially since the 1990s (Otero Prada, 2016) – see Figure 5.14. –. However, the severity 
of the security situation has declined notoriously since the mid-2000s, especially since the 
signing of the ceasefire between the government and the FARC (CERAC, 2017) (See 
Figure 5.16.). Again, the Ministry of Defence explained what they call “the new Colombia 
in terms of security” in its 2016 document Security and Defence Policy:  
[T]he general security situation has evolved very favourably for the Colombian State as a 
result of the sustained work of the Armed Forces, the National Police and other state 
agencies. Illegal armed groups and Organised Crime with transnational, national, regional 
and local outreach, have been weakened structurally and disarticulated in a decisive way31 
(Translated by the author from Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2016b, pp. 7–8). 
 




Note: Data from “Logros de la Política de Defensa y Seguridad. Todos por un Nuevo país”, by Ministerio de Defensa, 
2016, (https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/estudios%20sectoriales 
/info_estadistica/Logros_Sector_Defensa.pdf) Copyright 2016 by Ministerio de Defensa. Reprinted with permission. 
                                                 
31 Original text in Spanish: “la situación general de seguridad ha evolucionado de forma muy favorable 
para el Estado colombiano como resultado del trabajo sostenido de las Fuerzas Militares, la Policía Nacional 
y otras instancias estatales. Los Grupos Armados al Margen de la Ley y el Crimen Organizado con alcance 
trasnacional, nacional, regional y local, vienen siendo debilitados estructuralmente y desarticulados de 
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It must be noted that, while the motivation for a large military spending in Colombia is 
mostly domestic, some of its neighbours – particularly Ecuador and Venezuela – have 
perceived a threat to their national security that originates in the Colombian armed 
conflict and the possibilities of illegal actors, especially the guerrillas, to cross into their 
territories (Dallanegra Pedraza, 2012; Jost, 2012; C. Malamud, 2003; Tickner, 2007). 
Subsequently, in response to the Plan Colombia, a joint initiative signed in 1998 between 
Bogotá and Washington aimed at fighting the illegal armed groups and the production 
of illicit drugs, Ecuador and Venezuela started to perceive Colombia as a threat and 
increased their military expenditure considerably (Ardila, 2014; Pastrana Buelvas et al., 
2012; Tokatlián, 2001). This, in turn, had serious consequences for Colombia’s ability to 
engage constructively with two of its most important neighbours and, thus, harming its 
possibilities to become an influential actor in the region as part of its emerging strategy 
(Pastrana Buelvas, 2011a, 2011b).  
 
Even though the relationship with Ecuador and Venezuela did reach some critical 
moments, especially in March 2008 when the Colombian Air Force killed Raúl Reyes, 
number two in the FARC leadership, in Ecuadorian territory close to the Colombian 
border (Arámbula Reyes, 2008; Carvajal, 2012; Chirinos, 2008; Hernández Moreno, 2013; 
La Nación, 2008), there was a considerable de-escalation of tensions since president Juan 
Manuel Santos came to power in 2010 (Camacho & Martínez, 2014; Puerto Castro, 2011). 
Currently, relations with Venezuela and Ecuador have evolved positively to the point 
where both countries have actively participated in the peace negotiations with the FARC 
and ELN (BBC, 2016a; Molano Jimeno, 2016).  
 
Given the current de-escalation of the armed conflict due to the signing of the peace 
agreement with FARC, the improvement in the general security situation and the close 
working relations with its neighbours, the near future may bring a radical shift in the way 
the Armed Forces are perceived in the National Security and Defence Strategy, and thus, 
altering the military expenditure of the Colombian government (Cruz Rodríguez, 2016; 
Pastrana Buelvas & Gehring, 2016). However, this new approach to security and defence 
will not be clear until the peace agreements have been implemented in the upcoming 
years. In the meantime, more than five decades of internal war have left Colombia with 
the second largest Armed Forces in the region – after Brazil – and one of the best prepared 
in the continent (Carvajal, 2012). This, in turn, contributes greatly to Colombia’s hard 
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power capabilities, even if the country has shown no interest in using its military to 
pursue its foreign policy objectives.  
 
 
5.6. COLOMBIAN POWER RESOURCES: A CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, Colombia has seen an outstanding increase in its power resources during 
the past two decades, and the trends indicate that the situation will keep improving in 
the following years. The steady improvement in socio-economic indicators, the country’s 
positive economic performance and the outstanding reduction of violence, especially 
during the past decade, have come together to have a significant impact on Colombia’s 
ability to overcome some of its most important problems of the past. The road is still long, 
but the transformation has started to yield results for the country’s power resources. As 
stated by Pastrana Buelvas,  
Colombia is no longer a problematic country for others, it has experienced hard-to-reverse 
trends of domestic development and democratic consolidation, it has what it takes to become 
a ‘driver’ in the region on a variety of issues, playing a proactive role in the economic, 
political-military and cultural-ideological dimensions of the international system32 
(Translated by the author from Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 228). 
 
While Colombia does not have the same power resource of larger countries in the region 
like Brazil or Mexico, or the political stability of Chile or Peru, it is true that Colombia has 
undergone a transformation process in its power resources that has started to place it as 
a new, emerging power, not only in the region, but also in the world. It is undoubtedly 
an emerging emerging power and, as it will be explored in Chapter 7, the international 
perception and leadership support this statement.  
 
At the same time, as seen previously in this section, there is an extremely close 
relationship between the national level and Bogotá when it comes to power resources. 
                                                 
32 Original text in Spanish: “Colombia ya no es más un país problemático para otros, que experimenta 
índices de desarrollo interno y consolidación democrática difíciles de revertir y que tiene lo que se necesita 
para convertirse en “motor” de la región en diversos temas, desempeñando un papel protagónico en las 
dimensiones económica, político-militar y cultural-ideológica del sistema internacional” (Pastrana Buelvas 
et al., 2012, p. 228). 
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While the first has been responsible for improving security, infrastructure and socio-
economic indicators, the latter proved to be its economic powerhouse, the one responsible 
for generating approximately 25% of the national income and, thus, having an important 
impact in the overall performance of the country. At this point, it would be extremely 
difficult to imagine Colombia’s current growth in power resources without the 
contributions from Bogotá. The city is a fundamental part of the country; they are linked 
and they depend on each other. Therefore, for the Colombian case, a power resources 




: SOUTH AFRICA AND JOHANNESBURG: THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF AN AFRICAN EMERGING POWER 
 
South Africa is widely recognised as an emerging power from the Global South (Van der 
Westhuizen & Smith, 2013). The invitation to join the BRICS grouping in 2010 (J. A. Smith, 
2011; Xinhua, 2010), its membership in the India – Brazil – South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral 
Forum with Brazil and India (Alden & Vieira, 2005; De Sousa, 2007a) or even the country’s 
selection to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup (D. Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; 
Cornelissen, 2008), amongst others, are evidence of a major shift from the pariah State 
that was South Africa before 1994 to becoming a key African player in today’s 
International System (Akokpari, 1999; Mills, 1994; Sidiropoulos, 2007a; Van der 
Westhuizen, 1998).  
 
South Africa is perceived as the most important interlocutor for Africa in world affairs as 
a result of the country’s “return as a constructive player in the International System and 
as a good international citizen” (A. F. Cooper, 1998, p. 707) after the end of apartheid. 
Furthermore, South Africa’s democratic transition was considered Africa’s greatest 
success story at the time (Schraeder, 2001). But also, various policies such as the 
‘Diplomacy of Ubuntu’ (Bohler-Muller, 2012; Qobo & Nyathi, 2016), Thabo Mbeki’s 
‘African Renaissance’ (Bohler-Muller, 2012; Mills, 2000a; Vale & Maseko, 1998) and the 
country’s participation in peace negotiations and peace building initiatives, especially in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi (Schoeman, 2003), contributed to the 
recognition of South Africa as a continental leader and Africa’s voice in the world. 
 
But nonetheless, it is clear that the role of South Africa in international affairs is 
ambivalent. Even if the country is currently playing in the major leagues of International 
Relations as one of the most important emerging powers from the Global South, there are 
still doubts about the true capacity of its power resources. For example, when compared 
with Brazil, China, India or Russia, the other BRICS countries, South Africa falls short in 
most indicators, from size, to GDP to military capacity (Almeida Cravo, Hornsby, 
Nascimento, & José Santos, 2014; Rosstat - Statistics of Russia, 2015). In the words of 
Philip Harrison, “South Africa is a real minnow within BRICS” (P. Harrison, 2014, p. 68) 
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and “from the perspective of size and economic growth, there is little if any rationale for 
South Africa’s membership of BRICS” (P. Harrison, 2014, p. 69).  
 
It is true that South Africa’s international capabilities are considerably smaller than those 
of the other generally accepted emerging powers from the Global South. On this topic, 
Jim O’Neil, creator of the BRIC acronym, considers that South Africa “is punching above 
its own weight” (Martyn Davies, 2012) while Peter Draper goes one step further and 
argues that “South Africa’s days as the African representative of choice are numbered” 
(Draper, 2011, p. 207).  
 
Reality shows that South Africa is quite a contradictory emerging power. The fact that 
the country is the most powerful player in the weakest continent has undoubtedly 
elevated its status in the International System. With power resources similar to those of 
Colombia, it is questionable if South Africa would indeed have such important weight in 
the world if it was located in a different continent. Therefore, the regional dimension 
plays an outstanding role in South Africa’s emergence. The country has also been 
privileged after 1994. Its transition to democracy and the leadership of Nelson Mandela 
catapulted South Africa out of its international isolation status and placed it in the 
emerging power category. However, the widespread poverty, unemployment and 
inequality brought about by apartheid seem to be an enormous burden for the country 
(Schoeman, 2015). In turn, South Africa is faced with a dichotomy: maintaining its 
emerging status on one side, while, on the other, solving the economic, social and 
demographic legacy of apartheid.  
 
The city of Johannesburg has followed a similar path. It transitioned from being the 
cosmopolitan but isolated stronghold of capitalism in Southern Africa during apartheid, 
to falling in despair with the arrival of democracy in the 1990s, to becoming a “world-
class African city” (Kruger, 2012, p. 195) during the build-up to the FIFA World Cup in 
2010. With the end of international sanctions and South Africa’s renaissance as a 
constructive player in the world, Johannesburg was able to leave the place of darkness 
where it was during apartheid to position itself as a place of centrality in the Global South 
along with cities like São Paulo, Shanghai, Istanbul or Mumbai; as the gateway to Africa 
(Games, 2012).  
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Again, by drawing on the works of Nolte (2010), Pastrana Buelvas et al. (2012) and 
Breuning (2007), this chapter engages in an analysis of the power resources of both South 
Africa and Johannesburg, and highlights the importance of the city as an emerging actor 
in the country’s positioning in the world. This chapter has two objectives: first, to 
conclusively determine that South Africa is an emerging power from the Global South; 
and second, to demonstrate that, even though the power resources of Johannesburg 
contribute greatly to increase those of South Africa, city and country emerge at the same 
time but do so in isolation and not as part of a coordinated strategy that involves the 
power resources of both. 
 
There is, however, the need to clarify what will be understood as the ‘city of 
Johannesburg’ in this thesis. Considering the existence of other important municipalities 
such as Tshwane and Ekurhuleni right on Johannesburg’s borders, it is common to 
perceive them all as a whole, as one big conurbation, a City-Region at the heart of the 
Gauteng Province (See Figure 6.1.). The Gauteng City-Region Observatory explains it as 
follows: 
 
The main Gauteng City-Region is an integrated cluster of cities, towns and urban nodes 
that together make up the economic heartland of South Africa. The core of the city-region is 
Gauteng, South Africa’s smallest but most densely populated province. Gauteng includes 
the cities of Johannesburg, once the world’s most important centre of gold production and 
today South Africa’s financial capital, and Pretoria, the country’s administrative capital. It 
also includes commercial, industrial and mining centres such as Germiston, Springs, 
Alberton, Boksburg, Benoni, Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Krugersdorp, Randfontein and 
Westonaria (Gauteng City-Region Observatory, 2016). 
 
Even though often perceived as an amalgam of cities, especially regarding the 
municipalities of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni with boundaries between them that are 
extremely hard to see for someone who is not familiar with the territorial organisation of 
the area, this thesis will only focus on the Municipality of Johannesburg proper. And 
whereas it is clear that other municipalities such as Ekurhuleni and Tshwane contribute 
greatly to the importance of Johannesburg and Gauteng both within South Africa and the 
world, the main objective for this thesis is only to analyse the role of the main city in the 
international projection of emerging powers; in this case, the city of Johannesburg as seen 
in Figure 6.2. 
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FIGURE 6.1. MAP OF THE GAUTENG CITY REGION (GCR) 
 
 
Note: Adapted from: Gauteng City-Region Observatory (2015). Map indicating Gauteng City-Region [map]. Retrieved 
from http://www.urbanafrica.net/urban-voices/an-open-data-revolution-for-the-gauteng-city-region/. Reprinted with 
permission. 
FIGURE 6.2. MAP OF THE MUNICIPALITIES WITHIN THE GAUTENG PROVINCE 
 
 
Note: Adapted from: The Local Government Handbook 2016. Gauteng Province [map]. Retrieved from 
http://www.localgovernment.co.za/provinces/view/3/gauteng. Reprinted with permission. 
Chapter 6: South Africa and Johannesburg: The contradictions of an African emerging power 
 
123 
This section draws again on the metrics put forward by Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas, Stefan 
Jost and Daniel Flemes (2012) to complement the work of Detlef Nolte (2010). The analysis 
picks up on the same five key dimensions of power resources of emerging powers 
addressed in Chapter 5 for Colombia and Bogotá, and applies them to both South Africa 
and Johannesburg. The aim of this Section is to establish the true power resources of 
South Africa as an emerging power and, also, to understand how much of those power 
resources depend on Johannesburg as the nation’s economic and demographic 
powerhouse. In other words, the overarching point is to show that the power resources 




6.1. LOCATION IS NOT EVERYTHING: UNDERSTANDING THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN TERRITORY 
 
South Africa is the 24th largest country in the world (CIA, 2016a) with a land area of 
1,219,090 square kilometres (South African Government, 2016) and a maritime area of 
1,535,538 square kilometres (Sea Around Us, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). It is the ninth largest 
country in Africa, the smallest of all the BRICS countries and slightly bigger than 
Colombia (CIA, 2016a), the other case study in this thesis. In terms of total internal area 
– land area plus inland water bodies – plus the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), South 
Africa is the 30th largest country in the world (CIA, 2016a; Marine Regions, 2016).  
 
Located on the Southern tip of the African continent where the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans meet, South Africa is simultaneously strategically located for global trade and far 
away from the world centres of power. Although the country is considered as semi-arid, 
South Africa has important variations in climate as well as topography (Brand South 
Africa, 2002). The territory has two main features: the interior plateau and the lower areas 
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FIGURE 6.3. MAP OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
Note: Adapted from: Worldofmaps.net (2016). Map of South Africa (Political Map) [map]. Retrieved from 
https://www.worldofmaps.net/en/africa/map-south-africa/political-map-south-africa.htm . In the public domain. 
Due to the high presence of plant, animal and invertebrate endemisms, unique land and 
marine ecosystems and higher-level biodiversity, South Africa has been classified as one 
of the 17 most biodiverse countries on earth by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) (2014). On this topic, the Convention on Biological Diversity 
describes South Africa as follows: 
 
The diversity of topography, climate, geology and people in South Africa presents a wide 
variety of natural and cultural resources. It is notably considered one of the most biologically 
diverse countries in the world due to its species diversity, rate of endemism and diverse 
ecosystems. Terrestrial biodiversity can be divided into nine biomes, rivers into 31 different 
river ecoregions, and estuaries and coastal marine habitats into three biogeographical zones 
around the coast (subtropical, warm temperate, cool temperate). In addition, numerous 
structural types of vegetation, rivers, wetlands, estuaries and marine habitats add 
considerably to the biodiversity within these environments. While it occupies only 2% of the 
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world’s land surface area, South Africa is home to 10% of the world’s plant species and 7% 
of its reptile, bird and mammal species. Furthermore, it harbours around 15% of the world’s 
marine species. Endemism rates reach 56% for amphibians, 65% for plants and up to 70% 
for invertebrates (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2016b).  
 
Apart from the mainland, Marion Island and Prince Edward Island form the Prince 
Edward Islands archipelago in the sub-Antarctic Indian Ocean which was annexed by 
the Union of South Africa in January 4, 1948 (South African History Online, 2011) (See 
Figure 6.4.a.). Located 2,170 kilometres southeast of Cape Town (Department of 
Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2016) and politically part of the Western Cape 
Province, the islands have a combined area of 316 square kilometres (South African 
National Antarctic Programme, 2016) and are South Africa’s only overseas possession (J. 
Cooper, 2006). The archipelago’s sui generis status is explained by Cooper as follows: 
 
The Prince Edward Islands […] have been accorded the country’s highest state of formal 
protection, that of Special Nature Reserve in terms of the then Environmental Conservation 
Act of 1989, now superceded by the national Environmental Management: Protected Areas 
Act, No. 57 of 2003 (NEMPA). In terms of NEMPA, entry into a Special Nature Reserve 
is restricted for research and conservation management activities only. One consequence of 
this high level of protection is that commercial tourism may not be permitted (J. Cooper, 
2006, p. 6). 
 
Due to its sovereignty over the Prince Edward Islands, South Africa is able to expand its 
influence on the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans in the sub-Antarctic region as they 
enlarge the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by 473,371 square kilometres (See 
Figure 6.4.b.) (Sea Around Us, 2016a). This area has been crucial for South Africa in 
geopolitical terms for two reasons. First, it grants the country greater control over the 
Cape of Good Hope, one of the most important maritime routes in the world (See Figures 
6.5.a., 6.5.b. and 6.5.c.) (Rodrigue, Comtois, & Slack, 2017); and second, it was remote 
enough for the apartheid government to allegedly engage in secret nuclear tests and 
activities with Israel during the 1970s in the region (De Villiers, Jardine, & Reiss, 1993; V. 
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FIGURE 6.4. PRINCE EDWARD ISLANDS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN SUB-ANTARCTIC 
REGION 
 
FIGURE 6.5. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE FOR THE WORLD’S 
MARITIME SHIPPING ROUTES 
 
Note: Data from “Prince Edward Islands declared a 
Marine Protected Area”, by the Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2013, 
(https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/ 
princeedwardislands_declaredmarineprotectedarea) 
Copyright 2016 by the Department of Environmental 
Affairs. Produced by author. 
Note: Flanders Marine Institute [cartographer]. 
(2016b). Sovereign: South Africa · MRGID 8396 
[map]. Retrieved from 
http://marineregions.org/eezdetails.php?mrgid 
=8396&all_territories=1&zone=eez. Reprinted with 
permission. 
Note: Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Dr. Claude Comtois & Dr. Brian Slack [cartographer]. (2016). Main Maritime Shipping Routes 
[map]. Retrieved from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/main_maritime_shipping_routes.html. Original 
source: Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2017). The geography of transport systems (Fourth). New York, United States: 
Routledge. Retrieved from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/index.html. Reprinted with permission. 
FIGURE 6.4.B. SOUTH AFRICAN EEZ 
INCLUDING PRINCE EDWARD ISLANDS 
FIGURE 6.4.A. PRINCE EDWARD 
ISLANDS IN THE SUB-ANTARCTIC 
REGION 
FIGURE 6.5.A. MAIN MARITIME SHIPPING ROUTES IN THE WORLD 





Note: Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Dr. Claude Comtois & Dr. Brian Slack [cartographer]. (2016). Maritime Shipping Routes 
and Strategic Passages [map]. Retrieved from 
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch1en/appl1en/maritimeroutes.html. Original source: Rodrigue, J.-P., 
Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2017). The geography of transport systems (Fourth). New York, United States: Routledge. 
Retrieved from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/index.html. Reprinted with permission. 
 
Note: Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Dr. Claude Comtois & Dr. Brian Slack [cartographer]. (2016c). Oil Transportation and 
Major Chokepoints [map]. Retrieved from 
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/appl5en/oiltransportation.html. Original source: Rodrigue, J.-P., 
Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2017). The geography of transport systems (Fourth). New York, United States: Routledge. 
Retrieved from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/index.html. Reprinted with permission. 
FIGURE 6.5.B. MARITIME SHIPPING ROUTES AND STRATEGIC PASSAGES 
FIGURE 6.5.C. OIL TRANSPORTATION AND MAJOR CHOKEPOINTS 
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Johannesburg, the nation’s largest city, is located 1,694 metres above the sea level on the 
South African interior plateau (Department of Government Communication and 
Information System, 2015). With an area of 1,645 square kilometres (The Local 
Government Handbook, 2016a), the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
accounts only for 0.1347% of South Africa’s territory. Within its limits, the city of 
Johannesburg comprises a wide variety of territorial features ranging from the farmlands 
in the northwest, to the Klipriviersberg, Rietfontein, Melville Koppies, Kloofendal and 
Wild’s Nature Reserves, to former mining sites just west of the Central Business District, 
to the densely populated areas, both formal and informal, located all throughout the city 
(Beavon, 2004; City of Johannesburg, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h).  
 
An important feature for Johannesburg lies in the fact that, while the city’s economy 
includes water-intensive activities such as mining and farming, there are no significant 
water sources available within or near the city limits (Akoon et al., 2010; City of 
Johannesburg, 2011). This, in turn, means that Johannesburg depends greatly on the 
Gauteng Province as most of its water comes from the Vaal River, which is located outside 
its city borders (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2015). Moreover, since the water 
consumption in the whole Gauteng City Region is higher than what the nearby South 
African water sources can provide, foreign supply was required. The Lesotho Highlands 
Project was thus developed to satisfy the water demand for the Gauteng Province (City 
of Johannesburg, 2011; Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012; 
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, 2008) thereby making the city of 
Johannesburg dependent not only on the rest of the province, but also on a foreign 
country.  
 
Unlike Colombia where the mountainous terrain, the armed conflict and the lack of 
political will have left the country with a very incipient transport network, South Africa 
adopted its national roads strategy in 1935 and started building its national highway 
network in the 1970s (Floor, 1985). More than four decades later, the country has an 
impressive physical infrastructure (A. F. Cooper, 1998; Games, 2012) that comprises 
747,000 kilometres of roads, 16,200 of which are national roads linking all nine provinces, 
and the largest and most developed air and rail networks in the African continent (Brand 
South Africa, 2013). The city of Johannesburg and its surroundings, as the heart of the 
South African economy, are served by six out of the 15 national routes – namely the N1, 
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N3, N4, N12, N14 and N17 (South African National Roads Agency, 2016) –, making it the 
centre of the national transportation system (See Figure 6.3.). 
 
Furthermore, the South African government used the 2010 FIFA World Cup to complete 
a ZAR 60 billion infrastructure programme (Games, 2012) that included the upgrade and 
construction of highways (The South African National Roads Agency Limited, 2010, 
2011), the expansion of airports (Airports Company South Africa, 2010, 2015) and the 
building of new rail lines such as the Gautrain linking Johannesburg with Pretoria and 
OR Tambo International Airport  (Gautrain Management Agency, 2015; McGranahan & 
Martine, 2014). The transport sector has been recognised by the national government as 
a “key contributor to South Africa’s competitiveness in global markets. It is regarded as 
a crucial engine for economic growth and social development, and the government has 
unveiled plans to spend billions of rand to improve the country’s roads, railways and 
ports” (Brand South Africa, 2013). 
 
Apart from being South Africa’s transportation hub, Johannesburg has developed an 
outstanding road and rail infrastructure of its own. With more than 9,000 kilometres of 
roads within the municipality limits, 10 freeways and 4 more under construction, the city 
has a larger road network than the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Rwanda, Luxembourg 
or Hong-Kong (CIA, 2017; City of Johannesburg, 2017a; South African National Roads 
Agency, 2016). Also, with the recent construction of more than 325 kilometres of Rea Vaya 
Bus Rapid System (City of Johannesburg, 2017b) and 80 kilometres of the Gautrain rapid 
train linked to a 430 kilometre network of Gautrain buses (Gautrain Management 
Agency, 2015), Johannesburg not only is slowly reducing its dependency on private cars 
as the main form of transportation, but also increasing its national and international 
competitivity as a world class African city (City of Johannesburg, 2012a, 2012b; Kruger, 
2012; Lipietz, 2008).  
 
Being at the southern tip of the African continent, South Africa and Johannesburg are at 
least an 8-hour flight away from the Americas, Europe, Asia or Oceania. However, as the 
most advanced commercial city in Africa with a “world-class infrastructure in the fields 
of telecommunications, transportation, water and power, and with globally-competitive 
healthcare and educational facilities” (The Local Government Handbook, 2016a), 
Johannesburg has managed “to strategically position itself at the intersection of the 
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economic activity between Africa and the rest of the world” (Nganje, 2016b, p. 9). 
Consequently, the city has been able to develop an outstanding network of domestic and 
international connections in and out of OR Tambo International Airport33.  
 
Currently, the airport handles 19 million passengers a year and has an annual passenger 
capacity of 28 million. It is served by 47 airlines that connect Johannesburg with all six 
inhabited continents, making OR Tambo International the busiest airport in Africa and 
an international gateway to the continent (See Figures 6.6.a. and 6.6.b.) (Airports 
Company South Africa, 2016). Also, the domestic air network is extremely well 
developed as most of the urban centres and tourist hotspots in South Africa can be 
reached by plane in two hours or less from OR Tambo International as seen in Figure 
6.6.c. 
 
FIGURE 6.6. ROUTES FROM OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN JOHANNESBURG, 
SOUTH AFRICA (AS OF OCTOBER 2016) 
 
 
FIGURE 6.6.A. INTERNATIONAL ROUTES FROM OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA (AS OF OCTOBER 2016) 
Note: Data from “International Flights Route Map and Airline Contacts”, by OR Tambo International Airport, 2016, 
(http://ortambo-airport.com/flights/inter.php) Copyright 2016 by OR Tambo International Airport. Produced by 
author. 
                                                 
33 Although OR Tambo International Airport is located in the city of Ekurhuleni 24 kilometres from 
Johannesburg city centre, it serves the whole of the Gauteng Province for international and domestic flights 
(Brand South Africa, 2016b) 





Finally, in today’s world where most of the trade takes place across the North Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans (Gramer, 2017), South Africa’s location could be perceived as its 
biggest disadvantage. However, despite being far from the centres of world power, South 
Africa, and particularly its two main cities, have been a key component of international 
trade for centuries. First was Cape Town, a key place for Europe after “the discovery of 
the passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope” (Boshoff & Fourie, 2010, p. 
469), identified by Adam Smith as one of the “greatest and most important events 
recorded in the history of mankind” (Boshoff & Fourie, 2010, p. 469). Then was 
Johannesburg, the city of gold, a rarity in 18th and 19th century Africa, described by Achille 
Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall as follows: 
As far as we are concerned, Johannesburg is first and foremost a metropolis in every 
conceivable sense of the term. In fact, the entire history of its built structures testifies to its 
inscription into the canons of modern Western urban aesthetics. After all, until very 
recently, Johannesburg described itself as the largest and most modern European city in 
Africa. As amply demonstrated by Clive Chipkin, this meant that Johannesburg was the 
progeny of nineteenth-century European industrial society. This inland city developed as an 
Note: Data from “Regional Flights Route Map and 
Airline Contacts”, by OR Tambo International 
Airport, 2016, (http://ortambo-airport.com/ 
flights/reg.php) Copyright 2016 by OR Tambo 
International Airport. Produced by author. 
Note: Data from “Domestic Flights Route Map and 
Airline Contacts”, by OR Tambo International 
Airport, 2016, (http://ortambo-airport.com/ 
flights/dom.php) Copyright 2016 by OR Tambo 
International Airport. Produced by author. 
FIGURE 6.6.B. REGIONAL ROUTES 
FROM OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH 
AFRICA (AS OF OCTOBER 2016) 
FIGURE 6.6.C. DOMESTIC ROUTES 
FROM OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH 
AFRICA (AS OF OCTOBER 2016) 
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industrial metropolis supported by gold mining. A breeding ground for modernism, it grew 
as a frontier city closely tied to the global market economy and the world of consumption 
while at the same time mired in bigotry and prejudice, constantly caught between what it 
could be and what it ended up being (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pp. 361–362). 
 
Due to its strategic importance as well as its natural resources, especially diamonds and 
gold, South Africa has been somewhat able to overcome its condition as an ‘geographical 
outsider’ in global trade, mainly because of the economic power of the city of 
Johannesburg and its importance in the world’s mining industry. But the world today is 
different and, therefore, South Africa’s past strategic importance has changed 
dramatically. The Cape of Good Hope is not as important as it used to be and the country 
no longer relies on its mineral resources. 
 
Consequently, as was the case with Colombia, in a world where globalisation, the 
environment and climate change are key issues of the global agenda, South Africa’s 
megadiversity and its proximity to and engagement with Antarctica (Jabour-Green & 
Nicol, 2003; Pyper, 2011; Secretaría del Tratado Antártico, 2017; South African National 
Antarctic Programme, 2017) – the world’s biggest fresh water reserve – greatly enhance 
the country’s power resources. In turn, South Africa’s territorial dimension will affect its 
power resources mainly as a biodiversity hotspot and, to a much lesser extent, as a 
strategic point in world trade. 
 
To conclude, by analysing South Africa’s territory and location, this section provides the 
reader with a better understanding of the physical and geographical characteristics of the 
country in order to address its implications in the broader national emergence strategy. 
There are two confronting approaches on this topic. First, the resources available in the 
South African territory have guaranteed a place for the country in the global dynamics of 
capitalism for decades; and second, its location on the Southern tip of Africa and far from 
the centres of power can potentially create difficulties in interacting with the rest of the 
world. Nonetheless, South Africa’s geographic and economic positions allows it to exert 
influence on the continent as one of its most important regional powers.  
 
As an integral part of the country, Johannesburg is both affected by the territory’s 
limitations and favoured by its resources. It was the gold of the Witwatersrand – where 
Johannesburg is located – that shaped the economic and political life of South Africa since 
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the 18th century (Beavon, 2004; Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004). The city has been effectively 
integrated into the country through very ambitious infrastructure projects that deepen 
the connection between the national and the local. In geographical terms, it is impossible 
to understand today’s South Africa without the city of Johannesburg as its central point 
where most of the country’s dynamics come together. Johannesburg is also South Africa’s 
most important international city; through its international airport, it is the place where 




6.2. DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION: OVERCOMING APARTHEID 
 
As it was explained in the previous chapter on Colombia, the size of a country’s 
population has a dominant influence on its ability to become an emerging nation in the 
International System. Additionally, in 1994 during the dawn of democracy, one of South 
Africa’s most important challenges was universal education for its people. The 
educational gap created by apartheid affected the country’s ability to create human 
capital, especially for the vast black majority. As a city trying to emerge in the world after 
international isolation, Johannesburg was also greatly affected by this problem. In order 
to understand the implications demography has on South Africa’s international status, 
this section analyses the country’s most important population trends and the contribution 
of the city of Johannesburg to the national demographic power resources.  
 
South Africa has an estimated population of 54,956,920 inhabitants (The World Bank, 
2016p), making it the 26th most populated country on earth, the fifth in Africa – after 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of Congo –, and the least populated 
BRICS nation (CIA, 2016d). South Africa has a slightly bigger population than Colombia, 
the other case study in this thesis, which comes in number 30th on the list (CIA, 2016d). 
According to Statistics South Africa (2016b), 55.39% of the population is between 15 and 
49 years old, making it the largest age group in the country. 28.78% is 14 years old or 
younger and only 15.83% is 50 years old or older, the smallest age group in South Africa 
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Note: Data from “General Households Survey 2015”, by Statistics South Africa, 2016, 
(http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182015.pdf) Copyright 2016 by Statistics South Africa. Reprinted 
with permission.  
 
Since 1960, the highest population growth rate for South Africa occurred in 1961when it 
reached 3,31%. From then, the rate has oscillated between 2,0% and 2,6% until the period 
2000 – 2002 when it experienced a dramatic fall going from 2,4% to 1,19%, the lowest rate 
in more than half a century. After that, population growth rates have grown steadily at 
approximately 0,3% a year reaching 1,64% in 2015 as it is seen in Figure 6.8.b. (The World 
Bank, 2016r). As of 2015, South Africa’s population growth rate is higher than the majority 
of OECD countries and it is only surpassed by Luxembourg, Israel and Switzerland (See 
Figure 6.9.) (OECD, 2016a). 
 









Note: Data from “Population, total”, by The World 
Bank, 2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZA) Copyright 2016 by the 
World Bank. In the public domain. 
Note: Data from “Population growth (annual %)”, 
by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GRO
W?locations=ZA) Copyright 2016 by the World 











































































FIGURE 6.8.B. POPULATION GROWTH 
RATES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
FIGURE 6.8.A. POPULATION GROWTH 
IN SOUTH AFRICA (IN MILLIONS) 
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FIGURE 6.9. POPULATION GROWTH IN THE OECD COUNTRIES AND SOUTH AFRICA 
(2014) 
 
Note: Data adapted from “ALFS Summary tables: Population growth rate”, by OECD.Stat, 2016, 
(http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=27482) Copyright 2016 by OECD.Stat; “Population growth (annual %) – 
South Africa”, by The World Bank, 2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ZA) 
Copyright 2016 by The World Bank.  In the public domain. 
 
In terms of urbanisation, the tipping point when urban population exceeded rural 
population in South Africa occurred around 1986-1987 (McGranahan & Martine, 2014; 
Turok, 2012) and currently, the urbanisation rate for the country is around 64,8% (The 
World Bank, 2016y). “The rate of urbanisation accelerated in the 1980’s reaching a peak 
at 3.3% in 1993. Since then, there has been a general drop to about 1.3% in 2012 with a 
projected rate of 1% by 2025” (Ruhiiga, 2014, p. 610). However, urbanisation rates vary 
largely from one region to another. In fact, 52% of the urban population in South Africa 
is concentrated in five municipalities, namely Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Cape 
Town and eThekwini (Turok, 2012) which together account for only 1,20% of the national 
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Note: Adapted from Statistics South Africa 2016. Municipal Population - Municipalities [map]. Retrieved 
from http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=270. Reprinted with permission. 
 
In 2016, the city of Johannesburg had a population of 4,949,347 inhabitants (Statistics 
South Africa, 2016e; The Local Government Handbook, 2016a). If the city of Ekhurhuleni 
– located in the same conurbation – is added, the total population goes up to 8,328,451 
inhabitants (The Local Government Handbook, 2017b) and if the whole Gauteng City 
Region is considered, the continuous urban region within the borders of the Gauteng 
Province had an estimated population of 13,200,349 inhabitants for 2015 (Gauteng City-
Region Observatory, 2016). Even if only the city of Johannesburg is considered, its 
population is still almost one million inhabitants larger than that of Cape Town – the 
second largest city in South Africa – making it the demographic heartland of the country 
(The Local Government Handbook, 2016a, 2017a). Johannesburg has 8.89% of the national 
population and, if it was a country, it would have a similar number of residents as Costa 
Rica, Georgia or Ireland (CIA, 2016d). The demographic importance of Johannesburg 
exceeds the South African context as the city’s population is larger than that of Botswana 
and Namibia combined. Furthermore, the conurbation Johannesburg – Ekhurhuleni has 
City of Johannesburg 
City of Ekurhuleni 
City of Tshwane 
City of eThekwini 
City of Cape Town 
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more inhabitants than Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland combined (See Figure 
6.11.). 
FIGURE 6.11. COMPARISON OF THE POPULATION OF JOHANNESBURG AND SELECTED 




Note: Data adapted from “Population, total”, by The World Bank, 2017, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL) Copyright 2016 by The World Bank; “City of Johannesburg”, by 
Statistics South Africa, 2016, (http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=993&id=city-of-johannesburg-municipality) 
Copyright 2016 by Statistics South Africa; “The Gauteng City-Region”, by Gauteng City-Region Observatory, 2016, 
(http://www.gcro.ac.za/about/the-gauteng-city-region/) Copyright 2016 by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory. 
Reprinted with permission. 
In terms of education, South Africa gave the sector a major overhaul between 1994 and 
2016, not only in terms of the amount of resources available but also in the government’s 
pro-poor and pro-equity education policies (Statistics South Africa, 2016a). Yet, the 
Community Survey 2016 shows that the population aged 5 years and older attending at 
an education institution decreased from 37.59% in 1996 to 34.82% in 2016, that is -2.77% 
(Statistics South Africa, 2016a). These numbers can, however, be misleading. Data shows 
that the population aged 5 years and older attending school increased from 12.8 million 
in 1996 to 17.2 million in 2016 but, during the same period, the total population in that 
age group increased from 34.1 million to 49.5 million making the government’s efforts 
insufficient (Statistics South Africa, 2016a). Furthermore, the 2011 census shows that more 
than 95% of children aged between 7 and 14 in South Africa were attending school (as 
seen in Figure 6.12.a.) and that percentage decreases greatly between ages 15 and 24 














Namibia (NA) Botswana (BW) Lesotho (LS) Swaziland (SZ)
Chapter 6: South Africa and Johannesburg: The contradictions of an African emerging power 
 
138 
FIGURE 6.12. EDUCATION ENROLLMENT AND ATTAINMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
As for educational attainment, according to the Community Survey 2016 (Statistics South 
Africa, 2016a) and as seen in Figure 6.12.b., the number of people aged 25 years and older 
that had no schooling decreased from 3.7 million in 1996 to 2.2 million in 2016, while the 
population in that same age group with some level of schooling increased dramatically. 
In 1996, 10 million people stated their highest level of education successfully completed 
was primary education. In 2016, that number increased to 22.4 million. The same is true 
for secondary education and bachelor’s degrees going from 3.5 million in 1996 to 11.8 
million in 2016 for the former and from 0.4 million in 1996 to 1.2 million in 2016 for the 
latter. Consequently, statistics show an outstanding increase in South Africa’s education 
coverage during the past two decades. 
 
But there are still serious problems. Seekings and Nattrass demonstrated that, after 
apartheid, white South Africans continued to enjoy “the benefits of the skills and 
credentials they had acquired in the past and that they could pass onto their children 
Note: Data from “Census 2011 - Census in brief”, by 
Statistics South Africa, 2012, 
(http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/cens
us_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf) 
Copyright 2012 by Statistics South Africa. Reprinted 
with permission. 
Note: Data from “Community Survey 2016 Statistical 
Release”, by Statistics South Africa, 2016, 
(http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/) Copyright 2016 by 
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FIGURE 6.12.A. PERCENTAGE OF THE 
POPULATION AGED 5-24 YEARS 
ATTENDING AN EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2011) 
FIGURE 6.12.B. DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
POPULATION AGED 25 YEARS AND 
OLDER BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
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even when public education was deracialised” (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005, p. 300). Also, 
although an increasing black population managed to abandon poverty and climb to the 
higher classes (Crankshaw, 2008), the majority of black South Africans continued in deep 
poverty. In turn, in post-apartheid South Africa, privileges – including access to 
education – “could be reproduced on the basis of class rather than race” (Seekings & 
Nattrass, 2005, p. 300). The authors also mention a ‘skewed revolution’ in education in 
South Africa in which  
 
African students tended to complete fewer years of higher education, be enrolled in 
technikons rather than top universities, and be underrepresented in the more 
professional courses (such as engineering and accountancy). Institutions of higher 
education turned out very large numbers of African men and women with 
qualifications for middle class jobs but relatively fewer for the highest occupations 
(Seekings & Nattrass, 2005, p. 313). 
Consequently, the improvements in the number of students enrolled in South African 
institutions and in educational attainment fall short as the consequences of apartheid are 
still present in the country. Seekings and Nattrass (2005) argue that access to education 
no longer depends on race, but on class. However, even with an increasing deracialisation 
of classes, it is true that the majority of the black population that did not have access to 
education during apartheid is the same group that still belongs to the poorer classes 
today.  
 
As for Johannesburg, in 2015 the municipality had 610,185 learners registered in the 
ordinary school sector (Pre-Grade R to 12 Grade), approximately 4.82% of the learners in 
the same grades in the whole of South Africa, making it the third municipality in the 
country after eThekwini and Oliver Tambo (Department of Basic Education, 2016). The 
city has shown an impressive improvement in the levels of education since 1996. The 
literacy rates reached 98.7% in 2015 (Statistics South Africa, 2016b) and the number of 
people with no schooling in Johannesburg went down from 7.8% in 1996 to 2.9% in 2011. 
In the same period, those who completed grade 12 increased from 26.3% to 35%, while 
those who continued studying after grade 12 also increased from 10.6% to 19.1% (The 
Human Sciences Research Council, 2014). For 2016, further information is available in 
Figure 6.13. 
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Note: Data from “City of Johannesburg”, by Statistics South Africa, 2016, 
(http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=city-of-johannesburg-municipality) Copyright 2016 by Statistics South 
Africa. Reprinted with permission. 
 
Nonetheless, even with the improvements previously mentioned, differences within the 
city itself are marked and can be still linked to the consequences of apartheid. For 
example, between 1996 and 2011, the functional illiteracy rates for Region B (Rosebank, 
Bryanston, Randburg) were stable at around 20,000 people, while those for Region A 
(Diepsloot, Midrand, Fourways, Sunninghill, Woodmead) almost tripled by going from 
approximately 22,000 to 59,000 people. Out of Johannesburg’s 7 regions, only two 
reduced the number of people with functional illiteracy (Regions D and F) during that 
period. For Soweto in particular (Region D), the most affected by apartheid exclusions, 
the number of people who could not read or write decreased by 41% from 120,000 in 1996 
to 70,000 in 2011, showing the biggest improvement in the municipality, but still having 
the largest functionally illiterate population amongst all regions (The Human Sciences 
Research Council, 2014). 
 
In terms of higher education, only 8% of people aged between 18 and 29 years in 
Johannesburg are enrolled at a higher education institution. This enrolment is slightly 
higher than the national average of 7,8% but considerably lower than eThekwini’s 13,2%, 
the highest in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2016b). Pretoria is home to as many 
as five universities followed by Johannesburg and Cape Town, each with three. The 
combined universities in Johannesburg – namely the University of Johannesburg, the 
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enrolment of 98,203, which account for 9.60% of South Africa’s university students 
(BusinessTech, 2015).  
 
The previous paragraphs show that, despite being the largest city in South Africa, 
Johannesburg is far from being the country’s basic or higher education powerhouse. 
There have been important achievements in education after the fall of apartheid, but the 
fact that 80.9% of the city’s population does not continue studying after grade 12 shows 
the road to universal education is still long, both for South Africa and Johannesburg. In 
fact, South Africa is not only tied with El Salvador and Vietnam in place 116 in terms of 
educational achievements in the world, but also it is positioned after other African 
countries such as Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana and Algeria (UNDP, 2015b). 
Nonetheless, aware of the need to invest in education, government expenditure in the 
sector has been higher than the average of 5.0% of the GDP for OECD countries in 2011 
since 2009, reaching an all-time high of 6.36% for 2012 (OECD & Ministerio de Educación 
Nacional, 2016; The World Bank, 2016l).  
 
The last item in the demographic dimension is language. As explained in Chapter 5, 
according to Cristine Severo (2013), widely spoken languages become a source of power 
for countries as they allow them to better engage with the international community and 
the available information. Consequently, as an English-speaking country, South Africa 
has direct access to almost 985 million English speakers as a first or second language in 
more than 106 countries around the world (Ethnologue, 2016b, 2017).  
 
However, the use of English in South Africa is somewhat different to that of other 
English-speaking countries. Unlike the United Kingdom, Australia or the United States 
where almost all communications are in English, in South Africa only 11% of the 
population speaks the language at home (See Figure 6.14.) (Ndebele, 2016). Data 
regarding the total number of English speakers in South Africa is not clear as Statistics 
South Africa only provides information on English as a first language in the country. 
According to the Dictionary of South African English on Historical Principles (C. Muller 
& Wright, 1996) approximately 45% have a speaking knowledge of English, whereas, for 
Ethnologue (2017), it is only 29.99%. Yet, “English is South Africa’s lingua franca, and the 
primary language of government, business, and commerce. The new education 
curriculum makes two languages compulsory at school, with English the language of 
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learning and teaching at most schools and tertiary educations” (Brand South Africa, 
2016a).  
 




Note: Data adapted from “Census 2011 - Census in Brief”, by Statistics South Africa, 2012, 
(http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf) Copyright 2012 
by Statistics South Africa. Printed with permission. 
The demographic dimension shows a South Africa still struggling with the consequences 
of apartheid. Even though education rates have increased considerably since 1994, there 
is still a lot of work to be done on this subject. The city of Johannesburg shows a similar 
pattern. While the indicators continue improving, universal education is still far out of 
reach, especially in the city’s poorest areas. Nonetheless, as it was demonstrated by 
Perkins and Syrquin (1989), the power of size is present in South Africa. With a 
population of almost 55 million (The World Bank, 2016p), the country has a considerable 
demographic base that positively affects its ability to become an emerging nation in the 
International System. The same is true for Johannesburg. The city’s population, in 
conjunction with the other dimensions of power, have made it one of the most important 
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6.3. ECONOMIC DIMENSION:  AFRICA’S POWERHOUSE? 
 
This section explores the economic dimensions of South Africa and Johannesburg and 
their implications for the emergence of the country and the city in the world. The 
economy is closely linked to the power of size explained by Perkins and Syrquin (1989). 
The larger an economy, the more it increases a country’s power resources. And the same 
is certainly true for a city. This section demonstrates that, even though it has been argued 
that South Africa is ‘punching above its weight’ (Martyn Davies, 2012; P. Harrison, 2014), 
especially when compared with other BRICS nations, the country does have sufficient 
economic power resources to become an emerging power in the world. It also argues that, 
as South Africa’s economic powerhouse, the city of Johannesburg plays a crucial, if 
uncoordinated, role in the country’s emerging status in the world. 
 
In 2015, South Africa was the 29th largest economy in the world with a GDP (PPP) of 
USD 725,908,000,000, just one place above Colombia (number 30th on the list) and below 
Malaysia (27th) and the Philippines (28th) (International Monetary Fund, 2016). The 
IMF’s GDP (PPP) list places South Africa as the third largest economy in the continent 
after Nigeria (21st) and Egypt (22nd), however, when using the nominal GDP indicator, 
which is affected by the exchange rates between the USD and the national currency, South 
Africa and Nigeria have been competing to be the largest economy in Africa during the 
past lustrum (BBC, 2016d; BusinessTech, 2016; Doya, 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, the outlook for the largest economies in Africa is currently not very 
promising. According to the BBC, if the competition “was a horse race, the two leading 
contenders [South Africa and Nigeria] would be virtually neck and neck. But they 
wouldn’t be galloping, they’d be trotting at best. And looking increasingly tired and in 
need of sustenance” (BBC, 2016d). Indeed, after registering a 5.58% growth in 2006, the 
highest since the end of apartheid, the South African economy sank to -1.53% in 2009. 
There has been a noticeable recovery since, reaching 3.28% growth in 2011, and dropping 
to 1.26% in 2015 (See Figure 6.15.) (The World Bank, 2016g).  
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FIGURE 6.15. GDP GROWTH (ANNUAL %) FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1961-2016) 
 
 
Note: Data from “GDP growth (annual %)”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ZA) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the 
public domain. 
 
The IMF estimated South Africa’s growth to be 2.90% for 2016, 4.01% for 2017 and 4.49% 
for 2018 (International Monetary Fund, 2016), however, Statistics South Africa (2017) 
recorded a much lower overall growth for the South African economy of 0.7% for 2016. 
According to the OECD, the reasons for the country’s current low growth rates include 
negative or zero growth in private investments for six consecutive quarters, persistent 
drought, political uncertainties and a 27% unemployment rate that is affecting household 
consumption and driving up inequalities (OECD, 2016b). Even with the existing difficult 
macroeconomic situation, “economic growth is projected to rebound in 2017 and 
strengthen further in 2018, driven by household consumption and investment” (OECD, 
2016b, p. 233). South Africa will continue to grow, however by 2020, projections show the 
country will fall to place 31, losing two positions in the global ranking to Colombia and 
Bangladesh (International Monetary Fund, 2016). 
 
In 2013, the city of Johannesburg represented 13.9% of South Africa’s total economic 
output (GVA)34, 3% more than Cape Town, the second city on the list (See Figure 6.16.) 
(Karuri-Sebina, 2016). Furthermore, with a GDP of approximately USD 123,404,360,000 
                                                 
34 GVA is a measure of the value of goods and services produced in a defined area. It is related to Gross 
Domestic 
Product (GDP) though the following formula: GVA = GDP + subsidies - (direct, sales) taxes (P. Harrison, 
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for 2015, the city of Johannesburg accounted for 17% of South Africa’s GDP (City of 
Johannesburg, 2015a). If Johannesburg were a country, it would be the 79th largest 
economy in the world, similar to that of Guatemala and larger than Ghana, Serbia, Libya 
or Croatia (International Monetary Fund, 2016). 
 
FIGURE 6.16. CITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA’S TOTAL ECONOMIC OUTPUT 
(1995 AND 2013) 
 
 
Note: Data from “State of South African Cities Report 2016”, by the South African Cities Network, 2016, 
(http://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/SOCR/SoCR16 Main Report online.pdf) Copyright 2016 by the 
South African Cities Network. Reprinted with permission. 
 
The importance of Johannesburg as South Africa’s largest economy is widely recognised 
(Boraine et al., 2006). The city’s economy is the main driver of national growth and, over 
the past two decades, it “has grown faster than […] South Africa as a country. The result 
of this performance is a city output which in 2013 was some 92 percent larger than in 1996 
– compared with the 70 percent of South Africa as a whole” (City of Johannesburg, 2015b, 
p. 6). In fact, out of the last 19 years, the city’s GDP growth has been higher than that of 
South Africa in 17 of them (See Figure 6.17.). When taking the three main municipalities 
in the Gauteng City Region – Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni – into 
consideration, their economic output accounts for 31,9% of that of South Africa, making 
not only the city of Johannesburg but also the Gauteng province the indisputable 
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FIGURE 6.17. CITY OF JOHANNESBURG GDP GROWTH (1997-2016) 
 
 
Note: Data from “The City of Johannesburg (COJ) Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the Economy 
and other Key Indicators”, by the Human Sciences Research Council, 2014, 
(http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20_Rep
ort.pdf) Copyright 2014 by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Reprinted with authorisation. 
The OECD reported that South Africa’s unemployment rate for 2015 was 27% (OECD, 
2016b), however, both Statistics South Africa and the IMF placed the country’s 
unemployment rate for 2015 at 25.3% (International Monetary Fund, 2016; Statistics South 
Africa, 2016c). With that, South Africa had the third highest unemployment rate in the 
world after Bosnia-Herzegovina (27.70%) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (26.05%), and 3.76 percentage points higher than that of Sudan, the next 
African country on the list (International Monetary Fund, 2016). As seen in Figure 6.18.a., 
apart from three short periods in which the unemployment rate decreased since 1980, this 
indicator had an increasing tendency during the past 35 years until it finally stabilised in 
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FIGURE 6.18. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND JOHANNESBURG 
 
Although “between 2009 and 2015 employment increased from 14,2 million to 15,7 
million[, t]his rise […] did not keep pace with the increase in the working age population” 
(Statistics South Africa, 2016c). Unemployment is a structural problem for the economy 
of South Africa. In the period 2009–2015, “the number of long-term unemployed persons 
increased by 828,000, accounting for 88% of the increase in the total number of the 
unemployed. Those who have been unemployed for more than 5 years increased from 
just over 1 million to 1,5 million” (Statistics South Africa, 2016c). 
 
In terms of unemployment, similar problems are faced by the city of Johannesburg. The 
unemployment rate had a significant decrease from 37.4% in 2001 to 25.0% in 2011 (The 
Human Sciences Research Council, 2014) before going up again to 26.2% in the second 
quarter of 2015 (Karuri-Sebina, 2016). But the overall unemployment rate is not the only 
labour-related problem in the city. A youth unemployment rate of 31.5% for 2011 shows 
















































































Note: Data from “World Economic Outlook 
database”, by the International Monetary Fund, 2016, 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/ 
2016/02/weodata/WEOOct2016all.xls) Copyright 
2016 by the International Monetary Fund. Reprinted 
with authorisation. 
Note: Data from “The City of Johannesburg (COJ) 
Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the 
Economy and other Key Indicators”, by the HSRC, 2014, 
(http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/ 
4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%
202013%20_Report.pdf) Copyright 2014 by the HSRC. 































FIGURE 6.18.B. CITY OF JOHANNESBURG 
REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
(2011) 
FIGURE 6.18.A. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
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Sciences Research Council, 2014). Informality in the city grew 209.9% between 1996 and 
2001 posing an additional challenge as “growth in employment in the informal sector was 
much higher than growth in the formal sector for the period” (The Human Sciences 
Research Council, 2014, p. 56).  
 
Also, there are evident disparities in unemployment rates not only by regions in the city 
of Johannesburg (See Figure 6.18.b.) but also by race and gender (City of Johannesburg, 
2013a). On this topic, Crankshaw states that “the decline in manufacturing employment 
has transformed many of [the] Black neighbourhoods into ‘ghettos of exclusion’ with 
extremely high unemployment levels” (Crankshaw, 2008, p. 1693). Finally, the city’s 2.4% 
annual growth in population (Karuri-Sebina, 2016) adds to the challenges faced by 
Johannesburg’s labour market. 
 
Nevertheless, the city of Johannesburg concentrates the largest amount of jobs in South 
Africa as it accounts for 11.3% of all national employment, 2.5 percentage points more 
than eThekwini, the second metro in importance. Additionally, the city’s average labour 
absorption rate between 2003 and 2013 showed a positive behaviour as the average 
annual change in total employment (formal and informal) at approximately 3.2% was 
considerably higher than the average change in working age (15-65 years) population at 
approximately 2.6%  (Karuri-Sebina, 2016). Consequently, even with the existence of 
serious employment challenges, Johannesburg is undoubtedly the epicentre of South 
Africa’s labour market. 
 
Regarding foreign trade, South Africa exported a total of USD 69,631,082,610 in 2015, 
23.15% less than what was exported the previous year and 35.49% less than the total 
exports for 2011, the best year since the end of apartheid (See Figure 6.19.) (The World 
Bank, 2017c, 2017e, 2017f). In 2015, the most important sub-sectors for South Africa’s 
export market were precious metals with 20.8% of the export share, ores with 13%, 
mineral fuels with 10.7%, vehicles with 8.6%, iron and steel with 7.5% and machinery 
with 6.9% (Anand, Perrelli, & Zhang, 2016).  
 
Imports accounted for USD 79,590,945,310 in 2015 and were, in turn, 14.30% larger than 
the total value of exports during the same period. This leaves South Africa with a trade 
deficit of USD 9,959,862,700 (The World Bank, 2017g), a value similar to the total exports 
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of Sri Lanka, Bolivia or Zambia (The World Bank, 2017a). Furthermore, as Figure 6.19. 
shows, the total value of exports was larger than the total value of imports only in 2011. 
For all other years, South Africa experienced a trade deficit. 
FIGURE 6.19. SOUTH AFRICAN BALANCE OF TRADE (2000-2015) 
 
Note: Data from “South Africa Exports by Country and Region 2015”, by the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade 
Solution, 2017, (http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/LTST/TradeFlow/Export/ 
Partner/all/); and “South Africa Imports By Country and Region 2015”, by the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade 
Solution, 2017, (http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/2015/TradeFlow/Import); Copyright 
2017 by the World Bank. Reprinted with authorisation. 
Confidence, both political and economic, has been the key factor undermining South 
African industrial production and external trade (OECD, 2016b). The economic 
uncertainty linked to president Zuma’s various corruption scandals (Al Jazeera, 2016; 
BBC, 2016b, 2016c; Cohen, 2016; Kende, 2014) and his handling of the Minister of Finance 
post during the past few years (Cohen, 2017; Jammine, 2015) have undoubtedly damaged 
the country’s economic performance; so much that South Africa’s credit rating has 
recently been downgraded to junk status (BBC, 2017; Matthew Davies, 2017; eNCA, 
2017a, 2017b; EWN, 2017; The Guardian, 2017). Also, the global economic crisis of 2008 
and 2009; the flat OECD industrial performance during 2014 and 2015; the negative 
effects of a weak rand over South African manufacturers who rely heavily on imports for 
their inputs; and a higher inflation rate contribute to the recent decline in both exports 
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Additionally, the government’s inability to continuously provide basic public services 
such as electricity and water has also had a considerable impact on the country’s 
productivity and external trade. During 2015 and 2016, Eskom, South Africa’s primary 
electricity supplier, was not able to meet the country’s demand and therefore engaged in 
load curtailment and load shedding to protect the electricity power system from a total 
blackout (Eskom, 2017). Subsequently, “[f]irms in the electricity intensive sectors have 
seen lower exports growth as lack of power (“load shedding”) has prevented firms to 
expand exports” (Anand et al., 2016, p. 11). Water supply is also becoming uncertain. On 
top of South Africa already using 98% of its available water sources (Thelwell, 2014), the 
recurrent drought (Hlomendlini, 2016a, 2016b; Makube, 2015) is already having serious 
consequences both in the quality of life of South Africans and the country’s economic 
performance. According to Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve 
Bank: 
 
The economy continues to suffer spillovers from low global growth as well as idiosyncratic 
shocks, of which drought is the most recent. Rainfall in 2015 was 20 per cent below its long-
run average. Parliament recently adopted a motion that drought should be declared a 
national disaster. […] In addition to the issue of access to food, we continue to see enormous 
human suffering from water shortages affecting people’s quality of life. These shortages also 
endanger businesses; this, in turn, threatens the livelihood of the communities dependent on 
those businesses for employment (Kganyago, 2016, pp. 2–3). 
 
Thus, the economic forecast is not very promising and, even though the government 
recognised the export sector as a key driver of faster growth, it seems the aim to increase 
total exports by 6% a year and non-traditional exports by 10% a year to 2030 is not going 
to be achieved (National Planning Commission, 2011). According to the World Bank, 
South Africa’s exports are currently facing two major problems. First,  
 
South African exports are concentrated in few mega firms who ship products to countries 
around the world, with approximately 1000 companies generating 93% of all of the 
country’s exports. The rest of South Africa’s 20,000 exporting firms export small amounts. 
In addition, these mega companies are losing momentum as they are creating fewer new 
products and not expanding into new markets (The World Bank, 2013). 
And second,  
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South Africa export goods are also mainly highly sophisticated, capital intensive goods that 
are produced by highly skilled workers. While this offers opportunities for upgrading and 
moving up the value ladder, trading in these products means that the dominant export 
companies are underutilizing South Africa’s large pool of low-skilled labor, thus failing to 
create enough jobs to make the export sector a major contributor to employment growth and 
poverty reduction (The World Bank, 2013). 
 
The answer to South Africa’s export problems might lie in its own neighbourhood. Since 
2013, the World Bank has stated that, as “South Africa faces challenges from weaker 
commodity prices, lower Chinese demand and rising U.S. interest rates” (The World 
Bank, 2016x), greater competitiveness and regional integration are critical for South 
Africa’s growth (The World Bank, 2013, 2014b, 2016x). And the country seems to be going 
in that direction. In 2010, 27.67% of South Africa’s exports went to Sub-Saharan Africa 
(The World Bank, 2017d) whereas, in 2015, that number went up to 30.26% (The World 
Bank, 2017c). During both years, Sub-Saharan Africa was South Africa’s main export 
market; however, the difference with Europe and Central Asia, the second most 
important destination for South Africa’s exports, increased from 1.27% in 2010 to 6.04% 
in 2015 (The World Bank, 2017c, 2017d). 
 
Confidence in the economy by foreign investors has also been affected by South Africa’s 
economic performance during the past few years. While in 2010, South Africa was the 
34th easiest country to do business according to the World Bank’s DB Index, by 2015, the 
country had lost nine places and ranked 43rd in the world, and, by 2017, the fall was even 
more noticeable as South Africa lost 31 additional places and ranked 74th (The World 
Bank, 2009, 2014a, 2016a).  
 
On this topic, the “getting credit” indicator went from being the second best in the world 
in 2010 to number 62 in 2017; whereas the “getting electricity” indicator ranked South 
Africa 111th in the world, similar to that of least developed countries such as Sudan or 
East Timor (The World Bank, 2009, 2016a) and, as stated previously, proved the country’s 
difficulties to provide basic public services. Finally, even though the ranking for “trading 
across borders” improved nine places between 2010 and 2017, South Africa is still ranked 
139 in the world, placing its objectives of reducing poverty through promoting exports 
further out of reach (The World Bank, 2009, 2016a). Figures 6.20.a. and 6.20.b. 
demonstrate the volatility of Foreign Direct Investment in post-apartheid South Africa. 
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FIGURE 6.20. NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(1970-2016) 
 
Even with the difficulties mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the city of Johannesburg 
is still the cornerstone on which the economy of South Africa is based. 82% of 
Johannesburg’s economic activity is driven primarily by four sectors: finance and 
business services, community services, manufacturing and trade (City of Johannesburg, 
2013a). Trade is particularly important. In 2011, the city itself was responsible for 37.4% 
of South Africa’s external trade (The Human Sciences Research Council, 2014) and, in 
accordance with Johannesburg’s mining history, coal and lignite, metal ore and metal 
products, and machinery and household appliances made up for 69% of the city’s 
contribution to national trade (The Human Sciences Research Council, 2014). Figure 6.21. 
indicates the importance of the city of Johannesburg’s share in South Africa’s foreign 
trade totals, as it doubles that of the city of Tshwane, the second most important 
contributor to the country’s external trade. 
Note: Data from “Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (BoP, current US$)”, by The World Bank, 
2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX. 
KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=ZA) Copyright 2016 
by the World Bank. In the public domain. 
Note: Data from “Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.
WD.GD.ZS?locations=ZA) Copyright 2016 by the 





















































































FIGURE 6.20.A. NET INFLOWS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
SOUTH AFRICA (USD BILLION) (1970-
2016) 
FIGURE 6.20.B. NET INFLOWS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
SOUTH AFRICA (% OF GDP) (1970-2016) 
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Note: Data from “The City of Johannesburg (COJ) Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the Economy 
and other Key Indicators”, by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 2014, 
(http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20_Rep
ort.pdf) Copyright 2014 by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Reprinted with authorisation. 
 
Finally, more than 70% of South African companies are headquartered in the city of 
Johannesburg (City of Johannesburg, 2013c), its stock exchange is the largest in Africa 
and the 19th largest in the world (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2013) and the city hosts 
South Africa’s four largest banks – FirstRand, Absa, Standard Bank and Nedcor – which 
together control over 80% of the country’s banking assets (City of Johannesburg, 2013b). 
Also, with 4.4 million overnight international visitors and USD 2.6 billion of visitor cross-
border spending in 2015, Johannesburg is ranked second (after Dubai) in both of these 
indicators for the Middle East and Africa region (Hendrick-Wong & Choong, 2015). In 
terms of Global Cities, Johannesburg ranked 60th in the world and second in Africa after 
Cairo (ATKearney, 2016). Consequently, the city of Johannesburg is currently not only 
the heart of South Africa’s economy but also a hub for Africa and a point of entrance to 
the continent (Beall, Crankshaw, & Parnell, 2002; Lipietz, 2008; Rogerson, 2002). 
 
The analysis of the economic dimension of power resources for South Africa shows that 
the positive behaviour of the economy experienced after the fall of apartheid is slowing 
down. And although there are predictions for it to bounce back, the short-term economic 
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important, stable and diversified economies on the African continent and that cannot be 
overlooked. Even if it is only in relation to its African neighbours, South Africa is 
undoubtedly a powerhouse in the region and that, in turn, contributes largely to the 
country’s emerging status in the world.  
 
This section has demonstrated that Johannesburg is the heart of South Africa’s economy. 
The city’s diversified economy has been responsible for a large share of South Africa’s 
economic growth during the past few years. Johannesburg is home to the largest share of 
the country’s labour market, as well as most of its largest companies and its stock market. 
Also, due to its highly developed infrastructure and its international connectivity, 
Johannesburg is the city of choice for foreign companies wishing to enter the African 
markets. As South Africa’s biggest and most important city, Johannesburg plays a key 
role in the country’s economic emergence in the world. The opposite is also true: Being 
part of South Africa has helped Johannesburg to become an important emerging city in 
the Global South. The economic connection between national and local is clear, however, 
the political link in which both levels of government engage with each other to emerge in 
the world as part of a coordinated strategy is not.  
 
 
6.4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION: OVERCOMING INEQUALITY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
More than two decades after the arrival of democracy, apartheid is still a key determinant 
of South Africa’s current socio-economic situation. The inequalities brought about by 
decades of racial segregation still affect the country’s human development indicators. 
This analysis of the socio-economic dimension of power resources demonstrates that 
even with significant progress, South Africa still faces a major challenge in overcoming 
inequality and poverty, and improving the quality of life of its population. By including 
Johannesburg in the discussion, this section demonstrates that the improvements in 
socio-economic indicators have been more noticeable in the city than in rural areas, 
thereby making the city a crucial location for the national government’s aim to provide 
quality of life for its citizens. 
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South Africa was classified as a ‘medium human development’ country by the UNDP’s 
Human Development Index (HDI) in 2015 (UNDP, 2016). With an HDI of 0.666, South 
Africa is currently ranked 119 in the world, an improvement of only 0.045 since the first 
report in 1990 and of 0.028 since 2010 (UNDP, 2016). South Africa’s HDI improvement of 
two places between 2010 and 2015 has been somewhat limited when compared with other 
countries in the region. Seychelles, for example, jumped 11 places during the same period, 
while Mauritius and Gabon jumped five. Furthermore, even with the progress mentioned 
previously in this chapter, South Africa has been unable to radically improve its 
indicators for health, education and quality of life since the end of apartheid. 
Consequently, the ranking not only shows eight African countries above South Africa, 
but also war-torn Palestine and Iraq are extremely close in places 114 and 121 respectively 
(UNDP, 2016). 
 
On the same topic, the city of Johannesburg has slightly better indicators for health, 
education and quality of life than the rest of South Africa. Its HDI in 2004 was 0.67, similar 
to that of South Africa in 2015, and it grew to 0.72 for 2013, the last available data for the 
city (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2015). If Johannesburg was a country and its HDI 
was compared with the world rankings for 2013, the city would be ranked 91st between 
Tunisia (90th) and the People’s Republic of China (91st) (UNDP, 2014). Figure 6.22. clearly 
shows how the HDIs of the city of Johannesburg and Gauteng Province were much 
higher than those for Republic of South Africa between 1996 and 2011.  
 
In terms of GDP (PPP) per capita, South Africa registered USD 13,195 for 2015 (ranking 
84th in the world), doubling the USD 6,493 the country had in 1994 when apartheid came 
to an end (See Figure 6.23.) (The World Bank, 2016h). The country’s poverty indicators 
have also improved considerably since 2000; however, the most recent indicator dates 
from 2011. According to the MDG country report by Statistics South Africa (2015), the 
proportion of population living with less than USD 1.25 (PPP) a day went from 17% in 
2000, to 9.7% in 2006, to 7.4% in 2011. With that, South Africa achieved the MDG target 
of having less than 8.5% of the population in this category by 2015. On the contrary, the 
country had not achieved the target of 16.8% of the population living with less than USD 
2 (PPP) a day by 2015 as the latest indicator from 2011 shows that 20.8% of the population 
falls under this category. 
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FIGURE 6.22. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI) FOR THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG, 
GAUTENG PROVINCE AND SOUTH AFRICA (1996-2011) 
 
Note 1: Human Development Index data for South Africa is not available for every year. The Figure shows a tendency 
line of the available data. 
Note 2: Data from “The City of Johannesburg (COJ) Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the Economy 
and other Key Indicators”, by The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 2014, 
(http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20_Rep
ort.pdf) Copyright 2014 by The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC); and from “Human development report 
2013: The rise of the South Human Progress in a Diverse World - South Africa”, by UNDP, 2013, 
(http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/ZAF.pdf) Copyright 2013 by UNDP. Reprinted with 
authorisation. 




Note: Data from “GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)”, by The World Bank, 2016, 
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Palmer, Moodley and Parnell argue that “South Africa has a capable state, [however] the 
capacity of the state in South Africa must be seen as vulnerable rather than robust” (I. 
Palmer, Moodley, & Parnell, 2017, p. 252). Consequently, in the absence of a robust State, 
the economic, social and demographic legacies of apartheid are still visible in South 
Africa as the country faces major internal problems in distribution, inequality, poverty 
and even service delivery (OECD, 2011). When the poverty indicators are disaggregated, 
it becomes evident that rural South Africans are almost twice more likely to be poor than 
urban South Africans. According to the World Bank, the urban poverty headcount ratio 
at national poverty lines went from 52% in 2005 to 39.2% in 2010 (The World Bank, 
2016aa), whereas the rural poverty headcount went from 87.6% in 2005 to 77% in 2010 
(The World Bank, 2016u). Both indicators showed a significant decrease between 2005 
and 2010, the only two years with available data, but the road to poverty eradication, 
especially for the rural population, is still undoubtedly very long.  
 
Continuing with inequality, the Gini Index ranks South Africa as the second most 
unequal country in the world after Lesotho. South Africa’s index of 62.5 is 2.6 times larger 
than that of Slovenia, the most equal country on earth, and twice as large as Egypt’s, 
Africa’s most equal country. Nonetheless, South Africa is not alone in the region as it is 
closely followed by the Central African Republic (ranked 3rd), Botswana (6th), Namibia 
(7th), Zambia (9th) and Swaziland (18th) (CIA, 2016b).  
 
The CPI ranks South Africa as the 64th least corrupt country in the world – tied with 
Montenegro, Oman, Senegal and Suriname (Transparency International, 2017) with 45 
points. Corruption has gradually worsened in the country. In 2000, South Africa was 
ranked 34th (Transparency International, 2016b) and in 2010, it went down to 54th 
(Transparency International, 2016b). Corruption perception is more than likely to keep 
worsening in the following years. Thuli Madonsela, the then Public Protector of South 
Africa, produced the “State of Capture” report in October 2016 (Madonsela, 2016) in 
which she found conclusive evidence of acts of corruption involving President Jacob 
Zuma and the Gupta family. The ‘State Capacity Research Project’, an inter-university 
research partnership, also demonstrated the widespread corruption in the current South 
African Government in its report ‘Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa is being 
stolen’ (Swilling et al., 2017). Furthermore, ‘State Capture’ has been featured extensively 
in domestic and international media and, according to experts, it could have catastrophic 
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consequences for the South African economy in the near future (BBC, 2016e; S. M. Muller, 
2017; Newham, 2013; Omarjee, 2017; The Guardian, 2016).  
 
In terms of economic performance, the city of Johannesburg appears to be ahead of South 
Africa in most indicators. In turn, Johannesburg’s GDP per capita was USD 16,370 in 2014 
(Parilla, Leal, Berube, & Ran, 2015), USD 3,273 higher than that of South Africa for the 
same year (The World Bank, 2016j). The poverty head-count and the poverty gap for the 
city35 were respectively 12.6% and 0.8% lower than the national average for 2013 (City of 
Johannesburg, 2015a). With a Gini coefficient of 65 for Johannesburg and 62.5 for South 
Africa, this seems to be the only indicator in which the country outperformed the city36 
(City of Johannesburg, 2015a).  
 
Finally, in line with the increase of corruption in South Africa during the Zuma 
government, the City of Johannesburg has also had its share of corruption scandals. The 
Metropolitan Police Department appears to be in the centre of corruption in the city. 
According to Corruption Watch’s 2012 report, systemic weaknesses have caused this 
“law enforcement agency to become synonymous with corruption” (Bruce, 2012, p. 1). 
But the Police Department is not the only one. Under the government of Herman 
Mashaba, the “new anti-corruption unit identified 106 African National Congress 
officials responsible for R14 million lost to corruption under the previous administration” 
(Claymore, 2017) across various agencies. 
 
It must be noted that, while there was a mandate to fight corruption in various official 
documents of the City of Johannesburg during the previous ANC administration, 
references to this matter were extremely vague, scarce and came from other spheres of 
government. For example, the City of Johannesburg’s 2016 International Relations 
Strategy includes only two references to corruption, one recommended by the National 
                                                 
35 “In South Africa poverty indicators are domesticated based on national poverty lines derived from the 
cost of basic needs of households. These domesticated indicators include a lower-bound poverty line (LPL) 
of R433 per person per month (in 2011 prices) and an upper-bound poverty line (UPL) of R620 (in 2011 
prices)” (City of Johannesburg, 2015a, p. 30). The data for poverty head-count and poverty gap used in this 
thesis is based on the upper-bound poverty line for South Africa as stated in the 2012/2016 Integrated 
Development Plan for the City of Johannesburg. 
36 It must be noted that the Gini coefficient data is not available for the same year for the city of 
Johannesburg and South Africa. Therefore, data for the city of Johannesburg is from 2015 and data for 
South Africa was estimated by the World Bank in 2013 (CIA, 2016b; City of Johannesburg, 2015a, p. 28). 
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Planning Commission and the other one by the Gauteng Provincial Government (City of 
Johannesburg, 2016i). None of the references to corruption came from the city 
administration itself. The 2012/2016 Integrated Development Plan mentions the word 
corruption just twice, one in a list of actions to be undertaken, and another when it states 
that “Focus on eradication of corruption in vulnerable departments such as Metro Police 
and Revenue is yielding positive results” (City of Johannesburg, 2015a, p. 19). Finally, the 
Joburg 2040: Growth and Development Strategy only talks about the consequences of 
corruption but it does not include a call to fight it (City of Johannesburg, 2011). 
 
In turn, the crackdown on corruption implemented by the new DA government and its 
Mayor, Herman Mashaba, represents a major shift from the previous administration. In 
his own words, “the days when corrupt officials would get a gentle slap on the wrist… 
are over. I will not rest until a clean, responsive and caring administration that puts our 
residents first becomes a reality in Joburg” (BusinessTech, 2017). It is still too early to 
know if the new measures will have an impact on corruption in the city. However, what 
is true is that national corruption scandals involving President Zuma have somewhat 
overshadowed the severity of corruption within the City of Johannesburg. 
 
To conclude, even after achieving outstanding improvements, South Africa and 
Johannesburg still face some of the most important challenges commonly seen in 
countries in the Global South, such as poverty, inequality and low quality of life for a 
large portion of their populations (Beall, Crankshaw, & Parnell, 2000; Boraine et al., 2006; 
Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). Nonetheless, as it is with the case of Colombia, this section 
demonstrated that city governments tend to be more effective in addressing these 
problems than national governments – for South Africa, this issue is further explained by 
Palmer, Moodley and Parnell (2017) –. The considerable difference between urban and 
rural indicators are proof of this. Therefore, in terms of the socio-economic dimension, 
the contribution of the city of Johannesburg to the overall power resources of South Africa 
is undeniable. And while there is coordination in terms of domestic policy, this 
coordination is absent in the international strategies of both city and country. This topic 
will be further explored in Chapter 8.  
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6.5. SOUTH AFRICA’S MILITARY: FROM THREAT TO 
PEACEKEEPER 
 
South Africa’s approach to military power underwent a radical shift with the end of 
apartheid. Before 1994, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was the muscle used by 
the government to crack down opposition to the apartheid regime both within the 
national borders and in neighbouring countries. Not only was it used to support the 
União Nacional de Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Movimento de 
Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) in order to destabilise the governments 
of Angola and Mozambique, but also in Rhodesia against Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) (Friedland, 1982; Saul, 
1985; Sidaway & Simon, 1993). Furthermore,  
For South Africa, making trouble in Angola and Mozambique was relatively cheap and easy 
and served a variety of its regional strategic aims. There was no serious intention to install 
either Unita or Renamo in power, rather to damage the ideological appeal of the MPLA and 
Frelimo, weaken their support for the ANC, and keep the inland Frontline States dependent 
on South Africa. Non-aggression pacts were signed but not honoured by Pretoria, yet 
Washington made no attempt to punish Pretoria for that failure (R. Palmer, 1996, p. 506). 
Domestically, the SADF was used by the government for two main objectives. First, it 
was responsible for the occupation of South West Africa – Namibia today – and the 
crackdown of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), the nationalist 
group fighting for Namibian independence from South Africa (Batchelor, Dunne, & 
Lamb, 2002; Seiler, 1982; Wood, 1984). Secondly, it was used to suppress black resistance 
against the apartheid State (South African History Archive, 2017). In fact, “from 1984, 
SADF troops were deployed in many of the country’s black townships in an attempt to 
quell the growing political unrest” (Batchelor et al., 2002, p. 342). Consequently, the use 
of SADF to support the police force within the national borders during apartheid meant 
that, like Colombia, South Africa modified its armed forces mandate to deal with public 
order and internal security. 
 
Two additional elements have to be taken into consideration at this point as they 
enhanced SADF’s military capacity in Southern Africa during apartheid (Gould & 
Hecker, 2005). The South African Nuclear Warfare Programme and the South African 
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Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Programme – also known as Project Coast – 
were the reaction of the Afrikaaner nationalist government to the security threats posed 
by internal black rebels, especially in the townships and Bantustans, and revolutionary 
activities in Rhodesia and Namibia during the second half of the 20th century (Husain, 
1982; Purkitt & Burgess, 2002; Walters, 1976). In addition, fuelled by a shared perception 
of being ‘God’s chosen people’ and a heightened sense of isolation, the governments of 
South Africa and Israel cooperated “with each other on armaments development, 
including nuclear weapons and missile programmes. It is suspected that they also 
cooperated on chemical and biological warfare research and development” (Purkitt & 
Burgess, 2002, pp. 231–232). 
 
While the nuclear programme was perceived as a blackmailing tool “against Angola or 
Mozambique to force them to seal their borders and intern guerrillas, by threatening the 
destruction of Luanda, Maputo or Cuban cantonments” (Betts, 1979, p. 100), the CBW 
programme was aimed at suppressing the black opposition and securing the survival of 
white South Africa. As stated by Purkitt and Burgess,  
[I]t is known that some research efforts under the auspices of Project Coast were dedicated 
to producing a 'black bomb', using bacteria or other biological agents that would kill or 
weaken blacks and not whites. The black bomb could be used to wipe out or incapacitate an 
entire area where an insurrection was taking place (Purkitt & Burgess, 2002, p. 245). 
But the geopolitical situation for the apartheid government started to change towards the 
end of the 1980s.  
 
[A]fter the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independence of Namibia, the cessation of 
hostilities in Angola, and the withdrawal from that country of 50,000 Cuban troops – South 
Africa saw clearly that the nuclear deterrent was becoming superfluous. Furthermore, the 
government increasingly realized that accession to the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] would 
have distinct advantages for South Africa's international relations, especially those with 
African countries. Pretoria saw that the solution to South Africa’s problems lay in the 
political rather than the military arena and that the nuclear deterrent, along with strategic 
ambiguity, was becoming a burden rather than a benefit (De Villiers et al., 1993, pp. 102–
103). 
Chapter 6: South Africa and Johannesburg: The contradictions of an African emerging power 
 
162 
Furthermore, the imminent end of apartheid and the prospects of a new ANC-led 
government accelerated the dismantling of South Africa’s nuclear, chemical and 
biological programmes, mostly as doubts about the ANC’s fitness as a nuclear custodian 
grew in the country and the international community (De Villiers et al., 1993). 
Consequently, South Africa became the first country in the world to voluntarily and 
unilaterally relinquish nuclear weapons just before Nelson Mandela came to power (De 
Villiers et al., 1993; D. Fischer, 1995; V. Harris et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the scientific 
knowledge on how to produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons still remains in 
South Africa.  
 
The end of apartheid came with additional radical changes for South Africa’s military. 
While initially efforts were made to downsize the SADF between 1989 and 1993, it was 
later dismantled and replaced by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 
April 1994. The new SANDF “comprised personnel from the former SADF, the former 
TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) defence forces and the liberation 
armies of the ANC and the PAC” (Batchelor et al., 2002, p. 348). Furthermore, the end of 
the Cold War and the subsequent withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and 
Namibia, the legalisation of opposition groups in South Africa and the country’s 
economic deterioration after 1989 contributed greatly to the reduction of Pretoria’s 
military budget (Batchelor et al., 2002).  
 
As seen in Figure 6.24.a., the military budget peaked in 1976/1978 with the Soweto 
uprisings (Batchelor et al., 2002) and then in 1987/1989 during the South African invasion 
of Southern Angola (Manby, 1992). From that moment onwards, the military spending 
decreased steadily until it stabilised between 1% and 1.5% since 1997, approximately the 
same levels of military spending South Africa had before 1960. This decrease can also be 
seen in Figure 6.24.b. where South Africa went from being the 24th country with the 
largest military spending in the world in 1988 to being number 94th in 2015. 
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FIGURE 6.24. MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
Even with an outstanding decline in its military budget, post-apartheid “South Africa 
remains sub-Saharan Africa’s most powerful state in terms of military spending. On the 
continental level, only the military spending rates of Algeria, Egypt and Morocco are 
comparable to South Africa’s” (Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2014, p. 20). Nonetheless, the 
country’s approach to its military role in Africa seems to lack hegemonic aspirations. In 
turn, the inclusion of ‘Human Security’ in SANDF’s mandate in 1994 (Mongwaketse, 
2016), Pretoria’s foreign policy focus on peace and security affairs with an emphasis on 
consolidating an African peace and security architecture (Khadiagala & Nganje, 2016; 
Mabera, 2016) and even the use of the military to protect South Africa’s endangered 
wildlife (Ellis, 1994) are clear proof of the country’s current stand on its military role in 
the continent and the world.  
 
On this particular topic, Flemes and Costa Vaz state that South African  
FIGURE 6.24.A. MILITARY 
EXPENDITURE IN SOUTH AFRICA (% 
OF GDP) (1951-2015) 
FIGURE 6.24.B. RANKING OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S MILITARY EXPENDITURE 
IN THE WORLD (1988-2015) 
Note: Data from “Military expenditure data: 1949–
2015”, by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), 2017, 
(https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-
Milex-data-1949-2015.xlsx) Copyright 2017 by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI). Reprinted with permission. 
Note: Data from “Military expenditure (% of GDP)”, 
by The World Bank, 2016, 
(http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/MS.MIL.X
PND.GD.ZS?downloadformat=excel) Copyright 2016 
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Policymakers are conscious that a pronounced claim to regional leadership or unilateral use 
of military force like in Nigeria (1995) and Lesotho (1998) would undermine its legitimacy 
on the African continent (cf. Flemes, 2009b). Even though the issue is subject to political 
controversies, South Africa does not seem to be prone to hegemonic aspirations—not even 
in its immediate sub-regional context, where it has been committed to self-restraint […]. 
South Africa’s regional policies are driven foremost by ideas rather than by power and/or 
hegemonic aspirations (cf. Geldenhuys, 2010). If South Africa would have hegemonic 
intents, military considerations certainly played a stronger role in its security approach 
(Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2014, pp. 20–21) 
 
To conclude, it can be argued that while South Africa remains the most powerful country 
in Africa in military terms, the government in Pretoria abandoned the use of the military 
force to destabilise or exert its influence on neighbouring countries after apartheid 
(Evans, 1996). “The government strongly favours peacekeeping over peace enforcement, 
and insists that external military deployments require the approval of the UN Security 
Council” (Nathan, 2005). It is true that this new approach to the military does respond to 
the foreign policy guidelines of democratic South Africa, however, after SANDF’s failed 
intervention in the Central African Republic, Louw-Vaudran argues that “at the moment, 
[South Africa does] not seem to have the military capacity to act as a superpower on the 
continent” (Louw-Vaudran, 2016, p. 106).  
 
Consequently, nowadays, SANDF’s mandate is limited to a defensive approach to 
national security and an outstanding engagement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
missions, particularly in Africa (Sidiropoulos, 2007b). Nonetheless, the military power is 
still present in South Africa and it is used politically as part of its strategy to emerge in 
the Global South. The non-aggressive joint military exercises with Brazil and India 
(Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2014) are clear proof of that.  
 
Also, since the defence policy depends only on the national government, the participation 
of cities is quite limited. Furthermore, for the South African case, most of the defence 
apparatus is located in Pretoria, not in Johannesburg. Consequently, given the shift in 
South Africa’s defence policy after 1994 in which the military is only used for external 
security and not for domestic public order, no references to the city of Johannesburg were 
made in this section. 
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6.6. SOUTH AFRICAN POWER RESOURCES: A CONCLUSION 
 
An analysis of the power resources of South Africa shows two main trends. The first one 
includes substantial improvements in most indicators for the country since the end of 
apartheid. The second one demonstrates the legacy of apartheid in most of the variables 
that determine the country’s power resources and, consequently, there is still a long way 
to go in solving South Africa’s problems, mainly poverty and inequality. It is, therefore, 
a country “with a foot in two worlds” (Hentz, 2005, p. 22). Nonetheless, the combination 
of the power resources is enough to consider South Africa as an emerging power from 
the Global South. In fact, with a base big enough to support the country’s new status in 
the world, the improving indicators contribute to the emerging process for South Africa. 
 
There is one additional point to be taken into consideration. Supported by its power 
resources, South Africa’s behaviour in the continent reflects Nolte’s three characteristics 
of a regional power: a) it “articulates the pretension […] of a leading position in a region”; 
b) “displays the material (military, economic, demographic), organisational (political) 
and ideological resources for regional power projection”; and c) “truly has great influence 
in regional affairs” (Nolte, 2010, p. 893). In turn, the country’s outstanding relative weight 
when compared with most other States in Africa, and especially within the SADC region, 
makes it undoubtedly a regional and continental power and, consequently, increases its 
possibilities of becoming an emerging power in the world. In other words, being the most 
powerful player in Africa contributes greatly to South Africa’s current international 
standing.  
 
This chapter also demonstrated that Johannesburg and South Africa are closely linked in 
terms of power resources. The consolidation of Johannesburg as the country’s most 
important metro means that, as the city emerges, it also greatly contributes to the national 
emergence. However, even with the clear interdependence between the local and the 
national, there is no coordination in the emerging strategies of both spheres of 
government. Again, it is a disconnected approach between South Africa and 
Johannesburg when it comes to using their power resources that will be further analysed 
in Chapter 8.  
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After engaging with the power resources of both Colombia and Bogotá, and South Africa 
and Johannesburg in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 will analyse the two remaining 
variables proposed by Nolte – leadership and international recognition – as a 










: LEADERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL 
RECOGNITION: TWO PARALLEL PROCESSES FOR 
NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN COLOMBIA 
AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This chapter builds on the power resources debate proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al. 
(2012) and Breuning (2007), and engages in an analysis of an associated dynamic of 
national advancement: the international leadership of Colombia and South Africa. Since 
there are no metrics available to quantify this variable, this thesis solves the problem by 
taking a close look at the evolution of both countries’ foreign policies throughout the 20th 
century. For Colombia, there is a particular emphasis in the international engagements 
and strategy of the two last governments: Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010) and Juan 
Manuel Santos Calderón (2010-2018). For South Africa, the analysis focuses on the 
country’s international relations during and after apartheid and highlights the radical 
transformation of South Africa’s foreign policy in 1994. The purpose of this section is to 
examine the nature of Colombia’s and South Africa’s emergence in the world through 
their foreign policy actions and to probe the role Bogotá and Johannesburg have played 
in their global realignment.  
 
Then, the chapter focuses on the international recognition of Colombia and South Africa 
as emerging powers. Again, since the matter at hand is mainly subjective as it deals with 
perception, very few metrics are available in the literature. Consequently, this section 
starts by analysing the two countries’ performance in the Fragile States Index (FSI) and 
then continues to explore the shift in the countries’ international images through 
newspapers, magazine articles, travel guides and foreign investment reports that reflect 
popular perception on how Colombia and South Africa are seen in the world. The 
analysis also reveals how Bogotá and Johannesburg have shaken off their images as 
chaotic and dangerous cities to become emerging cities from the Global South in ways 
that contribute to the countries’ improved international images.  
 
Finally, building on the focus on power resources documented in Chapters 5 and 6, this 
chapter demonstrates that Colombia and South Africa can indeed be considered 
emerging powers and that Bogotá and Johannesburg, as their powerhouses and most 
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important cities, contribute greatly to their country’s emerging status. However, the 
mechanisms and instruments that Colombia and South Africa have used to emerge in the 
International System are mostly city-blind. The opposite is also true. Bogotá and 
Johannesburg can be considered emerging cities but their strategies to emerge are not 
coordinated with the national level. Consequently, there are two parallel emerging 
processes in both countries as a result of a disconnect between the national and the local 
spheres of government.  
 
Now, while the reader might find that the overarching argument for both Colombia and 
Bogotá and South Africa and Johannesburg is quite similar, it must be pointed out that 
their actual trajectories in terms of their emerging power status and how they position 
themselves in the world are very different because their realities are very different. On 
one side, Colombia has struggled to achieve its status as an emerging power because of 
its image as a place of war and drugs, whereas, on the other side, South Africa’s 
triumphant re-entry to the international arena during the democratic transition had an 
outstanding positive impact in the country’s emerging power status. In other words, 
while for Colombia it is about achieving the status as an emerging country, for South 
Africa it is about maintaining it.  
 
Although the analysis undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6 on the power resources of 
Colombia and South Africa is crucial to understand the countries’ role in the International 
System, it is true that power resources are mainly a domestic variable. When taking a 
close look at the five dimensions – territorial, demographic, economic, socio-economic 
and military –, it becomes clear that they depend greatly on what the countries are and 
what they have, and much less on international factors that influence a nation’s trajectory. 
Also, power resources are difficult to modify as they require government programmes to 
be implemented over a long period of time. In fact, while some components of the power 
resources such as size or location are almost immutable, others like the military, 
demographic or socio-economic variables are somewhat more flexible. The previous two 
chapters demonstrated that they can indeed be modified, although  the pace at which 
change can occur is quite slow. 
 
On the contrary, the two variables examined in Chapter 7 are much more fluid and 
manageable by governments. Unlike power resources, leadership and international 
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recognition are effectively about a country’s standing in the world and truly depend on 
international interactions. Consequently, foreign policy and country/city promotion are 
two of the ways in which they can be modified. Additionally, they are also a result of the 
countries’ domestic policies and, above all, positive public policy results. The decrease in 
violence brought about by the peace agreement with the FARC in Colombia or the end 
of apartheid in South Africa addressed in this chapter clearly demonstrate that a positive 
shift in domestic policy can translate in an increasing leadership and an improved 
international recognition of the country.  
 
 
7.1. COLOMBIA’S TAKE OFF AS AN EMERGING POWER 
 
7.1.1. GOING GLOBAL, A SHIFT IN COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
Building on the power resource analysis for Colombia and Bogotá in Chapter 5, the 
second variable drawn from Nolte’s work is leadership, which he understands as a 
country’s “political influence in diplomatic forums” (Nolte, 2010, p. 890). In order to 
understand Colombia’s strategy to improve its international standing, this section 
focuses on an analysis of the country’s foreign policy. It starts with a historic account of 
Colombia’s peripheral and shy approach to its role in the world and, then, engages 
particularly with the foreign policies under the governments of Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-
2010) and Juan Manuel Santos Calderón (2010-2018). The purpose of this analysis is to 
highlight Colombia’s improvements in developing an active foreign policy that allows it 
to defend its national interest abroad, while, at the same time, largely ignoring any 
possible contribution from its cities.  
 
During most of its independent years, Colombia has been a marginal, quiet State in Latin 
American and International Relations. When compared with the active foreign policy of 
other countries in the region such as Cuba, Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, Colombia seems 
to be extremely small and almost invisible. Bagley explains it as a “self-imposed 
dwarfism” (Bagley, as cited in Borda & Tickner, 2011, p. 52) while former president 
Alfonso López Michelsen talks about a self-absorbed and isolated Colombia, a “South 
American Tibet” (López Michelsen, as cited in Borda & Tickner, 2011, p. 53)  that seems 
extremely distant from its neighbours and the rest of the world. 




The reason behind that isolation is explored by Gerhard Drekonja Kornat: 
The fact that Colombia, as the successor state of the Great Colombia, had lost one third of its 
original territory in the course of the last century so that its neighbours could benefit from 
it, or that it was mutilated as a result of manipulated revolts (such was the case in Panama!), 
is a significant fact of the traumatic experience left by foreign policy, and that is why 
inactivity has been considered as the lesser evil37 (Translated by the author from Borda & 
Tickner, 2011, pp. 53–54). 
 
But even within its inactivity, Colombia had clear international interests. The most 
important of them being its almost unconditional alliance with the United States. As 
stated by Diego Cardona, starting with the presidency of Marco Fidel Suárez (1918-1921), 
the large majority of Colombian governments have “placed the United States as the centre 
of their aspirations and concerns” (Translated by the author from Cardona Cardona, 
2011, p. XVII). Furthermore, during the two governments of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), 
Colombia even assimilated the antiterrorist discourse of President George W. Bush 
without any restrictions (Cardona Cardona, 2011; Forero Rodríguez, 2011). Colombia has, 
therefore, cemented its foreign policy around the concept of respice pollum, an 
unconditional allegiance towards Washington that implied renouncing an autonomous 
approach to its own relations with the world (Borda & Tickner, 2011). 
 
However, during the 1970s, president Alfonso López Michelsen introduced a new 
concept in Colombian foreign policy: respice similia, that is, to look at those who are similar 
to you (Borda & Tickner, 2011). The efforts to focus on its neighbours did not replace the 
previous respice pollum but did allow for a better engagement with Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the natural space for Colombian foreign policy. Consequently, starting in the 
1980s, Colombia increased its participation in regional fora such as the Contadora Group, 
the Plan Puebla-Panama, the Andean Community and the G3 with Mexico and 
Venezuela (Cardona Cardona, 2011). During that period, Colombia also started looking 
                                                 
37 Original text in Spanish: “El hecho de que Colombia, en su calidad de Estado sucesor de la Gran 
Colombia, hubiese perdido en el transcurso del último siglo una tercera parte del territorio inicial para que 
de él se beneficiaran los vecinos, o que fuera mutilada a consecuencia de revueltas manipuladas (¡tal fue el 
caso de Panamá!), es un hecho significativo de la traumática experiencia que ha dejado la política exterior, 
y es por eso que la inactividad ha sido considerada como el mal menor” (Borda & Tickner, 2011, pp. 53–
54). 
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at the developing world and increased its participation in organisations like UNCTAD, 
the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (Borda & Tickner, 2011). 
 
But the impetus to engage with Latin America, the Caribbean and the broader Global 
South would not last long. Starting in 1990, César Gaviria’s neoliberalism, Andrés 
Pastrana’s Plan Colombia and Álvaro Uribe’s ‘democratic security’ turned the country 
back to the United States and created a closer-than-ever relationship with Washington 
(Borda & Tickner, 2011; Cardona Cardona, 2011). The consequences were clear for 
Colombia. During Uribe’s two terms, the country’s foreign policy was extremely 
securitised, concentrated and bilateralised with the United States while neither Latin 
America, Europe, Asia or Africa received the attention they should have had (Pastrana 
Buelvas, 2011b). Uribe’s lack of interest in the rest of the world was evident with the 
closing of 14 embassies and 10 consulates in 200238 (See Figure 7.1.a. and Figure 7.1.b.) 
(Barco, 2003).  
 
The breaking point in Colombian foreign policy took place in 2010 when President Juan 
Manuel Santos came to power. His National Development Plan (NDP) included, for the 
first time in decades, explicit references to the need to conduct a diversified and 
collaborative foreign policy for Colombia. As stated in the sixth objective of the NDP, 
 
The sixth objective, the defence of national interests through the consolidation of Foreign and 
International Co-operation policies, is understood as the scenario in which the presence and 
positioning of Colombia in multilateral, sub-regional, regional and global instances will be 
consolidated in order to guarantee the defence and promotion of national interests. By 2018, 
Colombia will consolidate bilateral relations with its neighbours in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and will strengthen its relations in Africa, Eurasia and Central Asia and Asia 
Pacific. It will work to maintain and diversify the sources and modalities of co-operation, 
and position the Colombian knowledge of good practices in the world, in line with the 
National Strategy for International Co-operation (ENCI). Likewise, it will continue with its 
active participation in the multilateral forums and in the regional conciliation and 
                                                 
38 As part of the government’s austerity plan, President Álvaro Uribe decided to close the Colombian 
embassies in Australia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Finland, Indonesia, Morocco, Haiti, Greece, Romania, 
Iran, Belize, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. He also closed the consulates in Bonn, Hamburg 
and Munich in Germany, New Orleans in the United States, Vancouver in Canada, Barquisimeto in 
Venezuela, Cuenca in Ecuador, Monterrey in Mexico as well as Singapore and Aruba (Revista Semana, 
2002).  
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integration mechanisms. Colombia will have complied with most of the instruments to which 
the country agreed on through the "Initial Memorandum" to become a full member of the 
OECD39 (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2014, p. 426). 
 
The National Guidelines for Foreign Policy (LPE in Spanish) established by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs also contain this new approach to the world and materialised it through 
five key foreign policy objectives (Translated by the author from Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, 2010): 
 
1. To deepen integration with Latin America and the Caribbean to generate more 
opportunities for trade, investment and technological exchange. 
2. To boost Colombia’s relations with Asian and Pacific countries through a strengthened 
diplomatic presence, the opening of new markets and investment attraction. 
3. To position topics such as science and technology, innovation, quality education, 
vocational and professional training, agricultural technology and knowledge, energy, 
climate change, biodiversity and security cooperation, in the international management 
for prosperity. 
4. To identify political, economic and investment opportunities for Colombia in groupings 
such as CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) and 
by joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
5. To strengthen South–South Co-operation. 
Attention must be brought to three issues at this point. First, Colombia keeps recognising 
the importance of North America and Western Europe in its foreign policy when it states 
“Relations with the United States, Europe and Canada are fundamental to the country as 
they are our main economic partners” and “[Colombia] will deepen the political dialogue 
                                                 
39 Original Text in Spanish: “El sexto objetivo, defensa de los intereses nacionales mediante la consolidación 
de la Política Exterior y la Cooperación Internacional, se entiende como el escenario en el cual se consolidará 
la presencia y posicionamiento de Colombia en instancias multilaterales, subregional, regional y global 
para la defensa y promoción de los intereses nacionales. A 2018, Colombia consolidará las relaciones 
bilaterales con sus vecinos de América Latina y el Caribe, y fortalecerá sus relaciones en África, Eurasia y 
Asia Pacífico y Central. Se trabajará en mantener y diversificar las fuentes y modalidades de cooperación, 
y posicionar las buenas prácticas de Colombia en el mundo, en línea con la Estrategia Nacional de 
Cooperación Internacional (ENCI). Así mismo, continuará con su activa participación en los foros 
multilaterales y en los mecanismos de concertación e integración regional. Colombia habrá cumplido con 
la mayoría de los instrumentos a los que el país adhirió mediante el “Memorando Inicial” para su ingreso 
como miembro pleno de la OCDE” (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2014, p. 426). 
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and economic and investment relations with the United States, Canada and Europe” 
(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010, p. 4). However, these countries are only 
mentioned in one of the five key points of the LPE. This, in turn, means that the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs will continue its work with the Global North but only as one of the 
main objectives and not, as used to be the case up until this point, as the most important 
foreign policy goal. 
 
Second, the remaining four key foreign policy objectives deal with countries of the Global 
South, an area that, apart from Latin America and the Caribbean, has so far been absent 
in Colombian foreign policy. There is, therefore, an explicit recognition of the importance 
of being part of the emerging Global South. Consequently, there are references to usual 
organisations and countries like the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Pacific Alliance, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile and Peru, as well as new groupings and countries that 
have never been seen before in the country’s priorities. Amongst them are: BRICS, 
CIVETS, APEC, ASEAN, China, India, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, 
Vietnam, Egypt and South Africa (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010).  
 
Third, a new approach to international co-operation is also evident. Colombia changed 
its historical role as a recipient of Official Development Assistance and promoted itself as 
a donor willing to share good practices with other countries of the Global South. For that, 
Colombia aims to continue the co-operation with Central American and Caribbean 
countries but gives a special place in its policy to Haiti, CIVETS and BRICS countries and 
the African continent – mentioned twice in the document, the same number as the United 
States (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010).  
 
The three issues discussed in the previous paragraphs provide evidence of Colombia’s 
new approach to its foreign policy, one that abandons the historic limitations of its 
international engagements and, instead, promotes an active insertion of the country in 
the world by diversifying its partners, topics and mechanisms. Colombia’s aim to play a 
more important role in the International System by presenting itself as an emerging 
power from the Global South is clear at this point. 
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The radical shift in Colombian foreign policy started in 2010 with the strengthening of 
the Pacific Alliance, a regional forum with the like-minded countries of Mexico, Peru and 
Chile aimed at creating an area of free trade, movement of people, capital and services. It 
also promotes economic development through a joint action in the world with an 
emphasis in Asia-Pacific (Alianza del Pacífico, 2016a). The results are already evident. 
The four countries together already represent the sixth largest economy in the world and 
the largest number of companies registered in the stock market in Latin America (Alianza 
del Pacífico, 2016b). It also began a process of joint diplomatic expansion that favours the 
four countries’ intentions to actively engage with the broader Global South. Thanks to 
the Pacific Alliance, Colombia currently has six new shared embassies with the member 
countries in the Global South: Ghana (with Mexico, Chile and Peru), Vietnam (with Peru), 
Morocco, Algeria and Azerbaijan (with Chile), and Singapore (with Mexico) (Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014b). 
 
The inclusion of Colombia in the CIVETS grouping (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) also had a significant impact in the country’s foreign 
policy. After that, the government started an aggressive insertion in the Global South that 
included the opening of Colombian embassies in Azerbaijan, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Morocco and 
Ghana (See Figure 7.1.a. and 7.1.b.) (Holguín Cuéllar, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). 
In 2012, Colombia also invited the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for the 
first “South–South Co-operation Dialogue for CIVETS+” in Cartagena as a first step for 
these countries to increase their knowledge about each other (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, 2012).  
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FIGURE 7.1. COLOMBIAN EMBASSIES IN THE WORLD IN 2000 AND 2016 
 
 
In terms of international relations with the Global South, the period 2010-2016 saw an 
outstanding diversification in Colombia’s bilateral agenda. President Santos visited 
Turkey (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2011) and the Philippines (Presidencia de la 
República, 2015b), President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey visited Bogotá 
(Presidencia de la República, 2015a), and the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs made 
official visits to Vietnam, Jamaica, Guyana, Cambodia, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, 
Suriname, Algeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Antarctica, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines 
(Holguín Cuéllar, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). Figures 7.2.a. and 7.2.b. show the 
difference between the international official visits of Presidents Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) 
and Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2016). Also, Figures 7.3.a. and 7.3.b. confirm the 
outstanding increase in high level relations between Colombia and countries in the 






Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2002-2010”, 
by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002-2010 
(http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ 
ministry/strategy/informes) Copyright 2002-2010 by 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. In the public 
domain. 
Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2010-2016”, 
by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010-2016 
(http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ 
ministry/strategy/informes) Copyright 2010-2016 by 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. In the public 
domain. 
FIGURE 7.1.A. COLOMBIAN EMBASSIES 
IN 2002 
FIGURE 7.1.B. COLOMBIAN EMBASSIES 
IN 2016 
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Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2002-2010”, 
by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002-2010 
(http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/inf
ormes) Copyright 2002-2010 by Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain. 
Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2010-2016”, 
by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010-2016 
(http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/inf
ormes) Copyright 2010-2016 by Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain. 
Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2002-2010”, 
by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002-2010 
(http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/inf
ormes) Copyright 2002-2010 by Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain. 
Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2010-2016”, 
by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010-2016 
(http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/inf
ormes) Copyright 2010-2016 by Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain. 
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Up to this point, the strategy undertaken by Colombia to improve its international 
standing originated from the President and has been implemented by both him and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is clear that foreign policy is exclusively the prerogative of 
the national government while other domestic actors, including cities, are largely 
overlooked. These legal and constitutional provisions, as well as the disconnection 
between national and local governments in foreign policy and the role of paradiplomacy 
will be analysed in Chapter 8 as part of the findings of this thesis.  
 
There is, however, one particular topic in which Bogotá greatly contributed to Colombia’s 
engagements with the Global South and that is public transport. The successful 
experience of the bus rapid transit (BRT) system Transmilenio (Bassett & Marpillero-
Colomina, 2013; Zamora Avilés, 2013) in the city generated a great interest from countries 
in Latin America, Asia and Africa that approached the Colombian government and 
requested South–South Co-operation projects in that regard. Consequently, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Colombian Agency for International Co-operation and the City of 
Bogotá have worked with the governments of South Africa, Bangladesh, Philippines, 
Iran, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Singapore, Tanzania, Senegal, Uganda, Vietnam and 
Botswana, amongst others in South–South co-operation initiatives aimed at developing 
similar systems in their main cities (Delgado Caicedo, 2011; Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, 2015a; Transmilenio, 2010). 
 
However, this inter-governmental co-operation has not been as strong or functional as it 
seems for the Colombian case. Sebastián Giraldo, an active diplomat working at the 
South–South Co-operation Desk at the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that 
a co-ordinated response to international demands on public transport from Bogotá is not 
easy. According to Giraldo, the City of Bogotá manages Transmilenio, but the operation 
and security of the system are in the hands of the private sector. Consequently, working 
with private actors and the different spheres of government poses additional difficulties 
on international co-operation initiatives and that is why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
prefers to work with Medellín, where transportation systems are city-owned (Giraldo, 
2015). More on inter-government co-operation on foreign policy issues will be addressed 
in Chapter 8.  
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7.1.2. THE NEW SHINING STARS: THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL 
PERCEPTION OF COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ 
Finally, an indicator that is not mentioned by Pastrana Buelvas et al. (2012) or Nolte 
(2010), but explains Colombia’s progress as a country during the past two decades, is the 
Fragile States Index (FSI), produced every year since 2005 by The Fund for Peace in 
Washington, DC. To measure the overall stability of the nation, the FSI measures 12 
indicators separated in three different categories: 1. Social indicators which include 
demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, group grievance and human flight and brain 
drain; 2. Economic indicators amongst which are uneven economic development and 
poverty and economic decline; and 3. Political and military indicators that analyse State 
legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, 
factionalised elites and external intervention (Fund for Peace, 2016g). 
 
In 2005, Colombia was categorised as the 14th most fragile State in the world and the FSI 
located it between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (13th) and Zimbabwe (15th) 
with 95 points – where 120 is the worst possible score (Fund for Peace, 2016d). The overall 
situation in Colombia was so unstable that countries like Burundi, Guinea or the Central 
African Republic were better placed in the index, all within the ‘high alert’ category. 
However, Colombia has been in a recovery path ever since. In 2010, the country reduced 
its points to 88.2 and went from the 14th place to the 46th (Fund for Peace, 2016c). Finally, 
in 2016, the improvement in the general situation was even more noticeable. Colombia is 
now in 67th place with 80.2 points, being the last country in the ‘high warning’ category 
and only 0.4 points behind Honduras, the first country located in the ‘elevated warning’ 
category (Fund for Peace, 2016a).  
 
The forecast for Colombia’s performance in the FSI is very positive. The ceasefire (Caracol 
Radio, 2016; Revista Semana, 2016b) and the signing of the peace agreement with FARC 
(El Espectador, 2016b; Noticias Caracol, 2016; Vera & Carrascal, 2016), and the start of the 
peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) 
(ELN) (El País, 2016; El Tiempo, 2016f) will surely help the country improve in the FSI 
rankings in the following years. An end to the six decades long war should bring an 
increase in the government’s social spending and, thus, generate an important 
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improvement not only in the quality of life of its citizens but also in the international 
perception of Colombia. 
 




Note: Data adapted from “The Fragile States Index Data”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, 
(http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2006to2014.xlsx) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace; data 
adapted from “Fragile States Index 2015”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, (http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015) 
Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace; data adapted from “Fragile States Index 2016”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, 
(http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace. Printed with permission. 
 
But the way a country is perceived in the world does not depend only on indicators and 
rankings. There is an abstract, intangible, immaterial element that plays an even more 
important role and that is the perception of the country in the collective imaginary around 
the world (Qobo, 2017). Do people want to go there? Do people think it is safe? Do people 
believe their investments are going to be safe? Of course, this perception is closely linked 
to the indicators and rankings, but it is more than that. It is about mental images, not 
about facts.  
 
Consequently, the improvement in the general security and institutional situation since 
2000 has had an outstanding impact in those mental images outside of Colombia’s 
borders. A country that used to be avoided at all costs is now being portrayed as a tourism 
hotspot. In fact, the Lonely Planet – the largest travel guide book publisher in the world 
(Fildes, 2007) – chose Colombia as the second “destination you cannot afford to miss” in 
2017 (Lonely Planet, 2016). According to the travel guide,  







2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Points in FSI Ranking Place in FSI Ranking
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Decades of civil war and violent crime meant Colombian passport stamps were once for 
hardcore travellers only. Fast forward to the present day, and the lost years seem but a dust 
speck in Colombia’s rear-view mirror. There are no world wonders, but the country’s mix of 
vibrant culture, nature and hospitality is a rich tapestry woven by welcoming arms. Over a 
decade into its dramatic about-face, this South American jewel is even expecting a visit from 
the world’s number-one Catholic. When Pope Francis kisses Colombian soil in 2017, it will 
mark the Andean nation’s first papal visit in 30 years (Lonely Planet, 2016). 
 
And that is not the only reference. In the Australian edition of Lonely Planet, Kevin Raub 
stated: 
 
Years of violence and instability caused by paramilitaries, armed rebels and drug cartels are 
(largely) a thing of the past in Colombia, with the country focused on bringing a final peace 
to the decades of conflict with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC; 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) rebels, which still sadly defines the country to 
many people. The reality of modern Colombia is very different, in fact: economically dynamic 
and fast changing, it’s a nation where tourism is simply booming (Raub, 2015). 
 
The Lonely Planet is not alone. Media around the world has been talking about a ‘new 
Colombia’ for a few years now. The economic headlines recognise that “Colombia is 
leading the CIVETS, the new emerging countries group” (América Económica, 2011), 
include Colombia as one of “The Civets: a guide to the countries bearing the world’s 
hopes for growth” (Allen, 2011) and one of “the countries bucking the downward global 
market trend” (Fletcher, 2016). At the same time, the Telegraph in London gives its 
readers “21 reasons why Colombia should be your next holiday destination” (Haines, 
2016); the Huffington Post not only talks about the “3 Misconceptions About Colombia 
(And Why You Should Go)” (Seper, 2012) but also gives “7 Reasons Everyone Should 
Consider Retiring In Colombia” (Haskins & Prescher, 2016) while the Miami Herald 
promotes the country for gay tourism saying “As Colombia shakes off its troubled past 
it’s emerging as an LGBT hotspot” (Wyss, 2014). Even the fashion industry is focusing on 
Colombia: “many fashion executives are now looking to Colombia, South America's third 
biggest economy, to help boost their balance sheets as the country shakes off its violent 
image” says Robb Young in his article “Colombia, Open and Ready for Business” (Young, 
2014). 
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Another indicator that shows how the international image of Colombia has radically 
improved in recent years is the elimination of visa requirements for Colombian nationals 
by many countries around the world, the Schengen area being the most significant. In 
2014, when the European Commission started the process aimed at eliminating the visa 
requirements for Colombians, it stated in its reports that only 4,8% of visa applications in 
the country are denied showing an increased confidence in the country. It also stated that 
the probability of illegal immigration is relatively low and there has been an outstanding 
improvement in the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Colombia 
(El Tiempo, 2014). Consequently, apart from the 26 members of the Schengen area, other 
countries like Turkey, Russia, Belize, Guyana, Antigua and Barbuda, Montenegro, 
Kosovo, Mexico, Jamaica, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Suriname have 
eliminated the visa requirements during the past few years (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, 2016a).  
 
In line with the improvement of Colombia’s image in the world, Bogotá went through a 
similar process of attracting increasingly positive global attention and not just because of 
relief from the threat of armed conflict (Beall, Goodfellow, & Rodgers, 2011). The city’s 
inclusive urban transformation became an international point of reference in various 
topics such as public transport, bike paths, public libraries and public spaces (Duque 
Franco, 2011; Martin & Ceballos, 2004; Rhinehart, 2009; Sustainable Cities Collective, 
2014). Consequently, Bogotá received the urban sustainability prize at the VII World 
Urban Forum in Medellín in 2014, the C40’s world prize on ‘climate leadership and the 
city’ in 2013 and the World Travel Awards prize for South America’s leading business 
travel destination in 2014 and 2015, amongst others (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2016b; 
World Travel Awards, 2016). 
 
Flor Ángela Durán explains Bogotá’s transformation in the following terms:  
 
Bogotá used to have a very bad reputation but has evolved to become an important 
destination for tourists and businesses. Transmilenio, the public libraries and other social 
programmes undertaken during the past few decades have contributed to improve the 
international perception of the city. At the same time, internationally, Bogotá has brought 
the attention back to Colombia. Bogotá has positive repercussions for Colombia’s image 
because it changes the perception of a country besieged by drugs, the country at war, to show 
a country that seeks progress and creates solutions for its many problems. Bogotá is 
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currently capable of sharing its experiences with other cities in the Global South, 
unfortunately, those experiences have never been included in the country’s official foreign 
policy40 (Translated by the author from Durán, 2017). 
 
As a result, during the past eight years, Bogotá almost doubled the number of 
international tourists – See Figure 7.5. – and, consequently, a new airport had to be built 
(El Tiempo, 2016d). Furthermore, in order to respond to the expected rise in air traffic 
from 30 million passengers a year in 2015 to 69,2 million in 2041, the national government 
already started the construction of a second airport – linked to the first one – in Bogotá 
(Gómez, 2016; Vicepresidencia de la República, 2015).  
 




Note: Data adapted from “Informes de Turismo”, by Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, 2007-2015, 
(http://www.mincit.gov.co/publicaciones.php?id=16590) Copyright 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016 by 
Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo. Reprinted with permission. 
 
Finally, the change of perception and the consolidation of Bogotá as an important tourism 
and business centre in the heart of Latin America has brought new airlines to the city 
                                                 
40 Original text in Spanish: “Bogotá solía tener una muy mala reputación pero ha evolucionado hasta 
convertirse en un destino importante para turistas y negocios. Transmilenio, las bibliotecas públicas y otros 
programas sociales llevados a cabo durante las últimas décadas han contribuido a mejorar la percepción 
internacional de la ciudad. Al mismo tiempo, internacionalmente, Bogotá ha devuelto la atención a 
Colombia. Bogotá repercute positivamente sobre la imagen de Colombia porque cambia la percepción de 
un país asediado por las drogas, del país en Guerra, para mostrar un país que busca el progreso y crea 
soluciones para sus múltiples problemas. Bogotá actualmente está en capacidad de compartir sus 
experiencias con otras ciudades del Sur Global pero desafortunadamente esas experiencias nunca han sido 
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during the past few years. The city went from having very few international connections 
during the worst days of the war to being served by 51 international airlines linking the 
city with the most important cities in the Americas and Europe (Aeropuerto El Dorado, 
2016a). And the number is expected to keep growing with the arrival of Emirates and 
other Arab carriers (Portafolio, 2015). 
 
 
7.1.3. COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ EMERGING IN PARALLEL: A CONCLUSION 
 
Colombia has undoubtedly gone a long way to securing a reputation as an emerging 
power since the dangerous and troubled times during the 1980s and 1990s. Security has 
improved substantially, the sustained economic growth has already left the country with 
a larger middle class than ever before (El Espectador, 2015) and the international 
perception of the country seems to be shifting from a no-go zone to a promising land. 
Aware of all these changes, the Santos administration has engaged in an aggressive 
foreign policy aimed at diversifying not only the topics that are important for Colombia 
but also its partners. For the first time in decades, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
recognised the importance of the Global South and engaged constructively with it. The 
results so far are outstanding and have impacted Colombia’s emergence in the world 
significantly.  
 
Bogotá has gone through a similar process and is now considered an emerging city and 
a point of reference for other cities from the Global South. This section showed how the 
city is Colombia’s economic, political and demographic powerhouse and, therefore, 
largely responsible for the country’s success during the last two decades. It would be 
inaccurate to analyse Colombia’s role in the world while ignoring Bogotá as a 
fundamental part of it. The city and the country are linked and both have benefited from 
each other’s success stories. 
 
When analysing the evolution of Colombia and Bogotá during the last two decades, the 
improvements are evident. By using Nolte’s contributions in addition to the emerging 
metrics put forward by Pastrana Buelvas et al. and Breuning, this section was able to 
demonstrate that the combination of the five dimensions, its current active foreign policy 
and a shift in the international perception add up to make Colombia an emerging power 
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from the Latin American region. And while it is almost impossible for it to surpass other 
bigger countries in the continent like Brazil or Mexico, it is true that Colombia appears to 
have what it takes to become a more relevant actor not only in the American Continent 
but also in the world as an emerging power.  
 
A bigger narrative comes out at this point. This section proved that Colombia is an 
emerging country and Bogotá an emerging city. However, it is clear that these two 
emerging processes are not coordinated. Consequently, although the trajectories 
followed by the country and the city look alike, and often for similar reasons, they are not 
part of one single strategy but, instead, they are two separate parallel processes. In turn, 
Bogotá is clearly important for Colombia in terms of power resources, leadership and 
international recognition, but not so important that it gets included in the country’s 
foreign policy strategy. In other words, Bogotá is a fundamental part of Colombia because 
it is located within the national borders and because it contributes greatly with the three 
variables, but not because it is part of Colombia’s efforts to improve its international 
status.  
 
To conclude, the analysis carried out in Chapter 2 showed how the International 
Relations literature is mostly city-blind. In this section, a similar phenomenon occurs in 
practice. The national government in Colombia engages in a strategy aimed at improving 
the country’s international standing and become an emerging power, but the 
mechanisms and instruments that it uses are mostly city-blind. In turn, the result is a 
disconnection between the national and the local spheres of government that keeps 
Bogotá out of Colombia’s official emerging strategy. 
 
 
7.2. SOUTH AFRICA: FROM PARIAH STATE TO AN EMERGING 
POWER 
 
7.2.1. FROM ISOLATION TO THE RAINBOW NATION, THE SHIFT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
With the purpose of understanding South Africa’s international strategy to become an 
emerging power, this section analyses the evolution of the country’s foreign policy. It 
focuses on the changes experienced by the international engagements of South Africa 
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before and after the democratic transition in 1994. Even though there are outstanding 
historical and operative differences with the Colombian case, this section finds similar 
dynamics between the two countries: a national foreign policy aimed at improving the 
international standing of South Africa through the normalisation of its international 
relations after apartheid while, at the same time, mostly ignoring its cities in the process.  
 
A nation that embarks upon a policy of racial discrimination could not help losing the minds 
of the coloured nations of the earth… At this point… the traditional distinction between 
foreign affairs and domestic policies tends to break down (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 194–195). 
 
Indeed, racial discrimination was the single most important issue affecting South Africa’s 
foreign relations during the second half of the 20th century. Ever since the National Party 
came to power in 1948, the country’s diplomatic relations with the rest of the world 
started deteriorating to the point where, by 1960, South Africa had closed its embassy in 
Egypt – its only one in Africa – and, with that, “none of the 68 states of the extensive 
African and Asian grouping maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa” 
(Christopher, 1994, p. 440).  
 
On this topic, Christopher states that 
 
The symbolically most severe form of sanctions that can be adopted in peacetime […] is the 
refusal of one government to recognise the legitimacy of another. This form of sanction was 
widely adopted to register international condemnation of the South African government’s 
policy of apartheid, based on racial classification and discrimination. International sanctions 
rendered the country one of the “pariah” states (Geldenhuys, 1990). Thus the pattern of 
South African foreign representation was highly skewed between 1948 and 1994 and not 
commensurate in extent with a country of its size and power (Christopher, 1994, p. 439).  
 
Furthermore, according to Deon Geldenhuys,  
 
[t]he history of South Africa’s post-war international relations shows quite clearly that no 
‘normal’ foreign relations are possible for such an ‘abnormal’ society. South Africa finds 
itself in a state of chronic high tension with the international community because its 
domestic political order is universally rejected. What is more, the outside world is committed 
to remedying the abnormality of apartheid, rooted as it is in racial discrimination and white 
domination. Apartheid […] is responsible for the uniquely hostile external environment 
confronting South Africa (Geldenhuys, 1989, p. 7). 
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The foreign relations of the apartheid government went through different stages from 
1948 to 1994, nonetheless, all of them were highly affected by confrontation. At first, 
South Africa maintained a small number of diplomatic missions in countries in Western 
Europe and North America with which it had important economic interests, mainly 
mining investments. Then, in the early 1960s, mandatory comprehensive sanctions from 
the Organisation of the African Unity and the United Nations came to place and, thus, 
increased South Africa’s isolation from the international community (Christopher, 1994; 
Mugomba, 1975).  
 
During the 1970s, Prime Minister John Vorster pursued an outward foreign policy in 
which the country established diplomatic relations with other pariah and isolated States, 
namely the dictatorships in South and Central America, Taiwan and Israel. Under Prime 
Minister Botha (1977-1989), the number of embassies fell again as a result of South 
Africa’s military involvement in Southern Africa and political changes taking place in 
South America. Finally, with F.W. De Klerk, apartheid’s last president, countries started 
to open up to South Africa as they believed the process of political reform in the country 
“could be encouraged by diplomatic recognition rather than confrontation” (Christopher, 
1994, p. 444). The most important countries in this grouping were Gabon, Ivory Coast 
and Lesotho in Africa and Japan and the People’s Republic of China in Asia (Christopher, 
1994). The evolution presented in the previous paragraphs is elaborated in Figures 7.6. 
and 7.7.  
 
FIGURE 7.6. NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN SELECTED YEARS 
 
Note: Data adapted from “The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1949-1994”, by A. J. Christopher, 
1994, Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers; and from “Foreign Relations”, by Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation, 2016, (http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/index.html) Copyright 2016 by the Department of 
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FIGURE 7.7. SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSIES OVERSEAS IN SELECTED YEARS 
 
 
While most of South Africa’s isolation came from the international community, Pretoria 
also played an important role in isolating itself. For example, in 1954, the Soviet Union 
was asked to close its consular office in South Africa after parliament passed the 
Suppression of Communism Act in 1950 (Christopher, 1994). Also, after Zambia gained 
Note: Data adapted from “The Pattern of 
Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1949-
1994”, by A. J. Christopher, 1994, Copyright 1994 
by Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted with 
permission.  
Note 2: Embassies in dark blue and consulates in 
light blue. 
Note: Data adapted from “The Pattern of Diplomatic 
Sanctions against South Africa 1949-1994”, by A. J. 
Christopher, 1994, Copyright 1994 by Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. Reprinted with permission. 
Note 2: Embassies in dark blue and consulates in light 
blue. 
Note: Data adapted from “The Pattern of 
Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1949-
1994”, by A. J. Christopher, 1994, Copyright 1994 
by Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted with 
permission.  
Note 2: Embassies in dark blue and consulates in 
light blue. 
Note: Data from “South African Representation 
Abroad”, by Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation, 2016, Copyright 2016 
by the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation. Reprinted with permission. 
FIGURE 7.7.D. SOUTH AFRICAN 
EMBASSIES IN 2016 
FIGURE 7.7.C. SOUTH AFRICAN 
EMBASSIES IN 1989 
FIGURE 7.7.B. SOUTH AFRICAN 
EMBASSIES IN 1979 
FIGURE 7.7.A. SOUTH AFRICAN 
EMBASSIES IN 1965 
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its independence in 1964, the apartheid government considered establishing diplomatic 
relations with Lusaka. However, the sole idea of having a black ambassador in ‘white’ 
Pretoria was enough to cancel the plans (Christopher, 1994).  
 
With 1994 came drastic changes for South Africa’s domestic and foreign policies. A 
negotiated political solution to apartheid was implemented and the new Nelson Mandela 
government was faced with the need to pursue a new and radically different foreign 
policy. The starting point could have not been better. In fact, Greg Mills calls the period 
between 1994 and 1999 the ‘honeymoon years of international courtship’ (Mills, 2000b). 
The ecstasy with which South Africa was received at the Commonwealth, the United 
Nations and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) provided a new moral space for 
the country and its highly respected new president (Spence, 1997). South Africa knew it 
could exploit this momentum in its favour.  
 
Consequently, South Africa’s strategy focused on five key strategies to adapt its foreign 
policy to the new realities of the post-apartheid era:  
 
1. Restoring civilian control over the security apparatus so that the military would only 
be used for national self-defence and could only be deployed overseas for internationally 
mandated peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief exercises and the restoration of 
democracy (Schraeder, 2001, p. 231).  
2. Restructuring the foreign policy establishment to include diplomats from the former 
apartheid regime, the ANC’s Department of International Affairs and the four homelands’ 
foreign ministries so that the new Department of Foreign Affairs could be capable of 
responding to South Africa’s new role in the international community (Schraeder, 2001, 
p. 232). 
3. Self-promotion as the leader of the ‘African Rennaissance’ to emphasise the 
centrality of Africa in South Africa’s foreign policy. Six further objectives were included 
in this concept: regional integration and development, nuclear non-proliferation, territorial 
integrity and state sovereignty, peaceful resolution of conflicts, promotion of democracy 
and human rights, and free trade and investment (Schraeder, 2001, p. 233). 
4. Adherence to the foreign policy principle of ‘universality’ through which South 
Africa underscores its willingness to establish diplomatic relations with all countries of the 
world regardless of political systems or foreign policy priorities (Schraeder, 2001, p. 234). 
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5. Assuming a leadership role in international organisations to emphasise its firm 
commitment to the strengthening of international norms associated with the United 
Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, the Organisation for African 
Unity and other international organisations (Schraeder, 2001, p. 234). 
 
This foreign policy strategy saw the largest diplomatic expansion in South Africa’s 
history going from 39 foreign missions in 1993 (Christopher, 1994) to 106 in 2016 
(Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2016c). Apart from the historic 
relationships with Western Europe and North America, Pretoria’s new diplomatic 
network included embassies in all but six African countries and the most important 
nations in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Oceania. Also, a total of 134 countries 
opened embassies in Pretoria after 1993 (Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation, 2016b), making it the second most important diplomatic city in Africa after 
Cairo.  
 
Similarly, as a consequence of its domestic peaceful political transformation, South Africa 
started occupying a moral high ground that enabled it to be at the forefront of world 
efforts to promote human rights and democratic governments (A. F. Cooper, 1998). This, 
in turn, allowed for a larger engagement, both political and military, in UN, SADC and 
OAU peace initiatives and mediation efforts in countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, 
Libya, Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Burundi, Iran and Ivory 
Coast, amongst others (A. F. Cooper, 1998; Nathan, 2012; Spence, 1997; Van der 
Westhuizen, 1998). The end result saw a new role in the world for South Africa in which 
its 
foreign policy actually reflects the dynamics of a new middle power emerging in the 
developing world. South Africa is not simply another 'goody-two-shoes state' as middle 
powers are often caricatured. Rather, South Africa is being propelled into such a posture by 
a variety of interrelated forces. Change at the level of world order, its position within the 
international political economy, and diverse social forces operating in its state-societal 
complex all drive the kind of internationalist activity that typifies middle power behaviour. 
Playing a mediatory role not only helps the South African state make diverse foreign policy 
goals more compatible, it also goes some way in thwarting criticism levelled at its foreign 
policy. In short, its middle power orientation represents the external extension of domestic 
politics organised along corporatist lines (Van der Westhuizen, 1998, p. 436). 
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In line with South Africa’s new status as middle power, the City of Johannesburg also 
went through a radical transformation in its international engagements after the end of 
apartheid (P. Harrison, 2015). And even though official foreign policy is an exclusive 
responsibility of the national government, the guidelines of the Department of 
International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) to focus the country’s foreign policy 
on Africa and the Global South also generated a shift in the City of Johannesburg’s 
international priorities; mainly to legitimate its own actions in terms of the dominant 
approach in national policy. According to Harrison, the city’s strong shift towards Africa 
and BRICS countries did support the foreign policy objectives of DIRCO, although in an 
indirect and uncoordinated way with national government (Harrison, 2016). In terms of 
foreign engagements, there are two parallel processes of emergence at the national and 
the local level, but again, they are not coordinated as part of one single foreign policy 
strategy. Evidence can be found in South Africa’s 2011 white paper (Government of South 




7.2.2. THE BIRTH OF A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN AND THE 
CONTRADICTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
As with Colombia, the FSI serves as a starting point to analyse South Africa’s perception 
in the International System. However, since the Fund for Peace only started measuring 
the FSI in 2005, there is an important absence of information for the last years of 
apartheid, the transition period between 1990 and 1994, and the first 11 years of 
democracy in South Africa. Nonetheless, it can be argued that, due to the highly unstable 
internal and external situations in the country during apartheid, including low State 
legitimacy, serious human rights violations, uneven economic development and 
economic crisis (Fund for Peace, 2016g), South Africa would have been considered an 
extremely fragile State right before the start of the democratic transition.  
 
Fast forward to 2006, the first year in which the Fund for Peace included South Africa in 
the index, the country ranked 110th or, in other words, the 36th least fragile State in the 
world. That year, South Africa was located between the European Union countries of 
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Latvia (109th) and Estonia (111th) (Fund for Peace, 2006), an outstanding position to be 
after apartheid. Yet, South Africa’s ranking has worsened considerably ever since, as 
Figure 7.8. shows. Its score of 57.4 in 2007 (Fund for Peace, 2007) increased to 69.9 in 2016 
(Fund for Peace, 2016a), meaning a loss of 25 places in the ranking and going from ‘Stable’ 
to ‘Warning’. Moreover, according to the FSI Decade Trends, South Africa experienced a 
‘significant worsening’ between 2007 and 2016 similar to that of Greece, the Central 
African Republic and Guinea-Bissau, and ranked it only one place away from the ‘critical 
worsening’ category (Fund for Peace, 2016b). Only six countries in the world had worse 
results than South Africa during the past decade.  
 
FIGURE 7.8. SOUTH AFRICA IN THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX (2006-2016) 
 
 
Note: Data adapted from “The Fragile States Index Data”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, 
(http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2006to2014.xlsx) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace; data 
adapted from “Fragile States Index 2015”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, (http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015) 
Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace; data adapted from “Fragile States Index 2016”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, 
(http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace. Printed with permission. 
Although the FSI forecast is not promising, other intangible and unmeasurable elements 
also play a role in the country’s perception in the world. Perhaps the most important one 
is the fact that South Africa still enjoys the status of a ‘good international citizen’ it gained 
with its peaceful transition to democracy after apartheid and the leaderships of Nelson 
Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. In turn, according to Cooper, a strategy of “external 
validation” (A. F. Cooper, 1998, p. 707) was key in the establishment of new South Africa 
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as it would conform with the country’s triumphant return as an active, accepted and 
constructive player in the International System.  
 
Furthermore, by focusing its new foreign policy on promoting human rights, regional 
integration and peaceful resolution of conflicts, amongst other principles, South Africa 
was able to claim a higher moral ground internationally and, therefore, be perceived as a 
trustworthy emerging or middle power from the Global South (Van der Westhuizen, 
1998). In other words, South Africa had arrived with a “world-view driven by ambition 
to do good and a belief that the coin of idealism still holds value in an increasingly 
Darwinian world” (Alden & Le Pere, 2004, p. 289). This improved perception of South 
Africa in the world allowed it to engage in international mediation and peace building 
initiatives during the past two decades (Louw-Vaudran, 2016). Consequently, since 1994, 
South Africa was able to mediate in 14 countries, 13 of them in Africa, and by March 2014, 
the country’s troops were involved in African peace operations in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Darfur and South Sudan (Dieckhoff, 2014; Mabera, 2016). 
 
It must be mentioned, however, that “there are legitimate concerns that this capital, 
agency, and stature are fast depreciating because of recent missteps and strategic 
blunders in the conduct of South Africa’s foreign policy, especially under President 
Zuma’s watch” (Le Pere, 2014, p. 32). Some of the most important ones being not granting 
the Dalai Lama a visa to enter the country (Institute for Global Dialogue / Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, 2014), the military failure in the Central African Republic in 2013 (Saunders, 
2013; Van der Westhuizen, 2016; Vreÿ & Esterhuyse, 2015), the Zuma-Gupta corruption 
scandal (Le Pere, 2014; Swilling et al., 2017), the slow and vague response to the 
xenophobic attacks against other African nationals in South Africa in 2008 and 2015 
(Qobo, 2017), the decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court in 2016 
(Cornelissen, 2017) and Zuma’s refusal to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in 
Johannesburg in 2015 (Bosco, 2017; Murphy & Sieff, 2015). On this topic, Liesl Louw-
Vaudran goes further and blames President Zuma for what she calls the “moral decline 
of a former superpower” (Louw-Vaudran, 2016, p. 181) in Africa. 
 
Another decisive aspect of South Africa’s new role in the world is its perception as 
Africa’s regional power. South Africa’s large economy and its share in the continent’s 
economic market, its perception as a major African leader supported by its robust foreign 
Chapter 7: Leadership and international recognition 
 
193 
policy in Africa and its participation in finding African solutions for African problems 
make it the strongest candidate, even over Nigeria, to be Africa’s regional hegemonic 
power (Ogunnubi & Isike, 2015). Regional and continental organisations are key for 
South Africa’s power in Africa. The country has had a leading role in the establishment 
and development of organisations such as the African Union, NEPAD, the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), the African Peer Review Mechanism, the 
African Standby Force or the Southern African Customs Union (Alden & Soko, 2005; 
Bohler-Muller, 2012; Flemes & Wojczewski, 2010; Lechini & Giaccaglia, 2016; Qobo, 2010; 
Saunders, 2013; Schoeman, 2003).  
 
However, South Africa does not only stand out in Africa. It is undoubtedly the country 
of choice to represent the continent in international forums and organisations. On this 
topic, South Africa is the only African full member of the G20 and the G8+5 (A. F. Cooper 
& Antkiewicz, 2008; Landsberg, 2011), it is one of the most important countries leading 
the African quest for permanent UN Security Council representation – along with Egypt 
and Nigeria – (Spies, 2008; Venter, 2003), it was invited to join BRICS in 2010 (J. A. Smith, 
2011; Xinhua, 2010), it was also a fundamental part in the creation of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum in 2003 (Alden & Vieira, 2005; De Sousa, 2007a), and, as previously mentioned, it 
was included in some other important groupings of emerging powers from the Global 
South such as CIVETS (Allen, 2011; América Económica, 2011; É. Vieira, 2011), NEST 
(BBVA, 2015), and VISTA (Rodrigues, 2007). Furthermore, hosting the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup had an enormous impact in South Africa’s visibility in the world as Africa’s most 
important emerging power (Cornelissen, 2010).  
 
In line with South Africa’s international recognition, the city of Johannesburg has 
undergone a similar trend. Despite its bad reputation as a ‘crime city’ (Dirsuweit, 2002; 
K. Harrison, 2006; Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004; Palmary, Rauch, & Simpson, 2003; Wafer, 
2009), Johannesburg has been able to position itself as the gateway to Africa and as 
Africa’s most important international city (Harrison, 2016; Lipietz, 2008). In turn, South 
Africa’s image has greatly benefitted from the advantages Johannesburg poses for 
international businesses and politics. The city has Africa’s largest stock exchange, its 
biggest and best capitalised banks and its busiest and best-connected airport, amongst 
others (Games, 2012). Johannesburg also hosts the Pan-African Parliament (Pan African 
Parliament, 2017) and an African branch of the New Development Bank – formerly 
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known as BRICS Development Bank – will open this shortly in the city (New 
Development Bank, 2016; Times Live, 2016).  
 
 
7.2.3. SOUTH AFRICA’S EMERGING POWER STATUS, A CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa is a sui generis nation. Perhaps, no other country has undergone such a 
radical transformation during the past few decades. Since 1990, South Africa went from 
international pariah to an active, accepted and constructive player in the International 
System, and an emerging power from the Global South. Furthermore, South Africa has 
not only been considered an emerging power. Other concepts such as ‘regional power’ 
and ‘middle power’ have also been used to describe the country during the past few 
decades. However, as it was mentioned previously, the recent missteps in the conduct of 
South African foreign policy, the economic and political drawbacks of the current Zuma 
government and the growing debate on whether the country is punching above its own 
weight in its international relations are proof of the ambiguities faced by South Africa 
and its perception in the world. Nonetheless, the international recognition of the 
country’s emerging power status is unquestionable.  
 
The situation for Johannesburg is quite similar. As an emerging city, it faces most of the 
problems of cities in the Global South (Bremner, 2000; Murray, 2008; Tomlinson, 
Beauregard, Bremner, & Mangcu, 2003), while, at the same time, it has been recognised 
as one of Africa’s most important global cities, or a ‘world-class African city’ as the city 
presents itself (City of Johannesburg, 2016a; Lipietz, 2008). Chapter 6 showed how 
Johannesburg is currently the economic, financial and demographic powerhouse of South 
Africa and, as such, a large portion of South Africa’s power resources and international 
recognition originate in the city. Johannesburg is a fundamental part of South Africa, so 
much so that the history of the country would be radically different if gold had not been 
discovered in the city at the end of the 19th century. Johannesburg and South Africa are 
closely linked and the country’s status as an emerging power cannot properly be 
addressed without considering the city as a fundamental part of it.  
 
Unlike Bogotá, which can be perceived as an important city in a region with many 
important cities, Johannesburg is the important city not only in the SADC region but also 
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in Sub-Saharan Africa. In turn, while other countries in the continent grow, their cities 
are not likely to surpass Johannesburg that will, at least in the foreseeable future, maintain 
its status as Sub-Saharan Africa’s powerhouse and most international city. Therefore, 
Johannesburg has consolidated its position as an emerging city and one of the most 
important from the Global South for three different reasons. First, it is the heart of South 
Africa, Africa’s most recognised emerging power. Second, by virtue of its own power 
resources, leadership and international recognition. And third, because of the nature of 
South Africa’s Sub-Saharan African neighbours, the importance of Johannesburg is, by 
far, larger than that of any other city in the region. 
 
Yet, as it was the case with Colombia, the strategy used by South Africa to obtain and 
maintain its status as an emerging power does not include Johannesburg. The country 
uses its official foreign policy to advance its national interest without much regard for the 
city. At the same time, the city is big enough to act on its own and, therefore, largely 
ignores South Africa. The result is that the city and the country engage in two parallel but 
disconnected processes of emerging. 
 
 
7.3. THE EMERGENCE OF COLOMBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA: TWO 
CITY-BLIND PROCESSES 
 
When the cases of Colombia and South Africa are analysed together, a bigger narrative 
stands out. It is clear that the two processes share some important characteristics. They 
are both abandoning a troubled past and trying to make it into the emerging power 
leagues by solving those major problems and inserting themselves into the world. For 
Colombia, it is the internal armed conflict, while for South Africa, it is the legacy of 
segregation that characterised apartheid.  
 
However, the historical differences, their approaches to foreign policy and, most of all, 
the way they are perceived by the rest of the world, have meant that the roads followed 
by both countries are radically different. On one side, Colombia is still struggling to 
achieve its emerging power status; while on the other, South Africa was catapulted to this 
category after 1994 and has consolidated its influence – although limited – not only in 
Africa but also in the world. For South Africa, it is not about reaching the emerging power 
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status, but about maintaining it. This is an important issue as it breaks the idea that there 
is a linear progression or a unique way into becoming an emerging power. Colombia and 
South Africa demonstrate that the status can be achieved through different paths. 
 
When trying to become an emerging power, both Colombia and South Africa have 
actively used their own power resources. Not only do they acknowledge these resources 
to be significant, they are also aware that an improvement in the five dimensions 
previously analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 will, in turn, increase their international status 
and their possibilities of defending their national interest abroad. Nonetheless, it is when 
they realise the importance of their power resources that it becomes clear how little they 
actively use the power resources of their cities. While Bogotá and Johannesburg are a 
fundamental part of their countries’ international capacities and recognition, they are not 
included in their foreign policy strategies that, in turn, have showed to be almost 
completely city-blind.  
 
Consequently, Part 3 of this thesis demonstrates an overarching dynamic that shows 
emerging countries on one side and then emerging cities on the other in two parallel 
processes. And although the national and local emerging trajectories might seem similar, 
they are unconnected. Neither Colombia or South Africa have been able – or wanted – to 
include their most important cities in their emerging strategies. The two spheres of 
government follow a similar path, but they do it on their own as if cities did not have a 
place in foreign policy. The following chapter (Chapter 8) engages with and explains this 
mismatch between national and local governments in the international projection of 
Colombia and South Africa. 
 
But while power resources, leadership and international recognition are mostly city-
blind, the nature of this blindness is quite different. For instance, cities are intrinsically 
included in a country’s power resources as part of the whole. Consequently, even if their 
contribution to national power is not officially recognised or actively used by the State in 
their quest to become an emerging power, they still add to the country’s capabilities in 
the world. On the contrary, leadership depends on foreign policy – an exclusive domain 
of the State – and, as such, a national emerging strategy can be carried out with a complete 
disregard for cities. In this scenario, sub-national governments will most likely follow 
parallel routes to internationalise their territories and search for contacts and co-
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operation on their own. Finally, international recognition seems to work both ways: 
countries can be recognised as ‘emerging powers’ and cities can be recognised as 
‘emerging cities’. Both national and local governments can work towards altering their 
international perception but, as it was demonstrated in this chapter, they do this in a 
separate, unconnected way. 
 
As the process of emerging involves improving a country’s status in the world over time, 
there is a need to address the possibilities of change for each one of the three variables. 
As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the fluidity of the five dimensions of power resources can 
vary largely from one to another. While the territorial dimension is almost immutable, 
the rest of them are somewhat more flexible. This part demonstrated that power 
resources can indeed be modified and improved, however, it is not an easy task as their 
fluidity is quite slow. On the contrary, leadership and international recognition are far 
from static and they can be modified in various ways. First, the foreign policy of the State 
can actively be used to improve the country’s standing and perception in the 
International System. Second, country and city promotion programmes can also affect 
the leadership and the international recognition of both the State and sub-national 
entities. And third, they usually respond to domestic changes that can both support a 
change in a country’s foreign policy and trigger a response from the international 
community.  
 
Finally, an additional conclusion that arises from the previous three chapters is the fact 
that the paces of change for Colombia and South Africa are radically different. While both 
countries have emerged, Colombia has shown a faster and more aggressive growth in its 
power resources than South Africa during the past few decades. As Colombia’s three 
variables keep improving rather steadily, for South Africa, the large debate about its true 
international capabilities and the contradictions between the guidelines and the practice 
of its foreign policy seem to slow down the emerging pace for the country. Nonetheless, 
because of their relative weight in Latin America and Africa respectively, South Africa is 
undoubtedly more visible in the international arena than Colombia, a country somewhat 








UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF CITIES 
IN THE OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY OF 
EMERGING POWERS: THE CASES OF 





The previous Chapters 5, 6 and 7 analysed the way nations are positioned – and can 
change – their place in the global hierarchy of States, with or without giving attention to 
their cities. The countries’ emergence was defined in terms of their power resources, 
leadership and international perception. The discussion on Colombia and South Africa 
proved conclusively that the two countries can indeed be considered as emerging middle 
powers from the Global South, while, at the same time, demonstrated that Bogotá and 
Johannesburg are located at the core of these three variables. In other words, the two cities 
are tightly linked to the national dynamics of Colombia and South Africa and, therefore, 
could and should play a driving role in their nations’ emerging strategy.  
 
However, Part 3 has already provided a first indication that while Bogotá and 
Johannesburg are crucial for the international emergence of Colombia and South Africa, 
they are not overtly considered in their countries’ international strategies. So far, the way 
in which the two countries have emerged seems to be almost completely city-blind. The 
opposite is also true. Bogotá and Johannesburg have used their own power resources, 
leadership and recognition to position themselves in the world but, while doing so, have 
almost completely disregarded the International Relations functions of the State. In turn, 
there are two unrelated, parallel processes of ‘emerging’, one for the State and one for the 
city. 
 
In order to build on that first indication, the thesis now shifts to analyse the role of cities 
in the official foreign policy of emerging powers. A number of questions can be raised at 
this point. Are the interests of the cities included in the countries’ official foreign policy? 
Is there co-operation between national and local governments in the design and 
implementation of foreign policy? Are cities considered when States identify the national 
interest? Using Colombia and South Africa as examples, is it possible to understand the 
role cities play in the foreign policy of emerging powers?  
 
Part 4 is divided in three Chapters. Chapter 8 takes a close look at the constitutional and 
legal interfaces between cities and States and gives particular weight to issues of foreign 
policy. It analyses the existing hierarchy of power in the legal frameworks of both 
countries that largely prevents national and local governments to co-operate in the design 
and implementation of foreign policy. Chapter 9 moves to address the operational and 




work together as part of a unified emerging strategy for the country and the city. In other 
words, Chapter 8 deals with why they cannot co-operate while Chapter 9 explains why 
they do not do it. Finally, the Conclusions (Chapter 10) go one step further to explain the 
reasons behind the disconnection between national and local governments in foreign 
policy and address the consequences these reasons pose for Colombia and South Africa 
when they appear as a composite.  
 
The analysis conducted in this Part is based on the constitutions and official foreign policy 
documents from the Colombian and the South African governments as well as 
international relations documents from the cities of Bogotá, Medellín, Tshwane, 
Ekurhuleni, Cape Town and Johannesburg. Interviews conducted in Spanish and English 
to key current and former national and local government officials in Bogotá, Medellín, 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town were also included and considered for the 
analyses. Finally, specialist academics and applied researchers from both Colombia and 
South Africa were consulted to augment and verify the interpretations drawn from a 




: CITIES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF 
EMERGING POWERS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL 
MISMATCH 
 
As the holder of the constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy, the national 
government through the executive branch is entitled by law to design and implement the 
international relations of Colombia and South Africa. Considering that foreign policy is 
based on the national interest, it should include all actors within the country to ensure 
their interests are also satisfied. However, this is not often the case. Evidence shows that 
national governments in Bogotá and Pretoria consider foreign policy to be the exclusive 
prerogative of the State and, therefore, regional and local governments have little to no 
say in the issue of international relations.  
 
While cities increase their demands for decentralisation and access to the multilateral 
bodies, the issue of how, if at all, they might be bound by a national law and the de facto 
practices of national government becomes crucial. This chapter explains the mismatch 
between the different spheres of government in foreign policy by taking a close look at 
the constitutional and legal frameworks in Colombia and South Africa as well as the 
reasons emanating from the national level, namely the Presidencies, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Bogotá and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Co-
operation in Pretoria. It also explores the consequences these reasons have on local 
governments both in Colombia and South Africa. 
 
8.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL AMBIGUITIES ON 
DECENTRALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
Perhaps the most important reason for the evident mismatch between national and local 
governments in foreign policy for Colombia and South Africa lies in the conception and 
implementation of their decentralisation processes. Although it can be argued that there 
were previous decentralisation initiatives and measures, the 1991 Constitution for 
Colombia and the 1996 Constitution for South Africa provided the current legal and 
constitutional framework for decentralisation for both countries (Lodge, 2005; Soto, 2003). 
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Over two decades later, Colombia has undergone one of the most advanced 
decentralisation processes in Latin America (Finot, 2007; Giraldo, 2003) and South Africa 
innovated in the continent by using its transition to democracy to further decentralise 
resources and policymaking authority to sub-national governments across the entire 
territory (Stanton, 2009; Tyler Dickovick, 2005). 
 
What is interesting, however, is that both Colombia and South Africa developed a very 
clear and advanced constitutional and legal framework that define the characteristics and 
limits of their decentralisation processes in most topics except international relations. With 
one clear exception for Colombia – which will be discussed later – both countries limit 
the competencies of sub-national entities to regional and municipal issues. In other 
words, neither the constitutions nor the decentralisation laws in Colombia and South 
Africa explicitly allow sub-national governments to engage in relations with entities 
outside the national borders. The following paragraphs examine the constitutional and 
legal ambiguities in both countries. 
 
As the fundamental laws of the States, both Constitutions stipulate that foreign policy 
and international relations are the exclusive responsibility of the President of the 
Republic as head of the National Executive. In turn, according to Part 2 of Article 189 of 
the Colombian Constitution,  
 
[It] corresponds to the President of the Republic as Head of State, Head of Government and 
Supreme Administrative Authority [to c]onduct international relations. Appoint diplomatic 
and consular agents, receive the respective agents and sign with other States and entities of 
international law treaties or agreements to be submitted for the approval of the Congress41 
(Translated by the author from Gobierno de Colombia, 2015, p. 54). 
There is, however, one exception in the Colombian Constitution that allows 
Departments42 and Municipalities in border regions – which does not apply to Bogotá – 
                                                 
41 Original text in Spanish: Corresponde al Presidente de la República como Jefe de Estado, Jefe del 
Gobierno y Suprema Autoridad Administrativa: 2. Dirigir las relaciones internacionales. Nombrar a los 
agentes diplomáticos y consulares, recibir a los agentes respectivos y celebrar con otros Estados y entidades 
de derecho internacional tratados o convenios que se someterán a la aprobación del Congreso. 
42 Departments (Departamentos in Spanish) are first-level administrative and political subdivision in 
Colombia. Consequently, the three levels of government in the country are: national, departmental and 
municipal. There are two additional exceptional divisions, namely special districts and indigenous 
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to engage in foreign activities under very particular and restrictive conditions. It must be 
noted that this authorisation is not regarded, under any circumstance, as foreign policy 
by the constitution or the law. This exception can be found in Article 289 of the 
Constitution:  
Under the terms of the law, departments and municipalities located in border areas may 
directly engage with same-level bordering territorial entities of the neighbouring country, in 
co-operation and integration programs aimed at promoting community development, the 
provision of public services and the preservation of the environment43 (Translated by the 
author from Gobierno de Colombia, 2015, pp. 80–81)
 
As for South Africa, the Constitution deals with foreign affairs in various articles and 
sections. Nonetheless, it is clear that the President and the National Executive are 
responsible for foreign policy, diplomacy and the signing of international agreements. 
Some of the most important articles are: 
 
CHAPTER 5: THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE 
ARTICLE 84: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT 
 
(2) The President is responsible for –  
(h) receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; 
(i) appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular 
representatives; (Constitutional Assembly, 1996, p. 1301) 
 
CHAPTER 14: GENERAL PROVISIONS / INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ARTICLE 231: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
 
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the 
national executive (Constitutional Assembly, 1996, p. 1331 (31)). 
 
                                                 
territories which are, according to the law, essentially equivalent to municipalities (Congreso de Colombia, 
2013). Departments in Colombia are the equivalent of provinces in South Africa.  
43 Original text in Spanish: Por mandato de la ley, los departamentos y municipios ubicados en zonas 
fronterizas podrán adelantar directamente con la entidad territorial limítrofe del país vecino, de igual nivel, 
programas de cooperación e integración, dirigidos a fomentar el desarrollo comunitario, la prestación de 
servicios públicos y la preservación del ambiente (Gobierno de Colombia, 2015, pp. 80–81). 
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In terms of decentralisation, both Colombia and South Africa recognise three levels of 
government, namely national, departmental/provincial and municipal, and provide 
which functions fall under their jurisdiction. Article 287 of the Colombian Constitution 
stipulates that “[t]erritorial entities enjoy autonomy for the management of their interests, 
and within the limits of the Constitution and the law”44 (Translated by the author from 
Gobierno de Colombia, 2015, p. 80) while the Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial 
[Organic Territorial Planning Law] – Law 1454 of 2011 – explicitly grants functions to 
each level of government in the country, all of them in regards of public administration, 
finances, fiscal policy, urban planning and land use (Congreso de Colombia, 2011). 
Consequently, in the Colombian case, with the exception of article 289 of the Constitution, 
no reference to international relations or foreign engagements of sub-national entities can 
be found in the legal framework.  
 
The South African case is very similar. Article 40 of the Constitution starts by stating that 
“[i]n the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of 
government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated” (Constitutional 
Assembly, 1996, p. 1267) while Article 41 goes further in establishing the requirements 
for co-operative government and intergovernmental relations in South Africa and 
emphasises the prohibition to “assume any power or function except those conferred on 
them in terms of the Constitution” (Constitutional Assembly, 1996, p. 1269). This is 
extremely important as, for South Africa, any function assumed by sub-national 
governments that is not mentioned in the Constitution appears to be illegal.  
 
The South African legal framework on municipal governments is complemented by 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution on Local Governments (Constitutional Assembly, 1996) and 
the three laws regulating municipalities in the country: the Municipal Demarcation Act 
of 1998 (Government of South Africa, 1998a), the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 
(Government of South Africa, 1998b) and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 
(Government of South Africa, 2000). As with Colombia, all of the above legal instruments 
focus on local government issues such as land use, fiscal policy, loans, provision of 
services and social and economic development, amongst others, but none mention any 
explicit reference to the possibility for sub-national entities to engage in international 
                                                 
44 Original text in Spanish: “Las entidades territoriales go- zan de autonomía para la gestión de sus intereses, 
y dentro de los límites de la Constitución y la ley”. 
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relations. Consequently, according to Constitutional Law expert Pierre de Vos (personal 
communication, June 2, 2017) and taking into account Article 41 of the Constitution, since 
it is not explicitly allowed in the law, any international engagement undertaken by local 
governments appears to be illegal in South Africa. 
 
Some new questions arise at this point: can the de facto international engagements of sub-
national governments in Colombia and South Africa be regarded as illegal according to 
the laws of both countries? Is there only an absence of legislation on the topic? Or, is there 
a contradiction in the current legislation? When addressing the issue of foreign policy, 
there is a clear ambiguity between the legal and constitutional provisions on international 
affairs and decentralisation in both countries. On one side, the legal framework only 
allows the National Executive to conduct foreign policy and, on the other, sub-national 
entities argue that the current decentralisation laws grant them enough political 
autonomy to pursue international engagements aimed at satisfying their own local 
interests. The following paragraphs take a closer look at this ambiguity. 
 
The first issue that needs to be addressed is the interpretation of the law. Both 
constitutions grant autonomy to its sub-national governments within the framework of a 
unitary State (Constitutional Assembly, 1996; Gobierno de Colombia, 2015) and, with the 
complementary laws (Congreso de Colombia, 2011; Government of South Africa, 1998a, 
1998b, 2000), set the boundaries as to what particular actions sub-national governments 
can undertake to fulfil their constitutional duties, none of which mention international 
relations. However, in line with the decentralisation trend in both countries, 
departmental/provincial and municipal governments in Colombia and South Africa have 
justified their international engagements with a broad, and often not so accurate, 
interpretation of the law.  
 
In this regard, under the decentralisation legal framework, the Mayor of Bogotá created 
the City’s Directorate for International Relations through Decree 425 of 2016 (Alcaldía 
Mayor de Bogotá, 2016a). This Decree informs in the preamble that the Mayor has the 
faculties to modify the administrative structure of the City according to parts 1, 4, 6 and 
9 of Article 38 of Law 1421 of 1993 (Presidente de la República de Colombia, 1993) which 
set out the legal functions of the Mayor: 
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1. To enforce the Constitution, the law, the decrees of the National Government and the 
agreements of the Council45. 
 
4. To exercise the regulatory power, issuing the Decrees, orders and resolutions necessary to 
ensure the proper execution of the agreements46. 
 
6. To distribute functions according to their nature between the secretariats, administrative 
departments and decentralised entities47. 
 
9. To create, suppress or merge the jobs of the central administration, indicate their special 
functions and determine their emoluments according to the corresponding agreements. 
Based on this option, [the Mayor] will not be able to create obligations that exceed the total 
amount set for personnel expenses in the initially approved budget48 (Translated by the 
author from Presidente de la República de Colombia, 1993). 
 
What is interesting is that, while the previous law allows the Mayor to modify the 
administrative structure of the city government within the country’s decentralisation 
scheme, no mention regarding the possibility of the City of Bogotá to engage in 
international activities can be found. Something similar happens with the International 
Co-operation Agency of the City of Medellín. In its Manual de Cooperación Internacional 
Descentralizada [Manual of Decentralised International Co-operation] (Agencia de 
Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana, 2012), the Agency explains 
the Colombian legal framework for decentralised co-operation and cites Article 226 of the 
Constitution: “The State will promote the internationalisation of political, economic, 
social and ecological relations on the basis of equity, reciprocity and national 
                                                 
45 Original text in Spanish: “Hacer cumplir la Constitución, la ley, los Decretos del Gobierno Nacional y los 
acuerdos del Concejo”. 
46 Original text in Spanish: “Ejercer la potestad reglamentaria, expidiendo los Decretos, órdenes y 
resoluciones necesarios para asegurar la debida ejecución de los acuerdos”. 
47 Original text in Spanish: “Distribuir los negocios según su naturaleza entre las secretarías, los 
departamentos administrativos y las entidades descentralizadas”. 
48 Original text in Spanish: “Crear, suprimir o fusionar los empleos de la administración central, señalarles 
sus funciones especiales y determinar sus emolumentos con arreglo a los acuerdos correspondientes. Con 
base en esta facultad, no podrá crear obligaciones que excedan el monto global fijado para gastos de 
personal en el presupuesto inicialmente aprobado”. 
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convenience”49 (Translated by the author from Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de 
Medellín y el Área Metropolitana, 2012, p. 27). It then continues by explaining the 
importance of decentralisation in Colombia:  
 
In the case of territorial entities – departments and municipalities –, it is important to 
emphasise that Article 13 of the Political Constitution of Colombia establishes the 
decentralisation and autonomy of territorial entities. This feature is reiterated in Articles 
287 and 288, the latter delegates the division of powers between the Nation and territorial 
entities to the Organic Territorial Planning Law, 1454 of 201150 (Translated by the author 
from Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana, 2012, p. 27). 
 
And this is where the broad interpretation of the law comes in. The Agency continues to 
provide its explanation on how Article 28 of the Organic Territorial Planning Law 
(Congreso de Colombia, 2011) provides sub-national entities with the ability to engage in 
international relations: 
 
This law clearly states in Article 28 that departments and municipalities will have autonomy 
to determine their internal structure and central and decentralised administrative 
organisation; as well as the establishment and distribution of their functions and resources 
for the adequate fulfilment of their constitutional duties. From here a permission from the 
national level to engage in international relations is deduced, and therefore, to seek and 
manage co-operation relations. Thus, by constitutional and legal provision, territorial 
entities have the absolute power to seek, encourage and foster relations of technical, economic 
and knowledge management exchange with juridical persons of the international level51 
                                                 
49 Original text in Spanish: “El Estado promoverá la internacionalización de las relaciones políticas, 
económicas, sociales y ecológicas sobre bases de equidad, reciprocidad y conveniencia nacional”.  
50 Original text in Spanish: “Para el caso de las entidades territoriales –departamentos y municipios-, es 
importante resaltar que en el Artículo 13 de la Constitución Política de Colombia, se establece la 
descentralización y autonomía de las entidades territoriales. Esta característica se reitera en los artículos 
287 y 288 de la misma, siendo este último, el que delega la repartición de competencias entre la Nación y 
los entes territoriales a la Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial, la 1454 de 2011”. 
51 Original text in Spanish: “Esta ley establece claramente en el Artículo 28 que los departamentos y 
municipios tendrán autonomía para determinar su estructura interna y organización administrativa central 
y descentralizada; así como el establecimiento y distribución de sus funciones y recursos para el adecuado 
cumplimiento de sus deberes constitucionales. De acá se deduce una permisión del orden nacional para el 
relacionamiento internacional, y por lo tanto para la búsqueda y gestión de relaciones de cooperación. De 
esta manera entonces, por disposición constitucional y legal, las entidades territoriales tienen la absoluta 
potestad de buscar, fomentar y propiciar las relaciones de intercambio técnico, económico y de gestión del 
conocimiento, con personas jurídicas del orden internacional”. 
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(Translated by the author from Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área 
Metropolitana, 2012, p. 27). 
 
The previous explanation is highly debatable as there is no clear causality between the 
text of the law and the Agency’s interpretation of it. Also, it fails to mention paragraph 1 
of the same Article that clearly establishes that “[t]he municipalities are holders of any 
competence that is not expressly attributed to the Departments or the Nation”52 
(Translated by the author from Congreso de Colombia, 2011, p. 11), in this case, 
international relations under the authority of the national executive as per Article 189 of 
the Constitution (Gobierno de Colombia, 2015). 
 
Sub-national governments, then, use the autonomy given to them by decentralisation 
laws to justify their international engagements, even if they are not explicitly allowed in 
the legal framework. Something similar can be found in the South African case. The City 
of Johannesburg’s integrated international relations agenda explains why the local 
government is allowed to have its own international engagements as follows: 
 
The Constitution establishes local government as a sphere of government which has the 
“right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community.” In 
addition, municipalities must “participate in national and provincial development 
programmes”. Hence the mandate for the establishment of a robust international relations 
programme for the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) is derived for the independence of local 
government on the one hand and the requirement to participate in national programmes 
which would include national government’s international relations policies and programmes 
on the other (City of Johannesburg, 2012b, p. 5). 
It can be argued that the causality in the South African case is also absent as the autonomy 
given to local governments according to decentralisation laws does not mention 
international relations. Also, considering the decentralisation process only gives sub-
national entities authority over their own territories, an international mandate cannot 
legally be assumed in the absence of an explicit legal authorisation. But the City of 
Johannesburg is not the only sub-national entity that assumes this mandate. The City of 
Ekurhuleni stated that “[t]he Constitution of the Republic of South Africa acknowledges 
                                                 
52 Original text in Spanish: “Los municipios son titulares de cualquier competencia que no esté atribuida 
expresamente a los departamentos o a la Nación”.  
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local authorities as a distinct sphere of government with considerable latitude in its 
functioning, including the right to establish International relationships” (Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality, 2010, p. 3). 
 
Interestingly enough, the available scholarship on decentralisation in Colombia 
(Calderón Álvarez & Velásquez Betancur, 2008; De la Cruz, Pineda Mannheim, & Pöschl, 
2011; Giraldo, 2003; Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 2005; Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, 2010; Nogales Rodríguez, 2009; Sánchez & Pachón, 2013; Soto, 2003) 
and South Africa (Bahl, Young, & Smoke, 2003; Calitz & Essop, 2012; Feinstein, 2015; 
Koelble & Siddle, 2013; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Parnell & Pieterse, 2014; Siddle, 2011; 
Siddle & Koelble, 2013; Yemek, 2005) does not deal with these issues of how cities engage 
matters of foreign affairs . First, the scholarship focuses mostly on the domestic, regional 
and local effects of decentralisation. Second, it does not question the causality argued by 
regional and local governments that would allow them to pursue international 
engagements according to the Constitution and the law. And third, it fails to address the 
fact that the legal limits to how sub-national entities can act internationally are set at the 
national scale, and consequently, even with a reform at the UN level, local and regional 
governments would still need the national legal framework to be changed in order to 
authorise them to do more internationally. 
 
The second issue that needs to be addressed is the foreign policy itself. All government 
officials interviewed for this thesis, both at the national and local levels (V. Cañón, 
personal communication, November 6, 2015; N. Currea, personal communication, 
August 5, 2016; F. Á. Durán, personal communication, February 5, 2016; J. Erasmus, 
personal communication, August 23, 2016; E. Falla, personal communication, September 
4, 2015; S. Giraldo, personal communication, August 20, 2015; S. Mokgalapa, personal 
communication, May 26, 2016; A. M. Moreno, personal communication, February 26, 
2017; F. Nacerodien, personal communication, June 24, 2016; C. Rath, personal 
communication, June 24, 2016; M. Tena, personal communication, June 27, 2016; M. P. 
Ávila, personal communication, September 4, 2015) agreed that the international 
engagements of cities cannot be considered as foreign policy for two reasons: first, they 
are actions carried out outside of the official diplomatic channels of both the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and DIRCO; and second, they are mainly co-operation initiatives 
with same-level foreign authorities aimed at fulfilling their constitutional mandates. 
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Consequently, since local authorities are not compromising the national government as 
they are not persons of international law, their actions cannot be regarded as foreign 
policy. 
 
Again, the legal framework does not support those two arguments. In Colombia, the 
official mandate given to the MFA by the law includes, amongst other functions 
(Translated by the author from Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2017):  
1. Formulate and propose to the President of the Republic the foreign policy of the 
Colombian State 
2. Execute, directly or through the various entities and agencies of the State, the foreign 
policy of the Colombian State 
6. To act as interlocutor, coordinator and liaison for all the official actions that are carried 
out between the governmental entities and the governments of other countries, as well 
as with the international organisms and mechanisms 
7. Participate in the formulation, orientation, integration and harmonisation of sectoral 
policies and programs that are the responsibility of the different state entities, when they 
are related to foreign policy 
8. To articulate the actions of the different State entities at all levels and of individuals, 
when appropriate, with regard to the country's international relations and foreign 
policy, in the areas of politics, security, economy and trade, social development, culture, 
environment, human rights, international humanitarian law, science and technology 
and international cooperation, based on principles of equity, reciprocity and national 
convenience 
10. To participate in the negotiation processes, with the cooperation of other national or 
territorial entities, as the case may be, of international instruments, as well as follow up, 
evaluate their results and permanently verify their compliance 
12. Participate in the formulation and implementation of the foreign trade and trade 
integration policy in all its aspects 
13. Orient and formulate the policy of international cooperation in its different modalities 
and evaluate its execution 
18. Formulate, guide, execute and evaluate foreign policy in the area of integration and 
border development in coordination with sectoral authorities of the national and 
territorial order, when applicable 
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19. Promote, articulate, finance or co-finance the implementation of border development and 
integration programs and projects in coordination with national sectoral authorities, 
territorial entities and international cooperation agencies responsible for their 
implementation, in accordance with the National Development Plan53. 
 
As for South Africa, the legal mandate for DIRCO can be found in Section 2 of the 2011 
White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy. Some of DIRCO’s functions relevant for 
the thesis are (Government of South Africa, 2011, p. 9): 
 
The Department and its Missions abroad carry out its mandate by:  
 Aligning, coordinating, and managing South Africa’s international relations and 
related activities 
 formulating foreign policy options; 
 conducting economic diplomacy; 
 conducting public diplomacy; 
 establishing and managing structures and mechanisms for achieving foreign policy 
objectives; 
 managing development cooperation and partnerships; 
 advising on international law matters and acting as custodian for all South Africa’s 
international agreements; 
 
Furthermore, Section 6 of the White Paper clearly states that 
 
In 2009, the Department of Foreign Affairs was renamed as the Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation in order to respond in order to better align South Africa’s foreign 
policy and domestic objectives. This provided the Department with an opportunity to 
redefine its role in building deeper and more expansive relations and using these 
partnerships to advance South Africa’s national interests. Global issues shaping the 
environment in which South Africa operates are increasingly complex and multidimensional 
and require a coherent cross-sectoral approach and a coordinated response across all spheres 
of government, public enterprises, the private sector, labour, civil society, and other non-
state actors (Government of South Africa, 2011, p. 35). 
 
                                                 
53 Original text in Spanish. Due to the size of the quote, the Spanish version can be accessed at: 
http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministerio/mision_vision_objetivos_normas_principios_lineamientos#4  
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Both mandates state that it is the responsibility of the MFA and DIRCO to conduct 
economic and co-operation initiatives and partnerships with foreign actors. Also, it is 
clear that both the MFA and DIRCO must articulate, coordinate and liaise with other 
government entities, including sub-national governments, any international engagement 
originating in Colombia or South Africa. Ultimately, what the two mandates imply is that 
there should not be any actions carried out outside the official diplomatic channels of 
both the MFA and DIRCO or, at least, not without their consent.  
 
The result of failing to coordinate the international engagements of local governments 
with the MFA or DIRCO, as well as the lack of constitutional and legal clarity in the 
boundaries of what cities can do internationally can have serious foreign policy 
consequences for countries (Beall & Adam, 2017). On this topic, South Africa faced a very 
difficult situation in January 2017 with its most important trading partner, the People’s 
Republic of China, when the Mayor of the City of Tshwane visited Taipei, the capital of 
Taiwan, a territory not recognised as a country by South Africa. After being aware of the 
visit, DIRCO reacted with a Media Statement directed to all spheres of government that 
stated:  
 
The Deparment [sic] of Internarional [sic] Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) wishes to 
place it on record that the recent trip to the city of Taipei in Taiwan, undertaken by Councilor 
[sic] Solly Msimanga, Executive Mayor of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 
was in breach of South Africa's foreign policy and is highly regretted. 
 
The Department was made aware of the visit and advised Mayor Msimanga not to undertake 
the visit as it would constitute a breach of our One China Policy. In a move that is highly 
regrettable, Mayor Msimanga disregarded DIRCO's advise and proceeded with the visit. 
 
[…] Representatives of any sphere of government must ensure that their engagements with 
international entities are aligned to existing mechanism and programmed and that such 
relations are coordinated in a manner that advances South Africa's foreign policy and 
national interests (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2017). 
 
In turn, while it is difficult to argue that international engagements of sub-national 
entities are illegal in both Colombia and South Africa, it is possible to talk about some 
ambiguities in the law that generate a constitutional, legal and operational mismatch in 
foreign activities between the national and the local levels in both countries. These 
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ambiguities can be summarised as follows: even though the constitutions establish that 
foreign affairs are the absolute domain of the national executive, a broad interpretation 
of the decentralisation laws has been used by sub-national governments in both countries 
to justify their international engagements. At the same time, there is a consensus in public 
officials at the different spheres of government that international activities by sub-
national entities are not regarded as foreign policy even if the MFA and DIRCO mandates 
say otherwise.  
 
Consequently, reality differs greatly from the law as local governments are generally 
allowed to engage in foreign activities or paradiplomacy as long as they do not clash with 
national foreign policy priorities and objectives, often even without the accompaniment 
of the national executive. At the same time, the national government conducts the official 
foreign policy of the State with little regard for departmental/provincial or local 
governments. These two dynamics will be further discussed throughout this chapter.  
 
 
8.2. A STATE-CENTRED APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY 
 
As it was explained in Chapter 4, foreign policy must be informed and determined by 
national interest (Bohler-Muller, 2012). Constitutionally for both Colombia and South 
Africa, the national executive is responsible for foreign policy and, in turn, it means that 
it is responsible for identifying the national interest according to the country’s domestic 
and external needs. What is key at this point is the fact that national interest is indeed 
national; there is one for the whole country and, while it should, at least in theory, 
consider the interests and priorities of all relevant actors within the national borders, 
including sub-national entities, it is undoubtedly the full prerogative of the national 
government. 
 
Sovereignty is also a crucial concept. Since the Peace of Westphalia (Goss, 1948) and 
reaffirmed by the Montevideo Convention (Organization of American States, 1933), the 
only sovereign entity in the International System has been the State and, as such, it 
monopolises the capacity to enter into official relations with other States. In other words, 
the State is the only person of international law that is able to conduct official foreign 
policy. 
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And while the International System has the previous principles at its core, it does not 
mean that there are not various voices that question them. The emergence of other 
important international actors such as sub-national entities, NGOs, international 
organisations and even persons is indisputable as they continue to increase their 
influence in today’s key international discussions. The notion of an ‘absolute sovereignty’ 
is also under debate with various authors even questioning if international law is itself 
eroding the concept of State sovereignty (Benhabib, 2012; Chertoff, 2009; Ferreira-
Snyman, 2007; Hunter, 2016; Macklem, 2008). 
 
But even with a changing international environment, assuming the State has lost its 
pivotal role in the International System would be inaccurate. Ian Brownlie writes: 
 
Seeking signs of the 'rebirth of statehood' is more than a little premature: there is no evidence 
that the State has died. It is an intellectual fashion to preach the end of the State and to attack 
sovereignty. But such iconoclasm has had no impact on the real world (Brownlie, as cited in 
Grant, 1998, p. 407). 
 
Consequently, it seems as if Morgenthau’s realist perception of the International System 
has remained unchanged, at least as far as foreign policy is concerned. The State 
continues to be the central actor with its foreign policy being determined by its national 
interest and the power resources available to pursue these objectives (Morgenthau, 1949). 
But the previous statement is not only found in the theory, it is also present in the 
designing and implementation of both the Colombian and South African foreign policies.  
 
After interviewing various diplomats at the MFA and DIRCO, it became clear that both 
ministries share this perception. Foreign policy is dictated by the national executive – the 
president and the foreign ministries – and any international engagement pursued by 
other government agencies, either at the national, regional or local level, is not regarded 
as the official foreign policy of the State. The dominant political narrative that foreign 
policy is the exclusive domain of national governments was undoubtedly adopted in 
Colombia and South Africa, and consequently, the foreign ministries in Bogotá and 
Pretoria concentrate all decision-making capacities while other actors within the national 
borders are mostly overlooked.  
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In Colombia, a formal mechanism for the MFA to engage with departmental and local 
governments does not exist. Sub-national entities are rarely consulted or included in the 
designing and implementation of foreign policy by the MFA and there does not seem to 
be an interest in changing that. Furthermore, the participation of the City of Bogotá in 
Colombia’s foreign policy is almost non-existent. As stated by Flor Ángela Durán (2017), 
an active diplomat from MFA,  
 
Bogotá is the centre of power in Colombia, it is seat of the national government, it is where 
the Foreign Ministry is and where all State visits take place. It is where the Colombian 
foreign policy is dictated and carried out, and it is where the instructions for embassies and 
consulates come from. But the role of Bogotá is minimal. The city’s government is not 
included in any way in the formulation or implementation of foreign policy54 (Translated by 
the author from Durán, 2017). 
 
Ana María Moreno (2017), another active Colombian diplomat, further explains the 
MFA’s perception on the role of cities, particularly Bogotá, in the country’s foreign policy: 
 
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state; it recognises foreign policy to be under 
the domain of the president and all actions of the state have to stick to that. Also, in terms of 
international law, the subjects of international law are unquestionably the States, not cities. 
Consequently, in international organisations or tribunals, the actions of Bogotá do not 
matter much as they cannot legally compromise the Colombian State55 (Translated by the 
author from Moreno, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, the perception at the MFA is that, under particular circumstances which 
will be explained in Chapter 9, cities are not even considered when it comes to city-related 
topics. María Paula Ávila, former General Coordinator of the Latin American Network 
of Cities at the City of Bogotá, explained it as follows: 
                                                 
54 Original text in Spanish: “Bogotá es el centro de poder en Colombia, está el gobierno nacional, es donde 
está la cancillería, es donde tiene lugar todas visitas de Estado. Donde se lleva a cabo y se dicta la política 
que se lleva a cabo en embajadas y consulados y donde se dicta la política exterior colombiana. Pero el rol 
de Bogotá es mínimo. La alcaldía no está incluida de ninguna forma en la formulación o implementación 
de política exterior. 
55 Original text in Spanish: “La Constitución en la ley fundamental de Estado; reconoce que la política 
exterior está en cabeza del presidente y todas las acciones del estado se tienen que ajustar a eso. Además, 
en términos de derecho internacional, los sujetos de derecho internacional son indudablemente los estados, 
no las ciudades. En consecuencia, en organizaciones internacionales o tribunales, lo que haga Bogotá no 
tiene mucha importancia porque no puede comprometer legalmente al estado colombiano”. 




During the preparation for Habitat III in Quito, the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
said "cities have nothing to do here", when those who will implement what is adopted in 
Quito are the cities. No national government has the capacity to do what cities can do to 
meet the Millennium Development Goals. Especially in Colombia where effective 
decentralisation began 20 years ago56 (Translated by the author from Ávila, 2015). 
There is, however, one exception in which the MFA includes and consults departmental 
and local governments in the implementation of its activities, the Plan Fronteras para la 
Prosperidad [Plan Border Regions for Prosperity]. It includes 13 departments and 77 
municipalities located on the border areas with 11 countries and it is aimed at improving 
the quality of life of its inhabitants by increasing State presence and public investments 
(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2015b). This is a sui generis plan because while it falls 
under the responsibilities of the MFA, it is technically not foreign policy as it is focused 
on territories inside the national borders.  
 
The South African case, on the contrary, does have a formal mechanism to include the 
three spheres of government in the formulation of foreign policy: the Consultative Forum 
on International Relations (CFIR). Established by DIRCO in 2008, the CFIR aims to 
“encourage greater coordination, information-sharing and accountability among 
international relations stakeholders in the three spheres of government” (Nganje, 2016a, 
p. 163). The forum should work in both ways. In the words of Mr Fadl Nacerodien, Chief 
Director of the Policy Research and Analysis Unit at DIRCO: 
 
We get the international relations people within the Premier of the provinces’ office, from 
other government departments that have their own international relations divisions, and 
down to the city level. We get them to come to this meeting which takes place at least once a 
year and our Director General chairs that. And they get briefed on events that will happen… 
South Africa is going to host the World Cup or it is going to host the climate change meeting; 
and number two, we let them tell us what some of their things are. So, there is that exchange 
of information (Nacerodien, 2016). 
                                                 
56 Original text in Spanish: “Durante la preparación para Hábitat III en Quito, la Cancillería colombiana dijo 
“las ciudades no tienen nada que hacer acá” cuando las que van a poner en práctica lo que se adopte en 
Quito son las ciudades. Ningún gobierno nacional tiene la capacidad de hacer lo que pueden hacer las 
ciudades para cumplir los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible del Milenio. Especialmente en Colombia que 
lleva 20 años de descentralización efectiva”. 
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The problem, however, is that the CFIR has not been as effective as it was envisioned. Mr 
Nacerodien continued to state: “Our new Director General just left and we have to wait 
and see if the new Director General will take this up enthusiastically because it was not 
as active in the past few years as it should be” (Nacerodien, 2016). On the same lines, 
Nganje argues that 
 
consistent with the idea of an institutional hierarchy in which the national government has 
the final say on foreign policy issues, Pretoria’s interventions to coordinate sub-state 
diplomacy have often come with a supervisory undertone. Although sub-national officials 
generally acquiesce to the national government’s overall authority on matters of foreign 
affairs, perceptions that coordinating measures are intended to control rather than facilitate 
sub-state diplomacy have tended to weaken compliance with, and undermine the 
effectiveness of such measures. This is the case with the most recent effort to coordinate sub-
state diplomacy at the national level through a Consultative Forum on International 
Relations (CFIR). […] [T]he forum and its accountability mechanisms have had limited 
impact on the efficiency of sub-state diplomacy mainly because of the erratic compliance and 
participation of sub-national officials, but also because of insufficient leadership at the level 
of DIRCO (Nganje, 2016a, p. 163). 
In terms of the City of Johannesburg, the perception is quite similar. During the interview 
with Jan Erasmus, Director of Strategy and International Relations at the City of 
Johannesburg, the question of whether the city’s International Relations Strategy 
mentions anything about its relationship with DIRCO was raised. His answer also shows 
a disconnection between national and local spheres in foreign policy: 
 
Yes, under the third leg, the international relations intergovernmental relations. It is vertical 
with the province as well as with DIRCO. But with DIRCO, they call a meeting once a year 
but it is a top-down “we tell you what we are doing”. They never ask us what we are doing. 
[…] I cannot remember of one example where we have been requested to submit what we are 
after or what we are doing. So, is there any interest? And we are fairly active, probably more 
active than many of DIRCO departments (Erasmus, 2016). 
The previous paragraphs suggest that, even though the CFIR was supposed to have both 
a top-down and a bottom-up approach, the reality shows not only that Pretoria keeps 
control of all foreign affairs issues, but also fails to recognise the importance of sub-State 
international engagements, and as a result, the co-ordination efforts fall short. The 
situation in Colombia is quite similar and, consequently, reality shows two foreign 
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ministries that function with a top-down approach and leave sub-national governments 
with little room, if any, to influence national foreign policy (Nganje, 2015). This in turn 
means that there is a disconnection between the national interest and that of the sub-
national governments that translates in both levels of government acting on their own 
internationally. Finally, even with the increasing importance of cities in the international 
arena, the State-centred approach to foreign policy does not seem to be changing for 




Chapters 5, 6 and 7 demonstrated that cities are an essential contributor to the State’s 
power resources, leadership and international recognition and, in the case of emerging 
powers, to the countries’ increasing importance in the International System. As such, both 
the International Relations literature and the Colombian and South African legal 
frameworks suggest that cities should be included in the design and implementation of 
the national foreign policy. However, Chapter 8 identified a clear constitutional and legal 
mismatch that prevents local governments from being an active actor in their countries’ 
official foreign policy mechanisms.  
 
Reality shows national and local governments taking two different paths. While the 
former makes use the official diplomatic channels of the State to advance its national 
interest, the latter follows a parallel route that allows it to place its urban concerns in the 
international agenda. The main explanations for this mismatch can be found in the State-
centred approach to foreign policy, followed by constitutional and legal ambiguities both 
on decentralisation and international relations and the increasing importance of the city 
as a global actor.  
 
In turn, even if the Constitutions dictate that the relationship between the three spheres 
of government must be interdependent and interrelated, the cases of Colombia and South 
Africa demonstrate that there is a clear hierarchy of power when it comes to foreign 
affairs in which national government is in charge, while sub-national entities are mostly 
marginalised. What is interesting, however, is that these dynamics are limited only to the 
official foreign policy of the State. In fact, national governments are mostly willing to 
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adopt a policy of laissez-faire with regards to the international engagements of sub-
national entities – although the legal frameworks do not explicitly authorise them – when 
they do not interfere or affect the national interest. The following Chapter 9 complements 
the constitutional and legal analysis in Chapter 8 by taking into consideration the 
operational and practical mismatch found in the relationship between national and local 




: BEYOND THE LAW: THE OPERATIONAL AND 
PRACTICAL DISCONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONAL AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN FOREIGN POLICY 
Apart from the constitutional and legal reasons that prevent national and local 
governments to co-operate in the design and implementation of foreign policy in 
Colombia and South Africa, there are several additional dynamics that also contribute to 
the isolation of these two spheres of government when dealing with international 
relations. While Chapter 8 focused on the legal obstacles, Chapter 9 takes into 
consideration seven operational and practical reasons why national and local 
governments do not co-operate in foreign policy. The emphasis in this chapter is on the 
nature of the everyday functioning relationship between the two spheres of government, 
as well as the particular characteristics of both the domestic political systems and the 
International System.  
 
However, when analysing the operational and practical dynamics of the national-local 
relationship, it becomes evident that there are a few exceptions or anomalies where cities 
and States are either willing or forced to work with each other. Chapter 9 examines these 
exceptions and addresses their consequences for the participation of cities in the design 
and implementation of foreign policy in Colombia and South Africa.  
 
 
 9.1. PERCEPTION VS. REALITY: AN EVIDENT MISMATCH 
 
In foreign policy, often the important issue is not about what cities can actually do or 
what they are allowed to do to position themselves both within the country and in the 
world, but how they are perceived by national government and the population in general. 
If the way a city is perceived differs greatly from reality, evidence shows that the State – 
and also policy-makers within the national government – will more likely respond to 
these external perceptions and adapt them in the country’s international strategy. In other 
words, if a city is perceived as successful, its chances of becoming a useful point of 
reference for the country’s foreign policy increase considerably. On the contrary, a city 
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with a bad perception may be overlooked by national government. The issue of 
perception is particularly visible for international co-operation initiatives, as will be 
explained throughout this section. 
 
Perception is, then, the first reason undermining a possible co-operation between national 
and local governments in foreign affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 discussed the territorial, 
strategic, economic and demographic importance of Bogotá and Johannesburg for 
Colombia and South Africa and analysed how most socio-economic indicators have been 
improving in both cities during the past few decades. In other words, it is evident that 
Bogotá and Johannesburg have been mostly effective in the process of tackling the 
problems of cities of the Global South and improving the quality of life of its inhabitants. 
Of course, the road is still long, but the results so far are undeniable.  
 
Nonetheless, the general improvement of most socio-economic indicators are often not 
visible to the majority of the population. For example, big infrastructure projects are 
easier to notice in everyday life than social programmes aimed at specific population 
groups. Also, existing problems are frequently augmented and sensationalised by 
politicians and the media to be used for political or economic purposes. This can be true 
for crime, the environment, traffic congestion or even the provision of public services. 
And here is where perception can differ greatly from reality. There is abundant available 
literature linking the role of the media and the perception of citizens on problems or 
issues in the city, particularly crime (Callanan, 2012; Cárdenas Ruiz, 2015; Mazur, 2006; 
Sacco, 1982), but the main idea can be summarised with the words of Buvinić and 
Morrison: 
 
Print and television media around the world decry rising violence as an endemic and 
worsening phenomenon. But do such depictions mirror reality? The phrase "if it bleeds, it 
leads" is a shorthand description of the media's tendency to sensationalize episodes of 
violence, whether or not they are particularly newsworthy or even characteristic of 
underlying trends (Buvinić & Morrison, 2000, p. 58).  
 
The question posed by Buvinić & Morrison can be extended to other areas. Do media 
depictions mirror reality in terms of traffic, homelessness, poverty, health, education or 
provision of services? The following paragraphs take a close look at this issue for Bogotá 
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and Johannesburg and the impacts it has for the relationship between national and local 
governments. 
 
Bogotá has a dark past. The generalised perception of the city included widespread crime 
and violence, drug trafficking, chaotic traffic, poverty and a failing infrastructure. It is, 
after all, the capital city of one of the most dangerous countries in the world during most 
of the 1980s and 1990s. But as it was explained in Chapter 6, Bogotá, like Colombia, 
bounced back and rose from the ashes during the first years of the 21st century. Moreover, 
the success of the successive local administration catapulted the city to a paramount 
position in the International System. Bogotá had become the shining star, a role model 
for other cities trying to overcome the problems of the Southern urban. In the words of 
the 2007 Venice Biennale,  
This city has in the last decades addressed the problems of social inclusion, education, 
housing and public space especially through innovations in transport. Bogotá has applied 
Mies van der Rohe's dictum ‘less is more’ to the automobile: less cars means more civic space 
and civic resources for people. The city provides a model for streets which are pleasing to the 
eye as well as economically viable and socially inclusive. Bogotá is, in short, a beacon of hope 
for other cities, whether rich or poor (2007 Venice Biennale, as cited in Crawford, 2009, p. 
i). 
 
But Bogotá’s innovative spirit eventually came to an end. While the administrations of 
Antanas Mockus (1995-1997), Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000) and again Antanas Mockus 
(2001-2003) are generally recognised as those responsible for the dramatic improvement 
of the quality of life of Bogotans (Casas Dupuy & González Cepero, 2005; Crawford, 2009; 
Fisman & Werker, 2011; Mockus, 2012), the following administrations of Luis Eduardo 
Garzón (2004-2007), and most importantly Samuel Moreno (2008-2011) and Gustavo 
Petro (2012-2015), all from the leftist Polo Democrático party, jeopardised these 
improvements through corruption and inefficiency.  
 
In 2011, Mayor Moreno was suspended and stripped of his office on corruption charges, 
leaving the city with two successive interim Mayors (El Tiempo, 2016c; Procuraduría 
General de la Nación, 2015; Revista Semana, 2011, 2015b). The following Mayor, Gustavo 
Petro, not only faced an unsuccessful recall process led by the opposition, but was also 
temporarily removed from office for two months in 2013, adding to the political 
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instability of the city (Caracol Radio, 2014; El Espectador, 2013; El Universal, 2016; Revista 
Semana, 2014).  
 
Yet, even in the presence of corruption and political instability, the social and economic 
indicators of the city continued to improve during the three administrations. Bogotá had 
undergone another dramatic change, one in which the left governments had abandoned 
the gigantic infrastructure and public space projects of the three previous Mayors and 
focused on social policies. With that, the city’s physical appearance started to deteriorate, 
traffic got worse, the perception of insecurity rose and the long-term sustainability of 
Transmilenio, Peñalosa’s most important legacy, started to come into question (Bassett & 
Marpillero-Colomina, 2013). The media in Colombia documented extensively the 
negative change citizens started to see in their everyday life and produced many analyses 
on how the left had lost Bogotá (El Heraldo, 2014; Morales, 2015; Revista Semana, 2015a).  
 
But perhaps one of the most important consequences of the three leftwing governments 
was a constantly deteriorating perception of the city. Bogotá had gone from being 
innovative to becoming a chaotic place, even if the government programmes were 
tackling the city’s social problems. And this change was crucial in the relationship 
between the national government and the City of Bogotá. On this topic, Viviana Cañón, 
former Chief Director for Asia, Africa and Eurasia at the Presidential Agency for Co-
operation (APC in Spanish), states: 
 
In Bogotá, there was very little satisfaction with the Mayor and the city administration. 
Everyone in Bogotá felt, first as citizens and then as public officials, that Bogotá was not on 
the right track. Many decisions to offer knowledge from a city are made like that… If there 
is a negative perception of Bogotá, then how can I offer that city? Then, for example, 
Transmilenio: How can I offer that system if my children hate it every day?57 (Translated by 
the author from Cañón, 2015). 
 
                                                 
57 Original text in Spanish: “En Bogotá había una muy poca satisfacción con la alcaldía. Todos en Bogotá 
sentíamos, primero como ciudadanos y después como funcionarios públicos, que Bogotá estaba mal. 
Muchas decisiones se toman así cuando uno ofrece el conocimiento… Si hay una percepción negativa de 
Bogotá, ¿entonces cómo voy a ofrecer yo esa ciudad? Entonces, por ejemplo, Transmilenio: ¿Cómo voy a 
ofrecer yo ese sistema si mis hijos lo odian todos los días? 
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The same perception can be found in all other interviews carried out with national 
government officials in Colombia. All of them agreed that Bogotá had an innovative 
period in which it became a point of reference for other cities not only in the country but 
also in the Global South, and then the innovation stopped. The overall perception is that 
other cities such as Medellín are doing things better and, therefore, they do not feel 
Bogotá is ‘good enough’ to be offered for international co-operation initiatives or as a 
valid counterpart in foreign policy.  
 
Similar shifts in the global profile of the city, in both reality and perception, can also be 
found throughout the history of Johannesburg. Lauren Kruger explains the evolution of 
the city as follows: 
Since its beginnings, 125 years ago, Johannesburg has reinvented itself several times over, 
from the lawless booming mining town in the 1890s to its arriviste self-promotion on the 
occasion of its fiftieth anniversary (and the first Empire Exhibition outside Britain) as 
“Africa’s Wonder City,” to the bastion of apartheid capitalism on the eve of the Soweto 
uprising in the 1970s, to the capital of crime, grime and decline in the 1990s, to the current 
aspiration, heading up the official city web site, to make Johannesburg “a world-class African 
city” (Kruger, 2012, p. 195). 
 
For Johannesburg, the issue of crime is extremely significant as it has affected the city 
image since the end of apartheid. In the words of  Mfaniseni Sihlongonyane, “crime has 
turned the once beautiful Jozi into [an] unfamiliar scary jungle” (Sihlongonyane, 2016, p. 
1610). In fact, crime is what defines Johannesburg in the minds of most locals and visitors 
(Dirsuweit, 2002) and it is present in the works of many academics and policy makers 
studying the city such as Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (2000, 2002), Lipietz (2008), K. 
Harrison (2006), Palmary, Rauch and Simpson (2003), Hungwe (2013) or Morris (1998), 
amongst others. Furthermore, Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall provide two particular 
references to this issue when they discuss Johannesburg: 
 
[T]he legibility of this extraordinary place has been reduced in most recent (and less recent) 
literature to an experience of the pathological and of the abnormal—the “crime city”—is not 
without parallels elsewhere. […] The loathing of Johannesburg in the social sciences should 
be seen as part of an antiurban ideology that has consistently perceived the industrial city, 
in particular, as a cesspool of vice (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, p. 354). 
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[Johannesburg] is an elusive metropolis because either it is denigrated as being a set of ugly 
urban agglomerations, a crime city, or a security-obsessed dystopia, or it is elevated as a 
place of rapacious survival, “making do,” and chance encounters (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, 
p. 367). 
 
Even though the disregard for Bogotá is a lot more noticeable in Colombia than it is for 
Johannesburg in South Africa, perceptions do affect the relationship between foreign 
policy officials at the national level and the cities’ administrations in international 
relations. This dynamic is particularly evident in international co-operation initiatives in 
which the knowledge of cities is needed, as will be explained in the following paragraphs.  
 
When faced with the need to interact with cities, evidence from the interviews shows that 
there is a tendency for national government to work with the cities they perceive not only 
to work better administratively but also cities they think would create a better image of 
the country. Furthermore, it helps when the city administration is more willing to engage 
with the national level, which is not usually the case with big cities like Bogotá or 
Johannesburg.  
 
This tendency is extremely clear within the Colombian government. Viviana Cañón from 
APC argues that the MFA likes to work with what she calls the ‘winning departments 
and cities’ because, that way, they do not take unnecessary risks (Cañón, 2015). She 
continued to state that “At APC, we always had to make the country look good, so we 
avoided Bogotá and worked with Medellín. In the end, we were ‘selling’ the country, we 
need the people who visit us to end up being ambassadors for Colombia”58 (Translated 
by the autor from Cañón, 2015).  
 
Other MFA officials shared Cañón’s views. Sebastián Giraldo, an officer from the South-
South Cooperation desk at the MFA, argues that the interaction with the City of Bogotá 
is not easy. According to him, the advantage held by Medellín lies in the Agencia de 
Cooperación Internacional [Agency for International Co-operation], which centralises all 
interactions with the national government, while in Bogotá, requests from National 
                                                 
58 Original text in Spanish: “En APC siempre teníamos que hacer que el país quedara bien, entonces 
evitábamos Bogotá y trabajábamos con Medellín. Al final uno vende el país. Uno necesita que la gente que 
viene termine siendo embajadores de Colombia”. 
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Government get lost in the bureaucracy and the City does not usually respond. 
Consequently, when South Africa, Ghana and El Salvador requested co-operation on 
mass transport systems in 2014, the MFA referred them to Medellín instead of Bogotá 
(Giraldo, 2015).  
 
In South Africa, this tendency is not so clear but it is nonetheless present. First, as Pretoria 
concentrates all national government agencies including DIRCO, it is only logical that it 
becomes the first choice for foreign affairs meetings and events in the country. And 
second, the fact that other cities such as Durban or Cape Town have engaged in city-
branding initiatives at a global scale means that their city administrations are better 
prepared to co-operate with DIRCO than other municipalities. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, 
Chief Executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), explains: 
 
Certainly, in the case of Durban, the Ethekwini municipality has said that they want to make 
themselves globally recognised as a conferencing centre or a global meeting centre. So, we 
had the Durban Anti-Racism conference. As a sporting centre, they bid for the 
Commonwealth games. Cape Town has done something similar. In Johannesburg, we 
probably have not articulated it as clear as that because there is so much else to Johannesburg 
as well, but clearly that is a dimension (Sidiropoulos, 2016). 
 
In turn, the disposition and willingness of a city to work with national government as 
well as its efficiency have an enormous impact when the MFA or DIRCO need to choose 
local allies for foreign policy and international co-operation initiatives and programmes. 
The main reason for this is that communication with these cities flows better and, 
therefore, the success rate is higher and the image of the country improves in the eyes of 
international partners and allies.  
 
 
9.2. SHIFTING AWAY FROM THE CITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY 
GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
 
Finally, the last reason that explains the legal and operational mismatch between national 
and local governments in foreign policy is the absence of the city in the international 
relations sections of the National Development Plans (NDP) in Colombia and South 
Africa. An analysis of both documents shows that no reference to or consideration of 
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cities is made in Section IX, Objective 6 of the Colombian NDP on “promoting and 
ensuring national interests through foreign policy and international co-operation” 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015a, 2015b) or Section 7 of the South African 
NDP on “positioning South Africa in the world” (National Planning Commission, 2011). 
 
When reading the two NDPs, it becomes evident that the top-down approach in foreign 
policy is not only a problem of the MFA and DIRCO, it is also present in the national 
government as a whole. It is clear in both countries that foreign policy is perceived as a 
national tool for national interests, and therefore, leaves little to no place for cities either 
in the priorities or the implementation of the NDPs.  
 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that cities could be included in the international co-
operation sections as they can be both donors or recipients of good practices. Historically, 
cities of the Global South have been at the recipient end of international co-operation; 
however, with the improving status of Colombia and South Africa as emerging powers, 
this situation has started to change. María Paula Ávila comments on this issue:  
There has been a shift in co-operation because countries no longer see Colombia as an 
underdeveloped or low-income country. We are now a middle-income country. Bogotá is not 
on the international cooperation priorities for local development because, in that sense, other 
African and Asian countries weigh more59 (Translated by the author from Ávila, 2015). 
 
And indeed, this same phenomenon seems to be happening in Johannesburg. According 
to Mokgadi Tena, former Deputy Director of International Development Cooperation at 
the Department of National Treasure in Pretoria,  
 
The city of Johannesburg is a power on its own. The things that the city is doing are much 
bigger than what the country can comprehend. If I am from Limpopo, I do not care about 
green buildings, but in Johannesburg that matters and they can do it. The city runs with the 
concept of being an emerging power because the city on its own is a power (Tena, 2016). 
 
                                                 
59 Original text in Spanish: “Ha habido un cambio en la cooperación porque los países ya no ven a Colombia 
como un país subdesarrollado o de renta baja. Ahora somos un país de renta media. Bogotá no hace parte 
de las prioridades de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo local porque, en ese sentido, pesan más 
otros países africanos y asiáticos”.  
Chapter 9: Beyond the law: The operational and practical national-local disconnection in foreign policy 
 
228 
This would leave these cities, not as recipients of international co-operation, but as 
donors. Cities as tools for national governments to position both Colombia and South 
Africa as emerging powers in the International System through international co-
operation by using the good practices developed and implemented in Bogotá and 
Johannesburg. But again, there is a problem. All interviews conducted in both countries 
showed that the knowledge of Bogotá and Johannesburg has not been included in 
national databases or programmes for international co-operation by either the MFA in 
Colombia (Giraldo, 2015; Durán, 2017) or DIRCO in South Africa (Erasmus, 2016; 
Nacerodien, 2016).  
 
Consequently, cities are mostly ignored due to a shift in both NDPs towards national 
topics in foreign policy priorities: conflict resolution, transitional justice, security, drugs 
and arms control, education and eradication of poverty for the Colombian case 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015a, 2015b) and regional integration, South-
South co-operation, BRICS or human security, amongst others, for South Africa (National 
Planning Commission, 2010). It seems as if the national governments in Colombia and 
South Africa could not – or were not willing to – find a place for cities in foreign affairs. 
It is as if cities were invisible in foreign affairs, not only for the MFA and DIRCO, but also 
for the national planning entities.  
 
There is, however, a shift being signalled by the United Nations in its ‘New Urban 
Agenda’ that calls for close co-operation between national and local governments in the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the achievements 
of the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 11 (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2017). This shift should, at least in theory, have an impact not only on the way 
cities are perceived by national governments as partners in achieving the SDGs, but also 
on the way they are included in the foreign policy priorities of the NDPs. On this topic, 
the United Nations General Assembly states:  
The New Urban Agenda reaffirms our global commitment to sustainable urban development 
as a critical step for realizing sustainable development in an integrated and coordinated 
manner at the global, regional, national, subnational and local levels, with the participation 
of all relevant actors (United Nations General Assembly, 2017, p. 3). 
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9.3. CITIES AS CRUCIAL INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, JUST NOT 
THROUGH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Along with the constitutional and legal ambiguities, the other important reason that 
contributes to the mismatch between national and local governments in foreign policy is 
the recent recognition of cities as key international actors. Historically, Peter Taylor 
considers that “cities are and have always been linked to other cities and other places, 
and this connectivity is not just a feature of present-day conditions, but of millennia of 
geopolitical “tangos” with states, empires and global processes” (as cited in Acuto, 2015, 
p. 3). However, these ‘tangos’ have not been enough for cities to be considered as 
international actors capable of influencing official international policies until recently.  
 
As was explained in previous chapters, the International System has been organised in 
such a way that States are the quintessential actor as they are the only ones capable of 
having sovereignty. For example, the United Nations as the most important international 
organisation does not have just ‘members’ but, instead, it has “193 Member States” 
(United Nations, 2017). The same is true for other regional organisations such as the 
European Union (2017), the African Union (2017), the Organisation of American States 
(2017) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2017), and thus, leaving little or no 
space to other actors in these organisations, at least according to their charters.  
 
But the International System has changed dramatically during the past few decades. 
Cities have gained such international importance that it is impossible for States or 
organisations to ignore them anymore, especially in key topics of the global agenda such 
as urbanisation, climate change or sustainable development. On this topic, Susan Parnell 
explains: 
 
Looking back over the decades of international debate on development priorities shows not 
only that there is now greater acceptance of the importance of defining and agreeing to ‘an 
urban agenda’ but that global policy on urban and regional issues has indeed evolved. There 
is no longer a question of whether cities are important for sustainable development, but 
rather why and how the urban condition affects our common future (Parnell, 2016, p. 529). 
Furthermore, the city’s importance does not only revolve around its role as the economic 
and demographic powerhouse of countries, but also as a complement for the State 
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because it is the only sphere of government that can effectively tackle some of the 
problems dominating the current international agenda and put the objectives for 
sustainable development into practice (Curtis, 2016). In turn, a disconnect between 
national and local governments would have a severe impact in the possibility for States 
to effectively solve many of the urban-related problems. Such disconnection could even 
constitute an obstacle to governability in the country. 
 
But while it is clear that, nowadays, cities and States should be working together, the 
reality is rather different. For example, the City of Bogotá was not invited by the 
Government of Colombia to participate in the preparations for Habitat III in Quito, 
Ecuador. And Bogotá was not alone in this oversight. Michael Müller, Mayor of Berlin, 
complained that “countries are largely agreeing on preparatory work [for Habitat III] 
without the contribution of cities, even though it is the future of cities that is in question. 
This is absurd” (As cited in Curtis, 2016, p. 457). 
 
Following what has just been set out above, States would be responsible for bypassing 
the city in foreign policy issues. However, the causality can also be reverted. After being 
overlooked for decades, cities too have been bypassing the national governments. The 
main consequence has been a proliferation of city associations that provide a platform 
where urban issues can be discussed by city governments with their equals from other 
parts of the world. These groupings have also become the space used by cities to influence 
international, regional and domestic policies and even promote the urban agenda at the 
United Nations and its agencies.  
 
The United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and the C40 Climate Leadership 
Group are two important networks focused on climate change (Curtis, 2016), but the 
topics around which cities mobilise internationally can vary greatly. For example, the 
Mayors for Peace grouping is engaged with disarmament and peacebuilding initiatives, 
while the Healthy Cities Network focuses on health policies (K. Fischer et al., 2015). There 
are also some smaller associations that have a regional or a continental approach to their 
mandate, such as Africities for Africa, BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Government 
Cooperation Forum for the BRICS countries (City of Johannesburg, 2016a; P. Harrison, 
2015) or Mercociudades for South America (Calvento, 2014). 
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During the interviews with national and local government officials in Colombia and 
South Africa, it was apparent that the Cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg favour their 
participation in these associations as a way to overcome the challenges of not being part 
of the official foreign policy of their countries. In the case of Bogotá, María Paula Ávila 
stated: 
 
The foreign relations of Bogotá ignore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are carried out 
within international alliances of cities such as Mercociudades. […] Cities are beginning to 
generate instruments and tools aimed at influencing their local interests on the global agenda 
through associations such as UCLG. Cities are beginning to see that national governments, 
on the one hand, do not represent them and, on the other, those who have the most direct 
contact for solving problems are not national governments but local governments. As a 
result, Bogotá's position in the international system is closely related to this new vision of 
an internationalisation process that encompasses several dimensions, one of which is 
international leadership. Bogotá begins to see how it positions itself in the city networks to 
influence the global agenda, to promote its vision of the city, to understand that the solution 
of local problems transcends both national and local administrative policy frameworks60 
(Translated by the author from Ávila, 2015). 
 
As for the City of Johannesburg, an active participation in city networks is crucial for the 
fulfilment of the objectives identified in the city’s international relations strategy. In fact, 
pillar number 2 of this document prioritised ‘strategic international networks’ with the 
goal of “targeting a shift from ad hoc attendance to the appointment of City leadership 
[…] to positions in key urban, environmental, finance and urban safety networks, to 
influence international dialogues and debates and to build the City’s brand” (City of 
Johannesburg, 2016i, p. 7). Jan Erasmus mentioned Metropolis, the Fonds Mondial de 
                                                 
60 Original text in Spanish: “Las relaciones exteriores de Bogotá ignoran a Cancillería y se realizan en el 
seno de alianzas internacionales de ciudades como Mercociudades. […] Las ciudades empiezan a generar 
instrumentos y herramientas destinados a incidir para que sus intereses locales incidan en la agenda global 
a través de asociaciones como UCLG. Las ciudades están empezando a ver que los gobiernos nacionales 
por un lado no las representan y por otro, quienes tienen el contacto más directo para la resolución de los 
problemas no son los gobiernos nacionales sino el gobierno local. En consecuencia, el posicionamiento de 
Bogotá en el sistema internacional está muy relacionado con esa nueva visión de un proceso de 
internacionalización que abarca varias dimensiones, una de ellas es el liderazgo internacional. Bogotá 
comienza a ver cómo se posiciona en las redes de ciudades para incidir en la agenda global, para 
promocionar su visión de ciudad, para entender que la solución de problemas locales trasciende los marcos 
político administrativos tanto nacionales como locales”. 
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Développement des Villes (FMDV), C4061 and specially UCLG, for which Johannesburg 
proposed its then Mayor, Mpho Parks Tau, as candidate for UCLG presidency in the 
elections held in Bogotá in October 2016 (Erasmus, 2016). He has subsequently been 
elected as UCLG president (UCLG, 2017). On Mr Tau’s possible election, Jan Erasmus 
stated: 
 
If he gets that position, we basically want to transform it to make sure that it is politically 
driven and then also that it meets the needs of the various regions. Up until now, it was ad 
hoc, so it is to ensure that local governments get a voice at the United Nations, that local 
government is recognised as one the most pertinent spheres of governments… and here the 
issue of decentralisation becomes very important. Lack of decentralisation in Latin America, 
Africa, many other places where the Mayor cannot even travel without the minister being 
present. So basically, there is no voice to a Mayor, it is the Minister who needs to tell the 
Mayor what to say (Erasmus, 2016). 
 
In turn, this new role played by cities in the International System, either as individual 
actors or as part of global or regional networks of cities, is undoubtedly changing the 
historic relationship national and local governments have had in terms of foreign policy. 
At the same time, these associations of cities are becoming increasingly important in 
shaping the global agenda as they provide strong platforms for cities to voice their 
concerns and participate in decision-making processes in the international arena. Finally, 
even with the current international status of cities, the governments of Colombia and 
South Africa on one side and Bogotá and Johannesburg on the other do not yet 
understand the importance of working together. It seems as if, for these two countries, 
the global and urban agendas have not found a meeting point and, therefore, there is an 
evident mismatch between the official foreign policy of the State and the international 
engagements of cities.  
 
                                                 
61 In 2014, Johannesburg was the first city from an emerging market (OECD, 2015) and the first within the 
C40 network (C40, 2017) to issue a Green Bond as a way to support social and environmental projects in 
the city (Audouin et al., 2015). As a result, the City of Johannesburg received the C40 Finance & Economic 
Development award in 2015. According to C40, “The Green Bond was a step in the right direction in 
creating funding opportunities to assist the City in preparing and implementing integrated inclusive and 
long-term adaptation strategies [to climate change] designed to reduce vulnerability, thus cementing its 
commitment” (C40, 2015). 
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9.4. THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROJECTION OF CITIES 
 
The ambiguous role national governments can play in the international projection and 
engagements of cities also affects the relationship between the State and the city. Bogotá 
and Johannesburg are strong enough to pursue their international relations on their own; 
however, there comes a point in which even the most important of cities cannot – or does 
not want to – engage in foreign activities on its own. And this is when the ambiguity 
becomes important. Cities abandon their generalised perception of the State as an 
obstacle for their international engagements and shift it to one in which the national 
government acts as a protector for the city in key issues of the international agenda.  
 
There are two main scenarios when this phenomenon occurs. The first one takes place 
when there is a need to organise or participate in special meetings, events or international 
visits. And this scenario is quite clear. It would be impossible for Johannesburg, Cape 
Town or Durban to organise their participation in the FIFA World Cup successfully 
without the support of the national government in Pretoria (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
2011). Also, the organisation of important international meetings, such as the 2001 World 
Conference against Racism in Durban, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg or the 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference 
in Durban, require a high degree of coordination between DIRCO in Pretoria and the host 
cities (Nacerodien, 2016).  
 
Although Colombia has not hosted global events of such magnitude, two examples can 
be used at this point. One is the collaboration between the City of Medellín, the MFA and 
UN-Habitat in organising the 2014 World Urban Forum in Medellín (Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores, 2014a). The other is even more revealing. Bogotá was chosen to 
host the UCLG world meeting under Mayor Gustavo Petro; however, the event took 
place after Mayor Enrique Peñalosa had assumed office. Initially, the City of Bogotá 
refused to work with the MFA in the organisation of the meeting (Falla, 2015; Ávila, 2015) 
but when the Peñalosa administration came to power, only 10% of the preparations were 
completed. At this point, the city called on the MFA and the Colombian embassies around 
the world to be able to finalise the preparations between February and October 2016 
(Currea, 2016).  
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The second scenario deals with matters under the jurisdiction of the national government 
that have a direct impact on cities, such as economic and commercial policy, national 
security, international migration or internally displaced persons. In all these topics, it is 
the national government that is responsible for defending its cities (J. Julio, personal 
communication, August 20, 2015). International migration is probably one of the most 
visible examples as Bogotá and Johannesburg have both become a preferred destination 
for regular and irregular migrants. In fact, the political and economic crises particularly 
in Venezuela and Zimbabwe have brought hundreds of thousands of migrants to Bogotá 
and Johannesburg respectively in search for a better future (El Tiempo, 2016e; Hungwe, 
2013; Revista Semana, 2016a).  
 
In Colombia, there have been many coordination meetings between the City of Bogotá, 
the MFA and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to discuss ways in which all 
involved parties can better handle the influx of migrants not only to Bogotá, but also to 
other Colombian cities such as Cúcuta, Barranquilla, Cartagena or Arauca (Durán, 2017; 
Ávila, 2015). Something similar happens in South Africa where “in terms of illegal 
migration, there is constant conversation between national and city governments, but the 
topic of migration does not fall under DIRCO but Home Affairs. But since our missions 
are involved, DIRCO is obviously part of that” (Nacerodien, 2016). 
 
But other situations also require the national government to protect its cities beyond the 
allocation of specific power functions and resources. For example, Johannesburg is the 
largest city in the world that is not built on the sea, a lake or a river (Nacerodien, 2016). 
Consequently, efforts had to be made by both the national and local governments to 
ensure a continuous water supply for the growing city. Since there was no water available 
in the surrounding areas, the Government of South Africa worked together with the 
Government of Lesotho on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which 
provides water to the whole of the Witwatersrand region where Johannesburg is located 
(Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, 2008). In turn, a local matter such as the 
provision of water as a public service became a foreign policy issue in which the City of 
Johannesburg and the Gauteng City Region participate actively (Nacerodien, 2016). 
 
The final situation shows cities pursuing their own international engagements by 
themselves as national governments are often perceived as obstacles. However, when the 
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need arises and they realise they are not capable of satisfying their city interests on their 
own, national governments can offer a safety net. Two additional issues need to be 
explained at this point. First, section 9.4. shows how, in practice, there is a clear limit to 
the international capacities of cities. They are effectively autonomous to engage in 
international relations but, at the end, there are certain topics that force them to work 
with national governments as their own capabilities are clearly restricted. This, in turn, 
means that even with their increasing importance in the world, something that has not 
changed is the fact that cities are still playing in a State-centred International System. 
 
And second, the interviews show that there does not seem to be a perception of 
partnership between national and local governments. The cities’ perceptions of the State 
range from being an obstacle to being a protector, but the word ‘partner’ does not appear 
in the vocabulary of the interviewees. It seems as if it is a confrontational relationship, 
one that cannot be defined in terms of willing collaboration. Bogotá and Colombia and 
Johannesburg and South Africa work together reluctantly, as if they were forced either 
by law or by particular circumstances. And although it is more evident in the Colombian 
case in which the City of Bogotá is mostly not willing to work with the national 
government and vice versa, in South Africa it is usually a matter of lack of coordination 
and initiative on both parts.  
 
 
9.5. LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLICIES AT THE CITY LEVEL 
 
The ways in which Bogotá and Johannesburg have modified their administrative 
structures to create their own international relations offices for coordinating and 
implementing the cities’ foreign engagements have already been discussed in Section 8.1. 
However, at least in theory, these engagements should respond to a clear mandate from 
the local administration aimed at satisfying the city’s interests in the world. In other 
words, they should be long-term city interests, not short-term mayoral interests. And this 
is crucial because a lack of continuity in the city’s international relations strategy would 
pose a challenge for the ability of successive local governments to successfully satisfy 
those city interests. 
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The experience of Bogotá on this topic is clearly more chaotic than that of Johannesburg. 
In Bogotá, there is a tendency for each new Mayor to change the structure of the city 
administration to match his own vision of the city and, with that, his international 
relations priorities change as well. The functions granted to the Dirección Distrital de 
Relaciones Internacionales [District Directorate for International Relations] during the 
governments of Moreno, Petro and Peñalosa through Decrees 163 of 2008 (Alcaldía 
Mayor de Bogotá, 2008), 77 of 2012 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2012b) and 425 of 2016 
(Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2016a) differ greatly from one another. For example, while 
for Mayor Petro, the directorate’s mandate did not include a coordination with the MFA, 
for Mayor Peñalosa, this coordination was one of the key pillars.  
 
But it is not only a legal matter. All officials interviewed at the City of Bogotá, the MFA 
and APC agreed, stating that people at the District Directorate for International Relations 
change constantly, and thus it is extremely difficult to coordinate actions between the 
three entities. Furthermore, this is a major problem for the city itself. Natalia Currea 
argued that the first six months are particularly complicated as they are still working with 
the previous development plan and they need to write a new one, so not much gets to be 
done in terms of international relations. Also, she pointed out that each administration 
comes with its own – usually untrained – people, its own priorities and its own interests 
and this usually translates in halting most of the previous programmes and starting new 
ones (Currea, 2016). 
 
On this same topic, Sebastián Giraldo from the MFA went further and explained the 
difference between Bogotá and Medellín. He argued that, while in Bogotá the constant 
reshuffle of people and interests in the Directorate for International Relations makes it 
difficult to create a working interaction, in Medellín the ACI has managed to keep a clear 
continuity between Mayors, making it a lot easier to work with them. This issue has a 
direct relation with the politics of political parties and the politics of people, which will 
be further discussed in section 9.6. 
 
The situation in Johannesburg is quite different as the ANC has managed to have a 
continuity in the city’s international relations policies. However, after the local elections 
in August 2016 in South Africa, the Democratic Alliance (DA) came to power in 
Johannesburg in a coalition with other smaller parties and this continuity was put at 
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stake. During the interview with Jan Erasmus in June 2016, he mentioned that the 
international relations strategy for the City of Johannesburg should be approved in the 
following weeks. After contacting him again in August 2016, he declared that a new DA 
Mayor, Herman Mashaba had just been elected and the city now has a loose coalition 
government in power. Consequently, the new international relations strategy now 
needed to be approved by the incoming political body and he was not sure how it would 
be received (Erasmus, 2016). 
 
For now, the new government in Johannesburg approved the international relations 
strategy (City of Johannesburg, 2016i), but it is unclear if the continuity will be guaranteed 
in the future as the ANC has lost significant support not only in the city but also in other 
metros in the Gauteng Province and throughout South Africa. Bogotá, on the other hand, 
has a long way to go in articulating a true city policy that does not change with every 
Mayor. Only then will the international objectives of the city be achieved.  
 
 
9.6. THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE POLITICS OF 
PEOPLE 
 
The last reason explaining the mismatch between national and local governments in 
foreign policy is directly related to who is in power in both the State and the city, and 
how they interact with each other. This issue can be broken down in two parts: the politics 
of political parties and the politics of people, even if most of the time, they are closely 
related. 
 
Evidence from the interviews in Colombia and South Africa shows that the political 
systems of these two countries are permeated by the dynamics and confrontations 
between political parties. In other words, if the same party – or a political ally – is in 
power both at the national and local levels, co-operation between the two spheres will be 
greater than if different opposing parties are in power. For Bogotá, Ernesto Falla, former 
Director of the District Directorate for International Relations at the City of Bogotá made 
it clear when he stated that  
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In Colombia, if you are not from my own party, you are my enemy. It is much easier for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to talk to Aníbal Gaviria [the Mayor of Medellín] than to talk to 
Petro. Even if we agree on the essentials (climate change, security, right to the city, 
sustainable urbanism), the fact that there are different parties in power makes it difficult or 
eliminates the possibilities of dialogue with the national government62 (Translated by the 
author from Falla, 2015). 
 
Natalia Currea went further and characterised the distance between the left in Bogotá 
under Mayor Gustavo Petro and the right in the national government as “unintelligent 
and very unprofessional” (Currea, 2016). She emphasised that it seemed as if there was 
an explicit order from the Mayor’s office to work internationally without the MFA or APC 
as he had a clear political project that differed greatly from that of the national 
government. The same problems were highlighted in interviews with Flor Ángela Durán 
(2017), Sebastián Giraldo (2015) and María Paula Ávila (2015). 
 
However, as soon as Petro left the office, local and national spheres of government started 
talking almost immediately, thereby proving the highly politicised nature of the 
relationship between Bogotá and the MFA. Again, according to Natalia Currea, 
Bogotá was disconnected from the public entities in charge of international cooperation and 
international relations in the country. I do not know how much you want to describe the 
issue of political inclination, but there was a disconnection with APC and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Ever since Peñalosa came to power, APC and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs insistently sought Bogotá because it is definitely a city of capital importance for these 
entities. Not only because of its size but because it is able to leverage processes in the rest of 
the country and generate good practices for the rest of the country 63 (Translated by the 
author from Currea, 2016). 
 
                                                 
62 Original text in Spanish: “En Colombia, si no eres de mi mismo partido, eres mi enemigo. Es mucho mejor 
para Cancillería hablar con Aníbal Gaviria que hablar con Petro. Así estemos de acuerdo en lo esencial (en 
cambio climático, seguridad, derecho a la ciudad, urbanismo sustentable), el hecho de que haya diferentes 
partidos en el poder dificulta o elimina las posibilidades de diálogo con el gobierno nacional”. 
63 Original text in  Spanish: “Bogotá venía desconectada de las entidades públicas que tienen al frente la 
cooperación internacional y las relaciones internacionales del país. No sé qué tanto quieras describir el tema 
de inclinación política pero sí había una desconexión con APC y con cancillería. Desde que llegó Peñalosa, 
APC y Cancillería buscaron insistentemente a Bogotá para tener ese acercamiento porque definitivamente 
es una ciudad de importancia mayúscula para estas entidades. No sólo por su tamaño sino porque es capaz 
de apalancar procesos en el resto del país y generar buenas prácticas para el resto del país”. 
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The South African case shows the other side of the story. When national and local 
governments come from the same party, there seems to be more willingness to 
collaborate and support the city in its international engagements. However, being part of 
the same party does not guarantee a totally smooth relationship between the two spheres 
of government, as explained by Jan Erasmus from the City of Johannesburg: 
 
When it was agreed that the Mayor will avail himself as a candidate for the presidency of 
UCLG, obviously he needs to get the support of the party and also the official structures. His 
candidacy was endorsed by the party, the ANC, and it was endorsed by SALGA. The one 
missing meeting is the one with DIRCO although they should know already because of all 
the lobbying meetings we’ve had. What makes the meeting difficult is because of all the 
divisions within the party because the Mayor is not the direct voice of current activities 
although he’s a staunch party member. The party’s endorsement is important because it’s 
before the local government elections. If you nominate someone as UCLG president and they 
say they’re going to deploy someone else as Mayor of Johannesburg, it can become a very 
embarrassing situation for the country (Erasmus, 2016).  
 
Aside from political parties, the Mayor himself can also have an outstanding impact in 
the international relations of his city and the relationship with national government in 
foreign policy. On this issue, Bogotá provides two examples that cannot be found in 
Johannesburg. First, the personality and particular beliefs of a Mayor can be included at 
the core of a city’s international engagements. Being a demobilised guerrilla member, 
Gustavo Petro disagreed with the Federación Latinoamericana de Ciudades, Municipios 
y Asociaciones de Gobiernos Locales [Latin American Federation of Cities, Municipalities 
and Municipal Associations] (FLACMA), the regional branch of UCLG for Latin America, 
and created the RedCisur, a network of South American cities organised around the logic 
of leftist governments. At the end of Petro’s term, this network had not shown any results 
and the new Peñalosa government simply dissolved it (Currea, 2016). Along the same 
lines, Petro also blocked the city’s participation in the Compact of Mayors as he 
considered it to be “owned by the yankees” (Currea, 2016). As it would be expected, all 
the previous measures had an important impact in the willingness of the national 
government to work with Bogotá in foreign policy. 
 
And second, the ‘cult’ of the Mayor also plays a key role in the international projection of 
the city. Even with his current very low popularity ratings in Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa 
was responsible for many of the positive changes in the city during his previous 
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administration (Bassett & Marpillero-Colomina, 2013; Crawford, 2009; Fisman & Werker, 
2011; Sustainable Cities Collective, 2014). Consequently, he is perceived as a worldwide 
authority in solving the problems of cities in the Global South. Ernesto Falla (2015), María 
Paula Ávila (2015) and Natalia Currea (2016) all agreed in recognising Peñalosa as an 
urban ‘rock star’ and that is why many cities are currently contacting Bogotá again for 
South-South co-operation projects. This, in turn, shows that a city can become a point of 
reference in the world when the Mayor’s profile is internationally recognised. An adverse 
effect can also be present as his high profile may lead him to conduct the City’s foreign 
engagements with disregard for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
In the South African case, the Mayors’ profiles have affected foreign policy and the 
international engagements of provincial and local governments in a different way, 
mainly in the continuity of policies. Fadl Nacerodien from DIRCO gave an example when 
he discussed the signing of memoranda of understanding (MoU) between South African 
and foreign regional and local governments: 
 
We have placed a moratorium on signing new MoUs because what we found was that 
Mayors were keen to go and travel overseas, sign an MoU with another city and then a new 
Mayor comes and says: it wasn’t my legacy, I want to sign it with another city and so these 
things pile up but they mean nothing. We put a moratorium on that and said let’s reflect on 
that so that at the city level, at the provincial level, we take a national approach on what is 
the competitive and comparative advantage of that province or that city and who should then 
logically therefore be twinned with and if the motivation is strong enough, we know that the 
agreement will outlast the Mayor or the premier (Nacerodien, 2016). 
9.7. CONCLUSION 
While Chapter 8 focused on the legal framework, Chapter 9 demonstrates that the 
mismatch is more complex as other reasons also contribute to prevent national and local 
governments from co-operating in foreign policy. Negative perceptions of emerging 
cities such as Bogotá or Johannesburg portrayed by the media and politicians usually 
focus on problems and not solutions, and thus affect greatly the willingness of the State 
to work with city administrations. Also, a preference for smaller cities that are perceived 
to work better, a shift away from the city in the international priorities of the National 
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Development Plans or the tensions between political parties or politicians at both spheres 
of government all come together to deepen the national-local disconnection in foreign 
policy.   
 
Yet even if there is a clear tendency for national and local governments to act on their 
own internationally, evidence shows that cities have limits as to how far they can go in 
their foreign engagements and, at that point, they appeal to the State for assistance and 
protection. Consequently, as demonstrated in the cases of Bogotá and Johannesburg, two 
particular scenarios fall under this category. First is the organisation of international 
events and conferences; and second, matters under the jurisdiction of the national 
government, especially economic and commercial policy, national security, international 
migration or internally displaced persons. 
 
It must be highlighted, however, that this co-operation between national and local 
governments in foreign policy does not seem to occur voluntarily. The State largely 
ignores the city in its international relations engagements and only looks down to the 
local level when forced either by topics that can only be resolved by national government 
or when cities request the support of the State. Once more, this reinforces the idea that 
the way in which decentralisation has been implemented in Colombia and South Africa 
does not facilitate a dialogue between the national and the local levels in foreign policy, 
mainly because of the legal and operational difficulties explained in Chapters 8 and 9.  
 
To conclude, given the fact that they are so closely linked together, logic dictates that 
cities and States should work together to advance the national interest internationally 
through foreign policy. However, due to the eight reasons explained in the last two 
chapters, national and local governments in Colombia and South Africa face a legal and 
operational disconnection that portrays the other as an obstacle and not as an ally. This, 
in turn, has an impact on the implementation of the constitutional mandate which states 
that, under the decentralisation framework, the relationship between the different 






The world is currently experiencing a very significant power shift. The influence of 
traditional superpowers such as the United States, the United Kingdom or France in the 
International System is declining – even if it is a relative decline. At the same time, new 
countries from the Global South are rapidly emerging, playing a stronger and more 
visible role in global politics and economics. Beyond the increasing importance of Russia, 
China or India, other smaller nations are following a path of increasing global 
prominence and influence and, while their limited capabilities do not allow them to 
become superpowers, they are individually and collectively altering the power dynamics 
in the world.  
 
The realignment of the hierarchy and distribution of power between States is not the only 
significant shift of the early twenty first century. Cities are also becoming key players in 
the International System. Increasing population and urbanisation trends translate into 
cities growing faster and larger than before, concentrating more power as their share of 
the national GDP grows. New centres of urban wealth and power are more obvious in 
countries of the Global South, where urbanisation and economic growth is fastest. 
Consequently, the cities of emerging powers appear as increasingly important sites, not 
only for national political action, but also of global dialogue.  
 
The thesis has demonstrated that the global realignment of power means that there is a 
need to reassess how the International System operates and which countries are currently 
driving the shifting global dynamics of power. Alongside the growing importance of 
emerging powers in this process, the general increase in attention to the question of cities 
makes understanding their position and function in the recalibration of the international 
context crucial. The nature of the relationship between these two trajectories, of a 
southernward tilt in the International System and the increasingly urban character of 
global deliberation, is poorly understood. Examining this relationship formed the 
foundations of this thesis.  
 
When trying to analyse the emergence of countries and cities in the International System 
as a composite, this thesis found that there is a disconnect that precludes city-national 
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trajectories from aligning at the global scale. This disconnect originates in a clear 
dominance of the State in international politics and the inability of the urban and global 
leadership to address the domestic institutional reform that would allow both spheres of 
government to co-operate in a country’s emergence strategy. These problems appear to 
be more serious in emerging powers where cities are stronger and de facto play a critical 
role in their countries’ emergence in the world but weak institutional frameworks of 
devolution mitigate against cities acting effectively beyond their territories.  
 
Given the increasing concern in the International System to ensure greater subnational 
engagement with global commitments such as the SDGs or agreements on climate 
change, urban development or disaster risk, the inability to maximise local–national 
collaboration to harness global processes is serious. Understanding the barriers to 
improved city-national collaboration is imperative, not just streamlining individual 
countries’ international relations operations, but also facilitating and maximising local 
(city) engagements and leadership around global challenges. The exploration of the 
interactions of local and national actors using the Bogotá and Colombia, and 
Johannesburg and South Africa cases reveals critical explanations for why current 
configurations of international relations are city-blind and outmoded given the realities 
of current global political practices and future multilateral demands. 
 
 
10.1. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMING OF THE CITY ON THE NATIONAL 
AND GLOBAL NEXUS 
The thesis set out to assess the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers of 
the Global South. To achieve this objective, a geopolitical analysis of both emerging 
countries and cities was provided. The starting point was to assume that cities play a 
pivotal role in the making and consolidation of emerging powers of the Global South in 
the International System, ascertaining how this catalytic action was conceptualised and 
operationalised in the specific contexts of Bogotá and Colombia and Johannesburg and 
South Africa. 
 
The study focus on the international dimension of the city-State relationship is not well 
defined in any disciplinary tradition and so the paucity of material on the topics 
Chapter 10: Conclusions 
 
244 
necessitated an interdisciplinary approach to forge a new perspective by deriving 
theoretical ideas from diverse traditions. Concepts that illuminate the city-State nexus 
were identified by engaging mainly with the International Relations and Urban Studies 
scholarships. At some points during the thesis, contributions from Political Science and 
Economics were brought into the discussion, specifically to understand the State and its 
power resources. While it was possible to draw ideas and concepts of use from 
fragmented secondary theoretical literatures, the overall lacunae in work on the problem 
of cities in the rise of emerging powers was evident, as was the overall spatial mismatch 
of theoretical approaches. First, the International Relations field is almost entirely State-
centred and leaves almost no place for the city in its analyses. And second, Urban Studies 
understands the city as an actor that is powerful enough to act on its own in the 
International System, even to shape global change, but has not hitherto addressed the 
question of how cities engage the international aspirations of nations through the vehicle 
of foreign affairs, the de jure mode through which global engagements are structured. 
Further insight into the rigidity and incompatibility of the conceptual and operational 
terrain of the city-national nexus was revealed through the detailed review of both 
English and Spanish literature that showed that, across linguistic traditions, these are two 
self-absorbed disciplines that rarely communicate with each other demonstrating that the 
city and the State are rarely seen as linked.  
 
Located at the interface between two bodies of academic communities of practice, the 
thesis brought an interdisciplinary approach to the topic and highlighted the imperative 
of approaching complex problems from diverse starting points, least the issues of how 
cities engage in international relations and how States draw in their major urban centres 
be further ignored. From this cross disciplinary reading, it was possible to demonstrate 
that cities are a crucial component of the power resources of emerging powers, but since 
there is no dialogue between disciplines, the relationship between cities and States in 
foreign policy has not been conceptualised in the scholarship. The literature on city-
national interactions is structured in a dissonant way that leaves an intellectual gap, 
which then, is mirrored in the operational gap found in the cases of Bogotá and Colombia 
and Johannesburg and South Africa. Failure to confront the interdisciplinary disconnect 
leaves a fragmented base for rethinking the imperative of bridging the city-national nexus 
at a time when it is clear, especially for emerging powers, that cities are critical drivers of 
global profile and power.  
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The thesis makes a particular contribution by drawing together and translating across 
languages. Further nuanced insight into the under-researched terrain of cities in 
emerging powers came from invoking multilingualism and including different linguistic 
sources, cultures and practices. Reading beyond the Anglo literature that dominates 
Urban Studies, the thesis was able to engage in a comprehensive analysis of the literature 
that combined the geographical and theoretical Anglo-Western tradition with sources 
and authors from the Global South. This allowed access to a large scholarship in Spanish 
and Portuguese, and to a lesser extent, French and German that is usually overlooked in 
English language studies. The value of the multilingual approach is that it puts the 
different linguistic traditions into dialogue and this juxtaposition catalyses new 
perspectives on the city-national nexus. 
 
The value of the multilingual approach was found primarily in the works of Pastrana 
Buelvas et al. and their metrics on how to measure emerging powers. By conducting an 
analysis that is scarce in the English literature, these Latin American scholars were able 
to fill a gap that was fundamental for the development of this study. Including different 
linguistic sources also helped in identifying the different handling of concepts in Spanish 
and English throughout the thesis. For example, a concept like ‘international insertion’ 
that is widely used in Spanish, is quite absent in the English literature. And that was not 
the only case. A joint engagement with the scholarship from various regions and in 
different languages allowed for a better complementarity between the concepts and 
definitions found in each one of them. 
 
Apart from the interdisciplinarity and multilingualism, this was also a multi-scalar study 
as it deals with both the State and the city. This thesis was not concerned about the debate 
around city rankings or how the Northern city is usually perceived as ahead of the 
Southern city. Instead, this research was interested in the role of two important cities from 
the Global South (Bogotá and Johannesburg) within their own countries (Colombia and 
South Africa) and as part of their nations’ emerging strategy in the International System. 
In other words, ultimately, the object of study was not the city itself but the State in the 
world through a multi-scalar approach aimed at understanding how much the city is a 
causal mechanism of change in the shifting global relations of nations. 
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Ultimately, the methodological findings of this thesis emerge from the fact that the object 
of study, the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers, is one that cannot be 
easily positioned in an existing debate, but, instead, is located in the new interface 
between International Relations and Urban Studies. In turn, part of the contribution of 
the thesis was to generate a theoretical framework out of fragmented sets of ideas that 
allowed not only to understand that gap between disciplines, but also to produce the 
methods and assert the use of literatures across linguistic barriers as necessary points of 
departure for research on the city-State nexus. Using this approach to explore the 
Bogotá/Colombia and Johannesburg/South Africa cases proved highly generative.  
 
 
10.2. SUBSTANTIAL FINDINGS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CITY AND THE STATE IN THE 
FOREIGN POLICY OF EMERGING POWERS 
 
In order to come to terms on the particularities of the power realignment in the world, a 
deeper look at the current International System was needed. Three interconnected 
dynamics were identified in the thesis. First, the growing importance of cities has turned 
them into crucial actors that challenge the traditional organisation of the International 
System. Second, even with an increasing importance of cities, the system is still centred 
in the State as the lone sovereign actor and, therefore, the only one capable of engaging 
in foreign policy. And third, the emergence of the Global South is challenging the abyssal 
way in which the world was organised by giving a voice to new countries and cities in 
the international arena. In turn, reality shows that while it is true that cities are becoming 
increasingly important international actors, it is also true that States are not becoming 
decreasingly important in foreign affairs. It is not one or the other, it is both at the same 
time.  
 
Even without the issue of how cities are positioned in international affairs, the thesis 
found the existing literature on emerging powers lacking in some particular respects. 
While it engages in a thorough analysis of regional powers and superpowers, there is no 
clarity as to what constitutes or how to measure other categories within the international 
hierarchy such as ‘emerging powers’, ‘middle powers’ or ‘secondary powers’. The result 
is that this multiplicity of terms darkens the debate more than it illuminates it. In order 
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to solve this problem, a combination of the works of Nolte and Pastrana Buelvas et al. 
provided a useful framework to deal with the absence of information on measuring 
emerging powers, not just as originally intended by them at the national scale, but also, 
as shown in this thesis, in relation to the role of the city in the State.  
 
The joint application of the three variables provided by Nolte – power resources, 
leadership and international recognition – and the five dimensions of power resources 
proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al. – territorial, demographic, economic, socio-economic 
and military – demonstrated that it is possible to engage with the categories of power 
meaningfully across scales. It allowed to engage in a first attempt at putting metrics into 
the analysis not only of emerging powers, but also of their cities. By doing this, the thesis 
was able to apply a geopolitical analysis – which is usually applied only to States – to the 
cities in an effort to examine the real power and influence of the urban in their nations’ 
emerging process.  
 
The discussion at this point highlighted the need to assess the issue of how countries 
become emerging powers in the International System – which, as was demonstrated, is 
dealt with in a very superficial way in the literature. The thesis reveals that, when 
exploring the shifting balance of global power, it is imperative to acknowledge the 
importance of large cities for these emerging powers’ trajectories. Consequently, given 
the outstanding importance of Bogotá and Johannesburg, this study used the cases of 
Colombia and South Africa to demonstrate that it is much more helpful to discuss the 
process of international emergence of countries in ways which recognise the crucial 
importance of cities in the shifting international status of the nations in which they are 
located. The two cases showed evidence that while the International System is State-
centric, the countries’ emergence, elevation and persistence in international profile are 
actually quite city-centric.  
 
The analysis of the two case studies for Colombia and South Africa also showed that both 
countries have the power resources, leadership and international recognition to be 
considered emerging powers and that their cities have played a fundamental role in their 
emergence. In other words, both the State and its cities – especially the largest ones – are 
drivers of the global reorganisation of power. Nonetheless, Colombia and South Africa 
also demonstrated that the path to becoming an emerging power is not the same for every 
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country. While the five dimensions of power resources are present in every case, they do 
not weight the same or are used in the same way by different nations. Also, the process 
of emerging is highly influenced by historic, political, demographic and even military 
particularities. Consequently, when looking at the power resources, leadership and 
international recognition as a composite, the result for each country will be radically 
different even when the destination as ‘emerging power’ is the same. There is no single 
route to emerging powership and thus, no simplistic understanding of how cities may be 
a more overt part of an emergent global transition.  
 
In this regard, this study showed that Colombia was in fact initially quite slow in 
becoming an emerging power. The armed conflict, a very shy and limited foreign policy 
and a very negative international image had significantly influenced the country’s ability 
to emerge in the past. It was only in the last decade that political and economic 
circumstances in Colombia allowed it to effectively use its power resources and its foreign 
policy to consolidate and accelerate its journey towards becoming an emerging power. 
For that, the peace agreement with the FARC has up to now played a crucial role.  
 
As for South Africa, its democratic transition, its power resources, the highly positive 
international perception of the country after 1994 and its relative strength compared to 
other Sub-Saharan African nations came together to grant the country an almost 
immediate status as an African emerging power in the world. For the government in 
Pretoria, it has been not so much about becoming but about maintaining the status. South 
Africa was, in turn, faster and more effective than Colombia in taking advantage of its 
international standing and domestic strength – highly determined by the power 
resources and recognition of Johannesburg – to position itself in the world. The problem 
nowadays, regardless of what happens in Johannesburg, is how to maintain the emerging 
power status while the country’s general power resources suffer some considerable draw 
backs. 
 
Colombia and South Africa also gave evidence of two parallel unconnected emergence 
processes for the national and the local. The two countries are gaining importance in the 
world and they do so by using their official foreign policy. At the same time, this study 
showed that Southern cities such as Bogotá and Johannesburg are particularly important 
as they are consolidating themselves not only as their countries’ powerhouses 
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respectively, but also as important actors from the Global South in the world-wide 
network of cities. The problem, however, is that even if these two processes occur at the 
same time and in the same direction, there is no coordination between national and city 
governments. Again, the nation’s emergence is city-blind and the city’s emergence is 
State-blind.  
 
The gap relating to the framing of the city-national nexus previously identified in the 
literature became evident in practice for both Colombia and South Africa. Consequently, 
the thesis inquired about how Bogotá and Johannesburg operationalise their importance 
through the official foreign policy tools and instruments. In other words, by probing the 
role of these cities in the official foreign policy of Colombia and South Africa as emerging 
powers from the Global South, it was possible to demonstrate that there is a clear 
mismatch between local and national governments in foreign policy, and this claim is 
supported by eight reasons, ranging from the constitutional and legal framework to the 
operational and practical scope. Out of all the reasons identified and explored in the case 
studies, three of them stood out as being crucial determinants of the mismatch between 
national and city interactions on global platforms.  
 
First, the Constitutional and legal ambiguities on decentralisation and foreign policy 
found in Colombia and South Africa make it extremely difficult to determine the how far 
sub-national entities can go in their international engagements. Furthermore, given the 
limits posed on the international activities of sub-national governments by the 
Constitutions of Colombia and South Africa, the thesis was able to determine that most 
of the international engagements of cities in both countries appear to be illegal. They are 
happening and they will continue to happen, but will do so outside of the law, the design 
of the State architecture and, by implication, outside of the foreign policy mandate and 
institutions. 
 
Second, the State-centred approach to foreign policy in both countries contributes greatly 
to a hierarchy in which national governments generally disregard the city in the foreign 
relations of Colombia and South Africa. Consequently, the role of cities in the 
international projection of their countries is quite constrained because the system is still 
focused on the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty in which only States are 
capable of engaging with foreign actors. In turn, foreign policy is perceived as an 
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exclusive domain of the State, not the city. The spill over of this configuration of cities 
and countries for the International System, where States, not cities, are the responsible 
parties, cannot be underestimated.  
 
Finally, in the absence of an effective, legitimate and legible city-national nexus that 
allows simultaneous global interactions of cities and States, ad hoc processes have 
emerged that put cities, especially those in emerging powers, into forums of global 
dialogue. The thesis revealed the increased importance of the city in the global agenda 
and the proliferation of international associations of cities provide emerging cities such 
as Bogotá or Johannesburg with an alternative space in which they can defend their own 
city interests without the help of the national governments. In the context of the Global 
South, this thesis demonstrated that cities are particularly important as their actions and 
international engagements usually have an outstanding impact in their countries’ overall 
global standing. However, because cities are not being included in the official foreign 
policy of the State, the international associations of cities and the global urban agenda 
have become the natural – but parallel – space in which cities can engage with foreign 
actors and emerge as major actors not only in a regional context, but also globally.  
 
Apart from the three previous reasons, other serious constraints have affected the ability 
to operationalise more effectively the city–national interface and the urban innovation in 
foreign policy. Amongst them, this thesis identified the following five: 1) a clear 
mismatch between the reality of the city and the perception national governments have 
of it, mainly because of political or mediatic manipulation of public opinion; 2) a 
generalised disregard for the city in the foreign policy guidelines of the National 
Development Plans in both Colombia and South Africa; 3) a conflicting and ambiguous 
approach to foreign policy topics in which, depending on the issue at hand, the State can 
be seen as both a protector or an obstacle in the satisfaction of the city’s international 
interests; 4) The continuous change of city officials usually translates in a lack of 
institutional continuity of international policies at the city level; and finally, 5) the 
political orientation and ideas of the parties and people in power both at local and 
national level can foster or block co-operation between both spheres of government in 
foreign policy. 
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While the reasons related to the constitutional and legal framework appear to be 
dominant explanations for the city-national international relations mismatch, the 
apparently less important formal and informal operational and practical edges are also 
crucial. In fact, this thesis was able to demonstrate through the case studies of Colombia 
and South Africa that the mismatch is not the fault of any of these reasons on their own 
as most of them would be manageable by the State and/or the city. However, when these 
reasons start to appear at the same time and complement each other in such a way that 
they form a composite, that is when the mismatch occurs and thus, creates a rupture 
between the local and national spheres in foreign policy. 
 
The particular dynamics found in Colombia and South Africa also demonstrated that 
there is a clear tension between the local and the national because it is not as simple as 
saying that States must make a place for cities in their internal procedures regarding 
foreign policy. Undoubtedly, Colombia and South Africa ought to pay more attention to 
what they do with cities and they must include them in their foreign policy systems and 
strategies. However, the analyses of Bogotá and Johannesburg show that cities of the 
Global South are actually engaging in city-to-city relations and that is not going to stop, 
even if they are included as an important actor in the official foreign policy of the State. 
Institutional reform thus needs to account for the evolution of de facto as well as de jure 
changes in the city-State global nexus. 
 
Reconfiguring the link between cities and States in a shifting global power regime is not 
without tensions. The previous paragraph brings the discussion to two issues that can 
potentially go in different directions. On the one hand, national governments need to 
make sure cities have a voice in the International System because they are already 
engaging with foreign same-level counterparts as a way to achieve their own interests, 
and they will continue to do so. On the other hand, in order to address the eight reasons 
explaining the city-national mismatch in foreign policy, changes need to be made at the 
domestic level, both in national and local governments, in order to accomplish 
functioning levels of understanding and co-operation between the city and the State. 
Again, it is not only about granting the city a voice in the world, it is also – and as 
important – to grant the city a voice within the official foreign policy mechanisms of the 
State.  
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Including cities in the official foreign policy of the State does not necessarily mean that 
they will achieve more on the path to becoming emerging powers. This thesis does not 
suggest that by coupling city and State, they will necessarily work better. It could be that, 
by working together, they actually slow each other down. Under the current 
circumstances, the cases of Colombia and South Africa show that they are bound only by 
the speed of the nation which is the actor dictating the emerging strategy. However, if 
city and State are coupled in a better way, a working interaction between them can be 
developed and, in turn, accelerate the speed at which they both emerge, this time as a 
composite.  
 
The hierarchy in which national governments dominate sub-national entities in foreign 
policy and the tensions of the de facto practices in both Colombia and South Africa 
translate in an unresolved national-local relationship. The terms in which States and cities 
should interact in the design and implementation of foreign policy are not currently clear 
and, given the rising importance of cities, it seems as if the relationship is only getting 
more complicated and, at times, contradictory. The tensions between both spheres of 
government are long-term and, by nature, fluid and difficult at the same time. The 
ambition of the multilateral system is that this all be resolved; however, the disposition 
of how to resolve it varies from case to case. What is clear is that, even when international 
organisations are calling national and local governments to work together, both States 
and cities are not willing to give up the spaces they already hold in the International 
System. Again, even if cities are becoming increasingly important, States are not 
becoming decreasingly important, at least when it comes to foreign policy, and, with that, 
the relationship between them continues to be tense and unresolved. 
 
On this issue, some authors, Acuto amongst them, and international organisations have 
called for cities to be given a seat at the UN system where they can actively participate in 
the decision-making process in relevant topics around the global urban agenda. This is, 
in fact, the only debate that has so far engaged with the interface between the State and 
the city. Now, even though this thesis only focused on the role of cities in the foreign 
policy of emerging powers, it has potential ramifications beyond this topic as cities 
become more active players in the UN system.  In other words, this study also provides 
insights into what is becoming one point of this city-State interface for wider issues, 
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particularly regarding the participation of cities in an organisation such as the UN, which 
has traditionally been the States’ domain.  
 
In turn, as cities become more important in today’s world and as global powers realign, 
it is imperative to operationalise more effectively the city-national interface. What this 
thesis has demonstrated is that it is not only about asserting the importance of cities or 
inviting them to the UN table. There are some real barriers at the domestic level that also 
need to be overcome in order to achieve a functional relationship between cities and 
States in the International System.  
 
In summation, the current power shift in the world has brought about substantial changes 
in the way States and cities interact in foreign policy, especially in emerging powers. 
However, this thesis demonstrates that these changes have not been studied in the 
academic literature. Neither the International Relations nor the Urban Studies fields have 
engaged constructively or systematically with the topic and, in turn, the questions 
brought to this study were generated through an assemblage of quite disconnected 
elements in the academic literature.  
 
This thesis demonstrated that it is possible, even from an amalgamatedly constructed 
framing of a research question, to innovate methodologically and identify an important 
unstudied domain between the fields of International Relations and Urban Studies that, 
as it is presently constructed, has considerable limits to it. Therefore, by bringing 
particular methodological and conceptual understandings to a conventional case study 
approach in order to engage with that unknown, unspecified gap between them, this 
thesis was able to discover that there is an imperfect fit, with an important mismatch 
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